Monarchy: Its Organisation

The Persians used to worship their kings as gods. Yet even their kings did not have the powerl to revoke laws once established, as is evident from Daniel, Chapter 6.

No monarch has been chosen on absolute terms without any explicit conditions.

For the fundamental laws2 of the state should be regarded as the king’s eternal decrees, so that his ministers are entirely obedient in refusing to execute his orders if he commands something that is opposed to the fundamental laws of the state.

We may make this point clear with the example of Ulysses. His comrades were carrying out his own command in refusing to release him when he was bound to the ship’s mast and bewitched by the Sirens’ song,3 although he ordered them to do so with all kinds of threats.

It is regarded as a mark of his good sense that he later thanked his comrades for rendering obedience to his first intention. Following this example of Ulysses, kings too are accustomed to instruct judges to have no regard for persons in administering justice, not even for the king himself if by some odd chance he issues a command that they know to be contrary to established law.

For kings are not gods; they are but men, who are often enchanted by the Sirens’ song. So if everything were to depend on the inconstant will of one man, there would be no stability. Thus, if a monarchy is to be stable, it must be so organized that everything is indeed done only by the king’s decree- that is, that all law is the explicit will of the king-but not everything willed by the king is law. On this see Sections 3, 5, and 6 of the previous Chapter.

Next it must be noted that in laying down the fundamental laws it is especially necessary to take account of human passions. It is not enough to have shown what should be done.

The main task is to show how it can be brought about that men, whether led by passion or by reason, may still keep their laws firm and sure.

If the right of the state, or public freedom, rests only on the feeble support oflaws, not only can the citizens have no assurance of its maintenance, as we showed in

Section 3 ofthe previous Chapter, but this will even prove their ruin. For it is certa inly true that no condition of a commonwealth is more wretched than that of a good commonwealth that is beginning to totter- unless it collapses at one single blow and plunges into servitude, which seems highly unlikely.'

So it would be far better for subjects to transfer their right unconditionally to one man than to covenant for guarantees of freedom that will prove untrustworthy and vain, or futile, and thus prepare a path to cruel servitude for later generations.

But if show that the foundations of monarchy as I have described them in the previous Chapter are strong and cannot be dismantled without arousing the indignation of the greater part of an armed people and that from them there follow peace and security for king and people, and if ! deduce th is from a general consideration ofhuman nature, no one will be able to doubt that these foundations are good and true, as is evident from Section 9 of Chapter 3 and Sections 3 and 8 of the previous Chapter.

That such is their nature I shall show as briefly as possible.

[3] That it is the duty of the sovereign 5 to be acquainted with the situation and condition of the state, to watch over the common welfare of all, and to bring about that which is to the benefit of the ma jority of his subjects, is universally acknowledged. But since one man alone cannot supervise everything and be always on the alert with a mind set for deliberation, and is often prevented by illness or old age or other causes from attending to public affairs, the monarch must have counsellors who would be acqua inted with current issues and would assist the king with their advice and often act as his deputies, so that the state or commonwealth may continue in one and the same mind.

[4] But human nature is so constituted that each pursues his personal advantage with the utmost keenness, regarding as most equitable those laws which he thinks are necessary for the preservation and increase of his own fortune and upholding another’s cause only so far as he believes his own position to be strengthened thereby.

Hence it follows that counsellors must necessarily be appointed whose private fortune and advantage depend on the general welfare and the peace of all.

So it is evident that if a certain number are appointed from every group or class of citizens, a proposal which receives the most votes in this council will be in the interests of a majority of subjects.

Although this council, being composed of such a large number of citizens, must inevitably have among its members many of an uncultivated mind, it is nevertheless true that every man is reasonably competent and sagacious in matters in which he has been long and attentively engaged.

Therefore if these appointments are restricted to those who up to their fiftieth year have been engaged in their own business without disgrace, they will be well-fitted to give advice relating to their own business, especially if in matters of greater importance they are granted time for reflection.

Furthermore, it is far from true that a smaller council will not have among its members some men of this kind. On the contrary, it is largely composed of such men, since everyone there strives his best to have as colleagues dull-witted men who will look to him for guidance. In large councils there is no opportunity for this.

[5] Furthermore, it is a fact that everyone would rather rule than be ruled, “for no one willingly yields sovereignty to another;’ as Sallust says in his first speech to Caesar 7 It is therefore evident that an entire people will never transfer its right to a few men or to one man if they can reach agreement among themselves and if they do not allow the quarrels which are a common feature oflarge councils to reach the point of civil strife.

So a people freely transfers to a king only that which is absolutely beyond its capacity8 to possess, that is, a facility for settling disputes and for making rapid decisions.

As for the not infrequent practice of appointing a king for the purpose of making war, on the grounds that kings are much more successful at waging war, it is downright folly for men, in order to wage war with greater success, to choose slavery in time of peace- if indeed there is really peace in the sort of state where, simply for the purpose of making war,9 sovereignty has been conferred on one man, who is therefore best able in war to display his worth and his unique value to them all. to On the other hand, the outstanding feature of a democracy is that its excellence is much more manifest in peace than in war.

But whatever be the reason for appointing a king, he cannot, as we have already said,” all alone know what is beneficial to the state; for this purpose he must have a number of citizens as counsellors, as we have shown in the previous Section.

And as it is quite inconceivable that in a matter of policy there can be anything that has escaped the attention of such a large body of men, it follows that there can be no opinion conducive to the people’s welfare that is not included among those submitted to the king by this council.

Thus, since the people’s welfare is the highest law, or the king’s supreme right, it follows that the king’s right is to choose one of the opinions advanced in council and not to make any decree or give any judgment contrary to the view of the entire council (see Section 25 of the previous Chapter). However, if all the opinions advanced in council had to be submitted to the king. it is possible that the king would always favour the small cities which have fewer votes. ‘2

For although the council’s regulations should require that opinions be submitted to the king with no indication of their sponsors, it will never be possible to take such strict precau lions that none will be divulged. There. fore there must necessarily be this provision, that an opinion supported by less than a hundred votes should be regarded as void; and this is a law which the larger cities will have to uphold with all their might.