Propositions 58

58. Honour (gloria) is not repugnant to reason, but may arise therefrom.

Note: Empty honour, as it is styled, is self-approval, fostered only by the good opinion of the populace.

When this good opinion ceases there ceases also the self-approval, in other words, the highest object of each man’s love (4.52. note).

Consequently, he whose honour is rooted in popular approval must, day by day, anxiously strive, act, and scheme in order to retain his reputation.

For the populace is variable and inconstant, so that, if a reputation be not kept up, it quickly withers away.

Everyone wishes to catch popular applause for himself, and readily represses the fame of others.

The object of the strife being estimated as the greatest of all goods, each combatant is seized with a fierce desire to put down his rivals in every possible way, until he who at last comes out victorious is more proud of having done harm to others than of having done good to himself.

This sort of honour, then, is really empty, being nothing.

The points to note concerning shame may easily be inferred from what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance.

I will only add that shame, like compassion, though not a virtue, is yet good, in so far as it shows, that the feeler of shame is really imbued with the desire to live honourably.

In the same way as suffering is good, as showing that the injured part is not mortified.

Therefore, though a man who feels shame is sorrowful, he is yet more perfect than he, who is shameless, and has no desire to live honourably.

Such are the points which I undertook to remark upon concerning the emotions of pleasure and pain; as for the desires, they are good or bad according as they spring from good or evil emotions.

But all, in so far as they are engendered in us by emotions wherein the mind is passive, are blind (as is evident from what was said in 4.44. note), and would be useless, if men could easily, be induced to live by the guidance of reason only, as I will now briefly, show

59. To all the actions, whereto we are determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive; we can be determined without emotion by reason

Note: An example will put this point in a clearer light.

The action of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and in so far as we merely look to the fact that a man raises his arm, clenches his fist, and moves his whole arm violently downwards, is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as proper to the structure of the human body.

If, then, a man, moved by anger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm, this result takes place (as we showed in Pt. 2), because one and the same action can be associated with various mental images of things.

Therefore we may be determined to the performance of one and the same action by confused ideas, or by clear and distinct ideas.

Hence it is evident that every desire which springs from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, would become useless, if men could be guided by reason.

Let us now see why desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, is called by us blind.

60. Desire arising from a pleasure or pain, that is not attributable to the whole body, but only to one or certain parts thereof, is without utility in respect to a man as a whole.

Proof.—Let it be assumed, for instance, that A, a part of a body, is so strengthened by some external cause, that it prevails over the remaining parts (IV. vi.). This part will not endeavour to do away with its own powers, in order that the other parts of the body may perform its office; for this it would be necessary for it to have a force or power of doing away with its own powers, which (III. vi.) is absurd. The said part, and, consequently, the mind also, will endeavour to preserve its condition. Wherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kind aforesaid has no utility in reference to a man as a whole. If it be assumed, on the other hand, that the part, A, be checked so that the remaining parts prevail, it may be proved in the same manner that desire arising from pain has no utility in respect to a man as a whole. Q.E.D.

Note: As pleasure is generally (4.44. note) attributed to one part of the body, we generally desire to preserve our being with out taking into consideration our health as a whole, to which it may be added, that the desires which have most hold over us (4.9) take account of the present and not of the future.

61. Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive.

62. In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the dictates of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea be of a thing future, past, or present.

Note: If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the duration of things, and could determine by reason their periods of existence, we should contemplate things future with the same emotion as things present and the mind would desire as though it were present the good which it conceived as future; Consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser good in the present for the sake of a greater good in the future, and would in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source of evil in the future, as we shall presently show.

However, we can have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things (2.31.) and the periods of their existence (2.44. note.) we can only determine by imagination, which is not so powerfully affected by the future as by the present.

Hence such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is merely abstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order of things and the connection of causes, with a view to determining what is good or bad for us in the present, is rather imaginary than real.

Therefore it is nothing wonderful, if the desire arising from such knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it looks on into the future, be more readily checked than the desire of things which are agreeable at the present time

63. He who is led by fear, and does good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason.

Proof: All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as active, or in other words to reason, are emotions of pleasure and desire (3.59).

Therefore, he who is led by fear, and does good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason.

Note: Superstitions persons, who know better how to rail at vice than how to teach virtue, and who strive not to guide men by reason, but so to restrain them that they would rather escape evil than love virtue, have no other aim but to make others as wretched as themselves; wherefore it is nothing wonderful, if they be generally troublesome and odious to their fellow-men.

Corollary: Under desire which springs from reason, we seek good directly, and shun evil indirectly.

Proof: Desire which springs from reason can only spring from a pleasurable emotion, wherein the mind is not passive (3.59), in other words, from a pleasure which cannot be excessive (4.61.), and not from pain.

Wherefore this desire springs from the knowledge of good, not of evil (4.8).

Hence under the guidance of reason we seek good directly and only by implication shun evil. Q.E.D.

Note: This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of a sick and a healthy man.

The sick man through fear of death eats what he naturally shrinks from, but the healthy man takes pleasure in his food, and thus gets a better enjoyment out of life, than if he were in fear of death, and desired directly to avoid it.

So a judge, who condemns a criminal to death, not from hatred or anger but from love of the public well—being, is guided solely by reason.

64. The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge.

Proof: The knowledge of evil (4.8) is pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof.

Pain is the transition to a lesser perfection (Def. of the Emotions, 3) and therefore cannot be understood through man’s nature (3.6. and 3.7).

Therefore it is a passive state (3. Def. 2) which (3.3.) depends on inadequate ideas.

Consequently, the knowledge thereof (2.29), namely, the knowledge of evil, is inadequate. Q.E.D.

Corollary: It follows that, if the human mind possessed only adequate ideas, it would form no conception of evil. Proposition 65. Under the guidance of reason we should pursue the greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils.

Proof: A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good is in reality an evil.

For we apply the terms good and bad to things, in so far as we compare them one with another (see preface to this Part).

Therefore, evil is in reality a lesser good.

Hence under the guidance of reason we seek or pursue only the greater good and the lesser evil. Q.E.D.

Corollary: We may, under the guidance of reason, pursue the lesser evil as though it were the greater good, and we may shun the lesser good, which would be the cause of the greater evil.

For the evil, which is here called the lesser, is really good, and the lesser good is really evil, wherefore we may seek the former and shun the latter. Q.E.D. –>