The Advantage of Council

[16] The citizens are that much more powerful and therefore more fully in control of their own right as their cities are larger and better fortified.

For the safer their dwelling place, the more capable they are of safeguarding their freedom, that is, the less they need fear an enemy, without or within; and it is an assured fact that the wealthier men become, the more natural it is for them to take measures to protect themselves.27

But those cities that stand in need of another’s power for their preservation do not have equal right with that other; they are subject to another’s right to the extent that they stand in need of the other’s power.

For we have shown in Chapter 2 that right is defined by power alone.

[17] It is also for th is same purpose-viz. that citizens may keep control over their own right and may safeguard their freedom-that the military force should be composed only of citizens, with no exemptions.

For an armed man is more fully in control of his own right than an unarmed man (see Section 12 of th is Chapter), and in giving up their arms and entrusting their cities’ defences to another, citizens are making an absolute transfer of their right to him, committing it entirely to his good faith.

A further consideration is men’s avarice, which is generally a prevailing motive; for it is impossible for mercenaries to be hired except at great expense, and citizens find very irksome the exactions needed to maintain soldiers in idleness.

The fact that no one should be appointed to command the entire military force or a great part of it except under urgent necessity and then for a year at the most is familiar to all who have read history, sacred or profane.

There is nothing that reason teaches more clearly than this; for it is obvious that the might of the state is then entrusted to one who will find opportunity enough to monopolise military glory and surpass the king in renown or to win the loyalty of the army by indulgence, generosity, and the other arls usually practised by generals whose aim is slavery for others and despotism for themselves.

Finally, for the greater security of the state I have added this provision, that these army commanders are to be chosen from the king’s counsellors or ex-counsellors, that is, from men who have reached an age when people choose the traditional and the safe in preference to the new and the perilous.28

[18] My purpose in saying that the citizens should be divided into clans and that an equal number of counsellors should be appointed from each clan was this, that the larger cities should have more counsellors proportionately to the number of their citizens and should have more voting power, as is fair.

For the power of a state, and consequently its right, must be assessed from the number of its citizens; nor do I think that any more su itable means can be devised for maintaining this equality between citizens, because29 all men are so constituted by nature that each wants to be identified with his own kind and to be distinguished by lineage from others.

[ 19] Furthermore, in a state of Nature the one thing a man cannot appropriate to himself and make his own is land30 and whatever is so fixed to the land that he cannot conceal it anywhere or carry it away where he pleases.31

Thus the land and whatever is fixed to it in the way we have described is especially the public property of the commonwealth, that is, of all those who by their united strength can claim it, or of him to whom all have delegated the power32 to claim it.33

Consequently, the land and whatever is fixed thereto must have, in the eyes of the citizens, a value as great as is their need to set their feet thereon and to be able to defend their common right or freedom. In Section 8 of this Chapter we have shown the advantages that must thereby accrue to the commonwealth.

[20] In order that the citizens should be, as far as possible, on terms of equality-a prime necessity in a commonwealth - none are to be regarded as noblemen except those of royal descent. 34 But if it were permissible for all of royal descent to marry or to have children, they would in time increase to a very large number and would become not only a burden to the king and all the citizens but very much an object of fear as well. For men who enjoy abundant leisure are prone to contemplate crime.

Hence it is mainly on account of their nobles that kings are induced to go to war because, surrounded by nobles, they find more safety and security in war than in peace.

But this being a well-known fact, I pass it by, as also my remarks in Sections 15 t0 27 of the previous Chapter. For the main points have been established in this Chapter, and the rest are self-evident.

[21] The following points are also universally accepted: That the number of the judges should be too great to allow of a considerable part of them being bribed by a private individual; that they should not vote openly but by secret ballot; and that they deserve to be paid for their services. But it is the general custom to pay them an annual salary, with the result that they are in no great hurry to settle law suits and disputes frequently reach no end.

Again, in cases where confiscated goods fall to the crown, it is not always justice or truth that are the main considerations, but the extent of a man’s wealth. Informers are everywhere, and the wealthy are seized as prey.

These evils, grievous and intolerable as they are, are excused on the grounds of the urgency of war but are continued even in time of

30 [ThlS passage summanzes nicely the dlSl:mchon between Spinoza’s ‘state of Nature’ ($latus naturalis) and Locke’s ’natural state’ A central role of the social contract ID Locke is the mamtenance and preservation of property fights which preexist the contract. For Spmoza, property Itself IS a creation of Civil society.]

peace.35 Still, the avarice of judges, those that are appointed for two or three years at the most, is kept in bounds by fear of their successors, not to mention again that the judges cannot own real estate; and to make a profit they must lend money to their fellow citizens. Thus they are compelled to have regard for the interests of their fellow citizens rather than to victimise them, particularly if there are a large number of judges, as we have said.

[22] But the military force, as we have said, is to be assigned no pay,36 freedom being the supreme reward for military service. In a state of Nature it is simply for freedom’s sake that each strives his best to defend himself, and he expects no other reward for his valour in war but his independence. Now in a civil order the citizens as a body are to be considered as a man in a state of Nature; so in fighting on behalf of that civil order they are all battling for themselves and serving themselves. But counsellors, judges, magistrates, etc. are serving others rather than themselves, and it is therefore right that they should be paid for their service.

Moreover, in time of war there can be no nobler or more powerful incentive to victory than the idea of freedom. But if, on the other hand, only a portion of the citizens were to be detailed for military service-for which reason they must also be assigned some fixed pay-the king will necessarily distinguish these above the rest (as we have shown in Section 12 of this Chapter).

Yet these are men skilled only in the arts of war, and in peace time, having too little to do, they become debauched and in the end are driven by poverty to think of nothing but rapine, civil discord, and war. 37

Thus we can assert that a monarchy of this kind is really a state of war; it is only the soldiers who enjoy freedom, the rest being slaves.

[23] Those who are near kinsmen to the king should be:

• at some distance from him and
• engaged in matters not of war but of peace, so as to bring honour to them and tranquillity to the state.

Yet not even this has been deemed a sufficient precaution by TUrkish despots who therefore regard it as an obl igation to slaughter all their brothers.

Nor is this surprising; for the more absolutely sovereignty has been transferred to one man, the more easily it can be transferred from one to another (as we have illustrated by an example in Section 14 of th is Chapter).

But in the case of a monarchy such as we are here describing-that is, one in which there is no mercenary soldiery- there can be no doubt that the measures we have proposed will be a sufficient provision for the king’s safety.

[24] Nor can anyone call into question the measures we proposed in Sections 34 and 35 of the previous Chapter. And that the king should not marry a foreigner is easily proved. For apart from the fact that two commonwealths, even when united by treaty, remain in a state of hostility (Section 14, Chapter 3), it is of the utmost importance to see to it that the king’s domestic concerns do not lead to war.

Since quarrels and disputes are especially likely to arise from an alliance based on marriage, and since questions at issue between two commonwealths are generally decided by right of war, it follows that it is fatal for a state to enter into so close an alliance with another state. Of this we have a deadly example in Scripture.

On the death of Solomon, who had married the daughter of the king of Egypt, his son Rehoboam waged a disastrous war against Shishak, king of Egypt, by whom he was utterly defeated.38 Aga in, the marriage of Louis XIV, king of France, with the daughter of Philip IV sowed the seeds of another war.39 And besides these, history provides numerous examples.