Propositions 15 to 24

25. We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves and what we love, everything that we can conceive to affect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object.

On the contrary, we endeavour to negative everything, which we conceive to affect painfully ourselves or the loved object.

Proof: That which we conceive to affect an object of our love pleasurably or painfully affects us also pleasurably or painfully (3.21.).

But the mind (3.12.) endeavours, as far as possible, to conceive those things which affect us pleasurably.

In other words (2.17. and Coroll.), it endeavours to regard them as present.

Contrariwise (3.13.), it endeavours to exclude the existence of such things as affect us painfully.

Therefore, we endeavour to affirm concerning ourselves, and concerning the loved object, whatever we conceive to affect ourselves, or the love object pleasurably. Q.E.D.

26. We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully.

Contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything which we conceive to affect it pleasurably.

Proof: This proposition follows from 3.23 as the foregoing proposition followed from 3.21.

Note: A man might easily think:

• too highly of himself, or a loved object
• too meanly of a hated object

Pride is a feeling of a person who thinks too highly of himself.

• It is a species of madness wherein a man dreams with his eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things that fall within the scope of his conception.

He sees his accomplishments as real.

He exults in them as long as he:

• is unable to conceive anything which excludes their existence, and
• determines his own power of action

Therefore, pride is pleasure springing from a man thinking too highly of himself.

The pleasure which arises from a man thinking too highly of another is called over-esteem.

Whereas the pleasure which arises from thinking too little of a man is called disdain.

27. By the very fact that we conceive a thing which is like ourselves and which we have not regarded with any emotion to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like emotion.

Proof: The images of things are modifications of the human body, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to us (2.17).

In other words (2.10.), whereof the ideas involve the nature of our body, and, at the same time, the nature of the external bodies as present.

If, therefore, the nature of the external body be similar to the nature of our body, then the idea which we form of the external body will involve a modification of our own body similar to the modification of the external body.

Consequently, if we conceive anyone similar to ourselves as affected by any emotion, this conception will express a modification of our body similar to that emotion.

Thus, from the fact of conceiving a thing like ourselves to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like emotion.

If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we shall, to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not similar, emotion. Q.E.D.

Note 1: This imitation of emotions, when it is referred to pain, is called compassion (cf. 3.22. note)

When it is referred to desire, it is called emulation, which is nothing else but the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact that we conceive that others have the like desire.

Corollary 1

If we conceive that anyone, whom we have hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects something similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love towards him.

If, on the other hand, we conceive that he painfully affects the same, we shall be affected with hatred towards him.

Proof: This is proven from the last proposition in the same manner as 3.22. is proved from 3.21.

Corollary 2

We cannot hate a thing which we pity, because its misery affects us painfully.

Proof: If we could hate it for this reason, we should rejoice in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.

Corollary 3

We seek to free from misery, as far as we can, a thing which we pity.

Proof: That which painfully affects the object of our pity, affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing proposition).

Therefore, we shall endeavour to recall everything which removes its existence, or which destroys it (cf. 3.13.).

In other words (3.9. note), we shall want to destroy it.

Thus, we shall endeavour to free from misery a thing which we pity. Q.E.D.

Note 2: This will or appetite for doing good, which arises from pity of the thing whereon we would confer a benefit, is called benevolence, and is nothing else but desire arising from compassion.

Concerning love or hate towards him who has done good or harm to something, which we conceive to be like ourselves, see 3.22. note.

28. We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive to conduce to pleasure.

But we endeavour to remove or destroy whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or to conduce to pain.

Proof: We endeavour, as far as possible, to conceive that which we imagine to conduce to pleasure (3.12.).

In other words (2.17.) we shall endeavour to conceive it as far as possible as present or actually existing.

But the endeavour of the mind, or the mind’s power of thought, is equal to, and simultaneous with, the endeavour of the body, or the body’s power of action.

(This is clear from 2.7. Coroll. and 2.11. Coroll.).

Therefore we make an absolute endeavour for its existence, in other words (which by 3.9. note, come to the same thing) we desire and strive for it; this was our first point.

Again, if we conceive that something, which we believed to be the cause of pain, that is (3.13. note), which we hate, is destroyed, we shall rejoice (3.20.).

We shall, therefore (by the first part of this proof), endeavour to destroy the same, or (3.13.) to remove it from us, so that we may not regard it as present.

This was our second point. Wherefore whatsoever conduces to pleasure, &c. Q.E.D. –>