Propositions 43-52

43. Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can on the other hand be destroyed by love

Proof: He who conceives, that an object of his hatred hates him in return, will thereupon feel a new hatred, while the former hatred (by hypothesis) still remains (3.40).

But if, on the other hand, he conceives that the object of hate loves him, he will to this extent (3.38) regard himself with pleasure, and (3.29) will endeavour to please the cause of his emotion.

In other words, he will endeavour not to hate him (3.41), and not to affect him painfully; this endeavour (3.37) will be greater or less in proportion to the emotion from which it arises.

Therefore, if it be greater than that which arises from hatred, and through which the man endeavours to affect painfully the thing which he hates, it will get the better of it and banish the hatred from his mind. Q.E.D.

44. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes into love= and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not preceded it.

Proof: The proof proceeds in the same way as Prop. 38 of this Part= for he who begins to love a thing, which he was wont to hate or regard with pain, from the very fact of loving feels pleasure.

To this pleasure involved in love is added the pleasure arising from aid given to the endeavour to remove the pain involved in hatred (3.37), accompanied by the idea of the former object of hatred as cause.

Note: Though this be so, no one will endeavour to hate anything, or to be affected with pain, for the sake of enjoying this greater pleasure.

That is, no one will desire that he should be injured, in the hope of recovering from the injury, nor long to be ill for the sake of getting well.

For everyone will always endeavour to persist in his being, and to ward off pain as far as he can.

If the contrary is conceivable, namely, that a man should desire to hate someone, in order that he might love him the more thereafter, he will always desire to hate him.

For the strength of love is in proportion to the strength of the hatred, wherefore the man would desire, that the hatred be continually increased more and more, and, for a similar reason, he would desire to become more and more ill, in order that he might take a greater pleasure in being restored to health= in such a case he would always endeavour to be ill, which (3.6) is absurd.

45. If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself hates anything also similar to himself, which he loves, he will hate that person.

Proof: The beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towards him who hates it (3.40).

Therefore the lover, in conceiving that anyone hates the beloved object, conceives the beloved thing as affected by hatred, in other words (3.13), by pain.

Consequently he is himself affected by pain accompanied by the idea of the hater of the beloved thing as cause; that is, he will hate him who hates anything which he himself loves (3.13 note). Q.E.D.

46. If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully by anyone, of a class or nation different from his own, and if the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said stranger as cause, under the general category of the class or nation.

The man will feel love or hatred, not only to the individual stranger, but also to the whole class or nation whereto he belongs.

Proof: This is evident from 3.16

47. Joy arising from the fact, that anything we hate is destroyed, or suffers other injury, is never unaccompanied by a certain pain in us.

Proof: This is evident from 3.27 For in so far as we conceive a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain, we ourselves feel pain.

Note: This proposition can also be proved from the Corollary to 2.17.

Whenever we remember anything, even if it does not actually exist, we regard it only as present, and the body is affected in the same manner.

Wherefore, in so far as the remembrance of the thing is strong, a man is determined to regard it with pain; this determination, while the image of the thing in question lasts, is checked by the remembrance of other things excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing, but is not destroyed.

Hence, a man only feels pleasure in so far as the said determination is checked.

This is why the joy arising from the injury done to what we hate is repeated, every time we remember that object of hatred.

For, as we have said, when the image of the thing in question, is aroused, inasmuch as it involves the thing’s existence, it determines the man to regard the thing with the same pain as he was wont to do, when it actually did exist.

However, since he has joined to the image of the thing other images, which exclude its existence, this determination to pain is forthwith checked, and the man rejoices afresh as often as the repetition takes place.

This is the cause of men’s pleasure in recalling past evils, and delight in narrating dangers from which they have escaped.

For when men conceive a danger, they conceive it as still future, and are determined to fear it.

This determination is checked afresh by the idea of freedom, which became associated with the idea of the danger when they escaped therefrom.

This renders them secure afresh.

Therefore, they rejoice afresh.

48. Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is destroyed, if the pleasure involved in the former, or the pain involved in the latter emotion, be associated with the idea of another cause and will be diminished in proportion as we conceive Peter not to have been the sole cause of either emotion.

Proof: This Proposition is evident from the mere definition of love and hatred (3.13 note).

For pleasure is called love towards Peter, and pain is called hatred towards Peter, simply in so far as Peter is regarded as the cause of one emotion or the other. When this condition of causality is either wholly or partly removed, the emotion towards Peter also wholly or in part vanishes. Q.E.D.

49. Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive to be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than if it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity.

Proof: A thing which we conceive as free must (1. Def. 7) be perceived through itself without anything else.

If, therefore, we conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain, we shall therefore (3.13 note) love it or hate it, and shall do so with the utmost love or hatred that can arise from the given emotion.

But if the thing which causes the emotion be conceived as acting by necessity, we shall then (by the same Def. 7, Part 1) conceive it not as the sole cause, but as one of the causes of the emotion, and therefore our love or hatred towards it will be less. Q.E.D.

Note: It follows that men, thinking themselves to be free, feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards anything else= to this consideration we must add the imitation of emotions treated of in 3.27, 3.34, 3.40 and 3.43.

50. Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope or fear.

Proof: This proposition is proved in the same way as 3.15, which see, together with the note to 3.18. Note= Things which are accidentally the causes of hope or fear are called good or evil omens.

Now, in so far as such omens are the cause of hope or fear, they are (by the definitions of hope and fear given in 3.18 note) the causes also of pleasure and pain;

Consequently we, to this extent, regard them with love or hatred, and endeavour either to invoke them as means towards that which we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles, or causes of that which we fear.

It follows, further, from 3.25, that we are naturally so constituted as to believe readily in that which we hope for, and with difficulty in that which we fear; moreover, we are apt to estimate such objects above or below their true value.

Hence there have arisen superstitions, whereby men are everywhere assailed.

However, I do not think it worth while to point out here the vacillations springing from hope and fear.

It follows from the definition of these emotions, that there can be no hope without fear, and no fear without hope, as I will duly explain in the proper place.

Further, in so far as we hope for or fear anything, we regard it with love or hatred; thus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fear what we have said concerning love and hatred.

51. Different men may be differently affected by the same object, and the same man may be differently affected at different times by the same object.

Proof: The human body is affected by external bodies in a variety of ways (2. Post. 3).

Two men may therefore be differently affected at the same time, and therefore (by Ax. 1 after Lemma 3 after 2.13) may be differently affected by one and the same object.

Further (by the same Post.) the human body can be affected sometimes in one way, sometimes in another.

Consequently (by the same Axiom) it may be differently affected at different times by one and the same object. Q.E.D.

Note: We thus see that it is possible, that what one man loves another may hate, and that what one man fears another may not fear; or, again, that one and the same man may love what he once hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on.

Again, as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good, what bad, what better, and what worse (3.39. note), it follows that men’s judgments may vary no less than their emotions[10],

Hence when we compare some with others, we distinguish them solely by the diversity of their emotions, and style some intrepid, others timid, others by some other epithet.

For instance, I shall call a man intrepid, if he despises an evil which I am accustomed to fear;

If I further take into consideration, that, in his desire to injure his enemies and to benefit those whom he loves, he is not restrained by the fear of an evil which is sufficient to restrain me, I shall call him daring.

Again, a man will appear timid to me, if he fears an evil which I am accustomed to despise; and if I further take into consideration that his desire is restrained by the fear of an evil, which is not sufficient to restrain me, I shall say that he is cowardly; and in like manner will everyone pass judgment.

[10] This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine intellect, as I have shown in 2.13 note.

Lastly, a man may be affected with pleasure at one time and with pain at another time, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause.

This arises from:

• the inconstancy of human judgment and,
  • Man often judges things solely by his emotions.
• the fact that things that cause of pleasure or pain are often purely imaginary.

This does not include the uncertainty of things alluded to in 3.28

Thus, we can easily understand what are Repentance and Self-complacency.

Repentance is pain, while self-complacency is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of one’s self as cause.

These emotions are most intense because men believe themselves to be free (3.49). –>

52. An object which we have formerly seen in conjunction with others, and which we do not conceive to have any property that is not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so long, as an object which we conceive to have some property peculiar to itself.

Proof: As soon as we conceive an object which we have seen in conjunction with others, we at once remember those others (2.28 and note).

Thus we pass forthwith from the contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another object.

This is the case with the object, which we conceive to have no property that is not common to many.

For we thereupon assume that we are regarding therein nothing, which we have not before seen in conjunction with other objects.

But when we suppose that we conceive an object something special, which we have never seen before, we must needs say that the mind, while regarding that object, has in itself nothing which it can fall to regarding instead thereof;

Therefore it is determined to the contemplation of that object only. Therefore an object, etc. Q.E.D.

Note: Wonder is the mental modification, or imagination of a particular thing.

Consternation is this imagination excited by fear.

Wonder at an evil keeps a man so engrossed in its simple contemplation, that he cannot think of anything else to avoid the evil.

Veneration is wonder towards a person’s prudence, industry, or anything of that sort, as that person is thereby regarded as far surpassing ourselves.

Otherwise, wonder at a man’s anger, envy, etc., is called Horror.

Devotion is wonder joined to veneration, when we . Again, if it be the prudence, industry, or what not, of a man we love, that we wonder at, our love will on this account be the greater (3.12), and when joined to wonder or veneration is called .

We may in like manner conceive hatred, hope, confidence, and the other emotions, as associated with wonder.

We should thus be able to deduce more emotions than those which have obtained names in ordinary speech.

Whence it is evident, that the names of the emotions have been applied in accordance rather with their ordinary manifestations than with an accurate knowledge of their nature.

To wonder is opposed Contempt, which generally arises from the fact that, because we see someone wondering at, loving, or fearing something, or because something, at first sight, appears to be like things, which we ourselves wonder at, love, fear, etc., we are, in consequence (3.15 Coroll. and 3.27), determined to wonder at, love, or fear that thing.

But if from the presence, or more accurate contemplation of the said thing, we are compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause of wonder, love, fear, etc., the mind then, by the presence of the thing, remains determined to think rather of those qualities which are not in it, than of those which are in it; whereas, on the other hand, the presence of the object would cause it more particularly to regard that which is therein.

As devotion springs from wonder at a thing which we love, so does Derision spring from contempt of a thing which we hate or fear, and Scorn from contempt of folly, as veneration from wonder at prudence.

Lastly, we can conceive the emotions of love, hope, honour, etc., in association with contempt, and can thence deduce other emotions, which are not distinguished one from another by any recognized name.