The Advantage of Council

[6] There are other considerable advantages deriving from this council. The most important is that there can be no greater incentive to virtue than the general hope of attaining this office.

For it is by ambition that we are all chiefly led, as we have shown at some length in our Ethics. 13

[7] That the greater part of th is council will never be minded to wage war and will always be strongly attached and devoted to peace is beyond all doubt.

For in addition to the constant fear oflosing their property together with their freedom as a result of war, they will have to provide the extra financial resources required for war, and furthermore their children and relations, busy as they are with domestic concerns, will be forced to turn their energies to warfare and to go soldiering, whence they can never bring back home anything but unprofitable scars. Because, as we said in Section 31 of the previous Chapter, the military force must receive no pay, and, by Section 10 of the same Chapter, it must be recruited exclusively from citizens and no others.

[8] Another factor which is also of great importance in promoting peace and harmony is th is, that no citizen may own real estate (see Section 12 of the previous Chapter). Hence the danger from war is practically the same for all; all will have to make a living by engaging in trade or by lending money to their fellow citizens-assuming that, as was once the case in Athens, a law is enacted forbidding the lending of money at interest to any but native inhabitants.

So they will have to engage in commercial deal ings that either make them mutually involved one with another or that require the same means for their furtherance 14 Thus the greatest part of the council will generally have one and the same attitude of mind towards their common interests and peaceful activities; for, as we said in Section 4 of this Chapter, every man upholds another’s cause only so far as he believes his own position to be strengthened thereby.

[9] It will never occur to anyone to bribe this council.

For if someone should win over one or two out of so many men, he is hardly likely to gain anything from it. This is because an opinion supported by less than 100 votes is void.

[1O] When this council is once established, it will not be possible to reduce the number of its members, as we shall see if we take into consideration the common passions of mankind. For all men are chiefly led by ambition, and there is no man of sound physical health who does not hope to live to a good old age.

If, then, we calculate the number of those who actually attain their fiftieth or sixtieth year, and if we also take into account the large number of th is council who are appointed every year, we shall see that there can hardly be anyone of those who bear arms who is not possessed of high hopes of rising to this lofty position.

So all will uphold, to the best of their ability, this law concerning election to the council.

For it should be noted that corruption, unless it creeps in unobtrusively, is easily prevented. However, a reduction in the number appointed from each single clan is more easily envisaged and would be less invidious than such a reduction in the case of a few clans or the complete exclusion of one or two clans.

Therefore (by Section 15 of the previous Chapter) the number of counsellors cannot be reduced unless a third, or fourth, or fifth part is removed simultaneously, which represents a considerable upheaval and is therefore altogether divorced from common practice. Nor is there any reason to fear delay or negligence in making appointments, since provision is made for this procedure by the council itself.

See Section 16 of the previous Chapter.

[11] The king, then, whether motivated by fear of the people or by his desire to win over the greater part of an armed populace, or whether he is led by nobility of spirit to have regard to the public interest, will always ratify the opinion that is supported by most votes- Leo (by Section 5 of this Chapter), that is of greater advantage to the greater part of the state; or else he will try, if possible, to reconcile the differing opinions submitted to h im so as to gain popularity with all (wherein he will spare no effort) 15 and to show them whata prize they have in his single self, both in peace and in war. Thus he will be most fully in control of his own right and most fully sovereign when he has most regard for the general welfare of his people.

[12] For the king by himself cannot restrain all in fear; his power, as we have said, rests upon the number of his soldiers and especially on their valour and loyalty, which will always endure among men just so long as they are bound together by some need, be that need honourable or base.

Hence it comes about that kings are more prone to urge on their soldiers than to keep them in check, to gloss over their vices rather than their virtues,16 and generally, so as to exert pressure on the good, to seek out idlers and the debauched, giving them recognition, assisting them with money and influence, clasping their hands, throwing them kisses, and stooping to any form of servility as the price of despotism.

17 Therefore, to ensure that citizens should stand highest in the king’s esteem and should be in control of their own right as far as the civil order or equity permits, it is necessary that the militia be composed solely of citizens and that citizens should be his counsellors; while on the other hand citizens become completely subjugated and are laying the foundations for perpetual warfare from the moment that they allow mercenary troops to be engaged, 18 men whose trade is war and who find their greatest powerl9 amid discord and sedition.2o

[13] That the king’s counsellors should not be appointed for life, but for 3-5 years at the most. This is evident both from Section 10 and Section 9 of this Chapter.

If they were appointed for life, most of the citizens would have scarcely any hope of attaining this office. This would result in great inequality among the citizens, leading to envy and incessant murmurings and finally to outbreaks of sedition -which would no doubt be not unwelcome to kings who are eager to dominate.

In addition, the counsellors, rid of all fear of their successors, would cast off all restraint with little opposition from the king.

For the more they are hated by the citizens, the more they will cling to the king and the more ready they will be to fawn upon him.

Even a five-year term of office still appears excessive, for in this space of time it seems not altogether impossible fur a considerable part of the council, however large it may be, to be corrupted by bribes or favours.

So it will be a much safer arrangement if every year, two out of each clan retire and are replaced by a like number (assuming that each clan is to have five counsellors) except in that year when the lawyer of a clan retires and another lawyer is appointed in his place.

[ 14] Moreover, no king can promise himself greater security than one who reigns in a commonwealth of th is kind. For apart from the fact that he soon perishes whose safety is not desired by his own soldiers, it is quite certain that the greatest danger to kings is from those nearest them. So the fewer in number and consequently the more powerful the counsellors, the greater the danger to the king of their transferring the sovereignty to another. Indeed, nothing caused David more alarm than that his counsellor Achitophel had taken Absalom’s side 2l Then again, if all power22 has been transferred absolutely to one man, it is23 much simpler for it to be transferred from one man to another. Two common soldiers undertook to transfer the Roman Empire, and they succeeded (Tacitus, Histories, Book 1).24 I pass over the devices and cunning wiles which counsellors must employ to avoid falling victim to jealousy; for these are known only too well, and no reader of history can be unaware that the loyalty of counsellors has often proved their ruin. So for their own protection they have to be cunning, not loyal.

But if counsellors are too many in number to unite in the same crime and are all equal with one another, and their term of office does not exceed four years, they cannot possibly be an object of fear to the king unless he attempts to deprive them of their freedom, whereby he will offend all citizens equally 25 For (as Antonio Perez well remarks) the exercise of absolute dominion is very dangerous to the ruler, very hateful to his subjects, and opposed to the established laws both divine and human, as is shown by countless examples 26

[15] Besides these laws, in the previous Chapter we have laid down other fundamental laws which are effective in securing for the king his sovereignty and for the citizens their freedom and peace. These we shall go into in due course, for it

was my purpose first of all to explain those laws that concern the supreme council and which are of the greatest importance. I shall now go on to deal with the rest of them in the order in which I propounded them.