Propositions 29-32

29. We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall shrink from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from.

Proof: From the fact of imagining, that men love or hate anything, we shall love or hate the same thing (3.27.).

That is (3.13. note), from this mere fact we shall feel pleasure or pain at the thing’s presence.

And so we shall endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard with pleasure, etc. Q.E.D.

Note: This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone, solely in order to please men, we call ambition, especially when we so eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that we do or omit certain things to our own or another’s hurt.

In other cases it is generally called kindliness.

I call:

• “praise” the pleasure that we get from the action of another that pleases us
• “blame” the pain that we get from the action of another that we are averse to

30. If anyone has done something which he conceives as affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause.

In other words, he will regard himself with pleasure. On the other hand, if he has done anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully, he will regard himself with pain.

Proof: He who conceives, that he affects others with pleasure or pain, will, by that very fact, himself be affected with pleasure or pain (3.27).

But, as a man (2.19 and 2.23) is conscious of himself through the modifications whereby he is determined to action, it follows that he who conceives, that he affects others pleasurably, will be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause.

In other words, he will regard himself with pleasure.

And so mutatis mutandis in the case of pain. Q.E.D.

Note: Love (3.13) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

Hatred is pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

The pleasure and pain in question will be a species of love and hatred.

But ’love’ and ‘hatred’ refer to external objects.

We will use other names for the emotions now under discussion.

I call:

• “Honour” the Pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause.
• “Shame” the emotion contrary to honour

A man is being praised or blamed when pleasure or pain arises from a man’s belief.

Otherwise, pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause is called “self-complacency”.

• Its contrary pain is called “repentance”.

The pleasure, which a man conceives that he affects others, (2.17 Coroll.) might exist solely in his own imagination.

• He might feel pleasure imagining that everyone thinks of him in the way that pleases him (3.25)

A vain man might:

• be proud
• imagine that he is pleasing to all, when in reality he may be an annoyance to all.

31. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates anything which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love, etc.

On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks from something that we love, we shall undergo vacillations of soul.

Proof: This is from the mere fact of conceiving that anyone loves anything we shall ourselves love that thing (3.27).

But we are assumed to love it already.

There is, therefore, a new cause of love, whereby our former emotion is fostered; hence we shall thereupon love it more steadfastly.

From the mere fact of conceiving that anyone shrinks from anything, we shall ourselves shrink from that thing (3.27).

If we assume that we at the same time love it, we shall then simultaneously love it and shrink from it.

In other words, we shall be subject to vacillation (3.17 note). Q.E.D.

Corollary

From 3.31 and 3.28 it follows that everyone endeavours others, as far as possible:

• to love what he himself loves
• to hate what he himself hates

32. If we conceive that anyone takes delight in something, which only one person can possess, we shall endeavour to bring it about that the man in question shall not gain possession thereof.

Proof: From the mere fact of our conceiving that another person takes delight in a thing (3.27 and Coroll.) we shall ourselves love that thing and desire to take delight therein.

But we assumed that the pleasure in question would be prevented by another’s delight in its object; we shall, therefore, endeavour to prevent his possession thereof (3.28). Q.E.D.

Note: Thus a man takes pity on those who fare ill, and envies those who fare well with an amount of hatred proportioned to his own love for the goods in their possession.

It follows that men are merciful, it follows also that they are envious and ambitious.

This is especially true to the first years of our life such as in children whose bodies are continually in equilibrium.

They laugh or cry simply because they see others laughing or crying.

They desire to:

• imitate whatever they see others doing
• possess themselves of whatever they conceive as delighting others inasmuch as the images of things are, as we have said, modifications of the human body, or modes wherein the human body is affected and disposed by external causes to act in this or that manner.