The Nature of Imagination

We have thus removed the common cause of error.

Falsehood consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas which are fragmentary and confused.

Wherefore, a false idea, as it is false, does not involve certainty.

When we say that a man acquiesces in what is false, and that he has no doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is certain.

We only say that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is false, as there are no reasons, which should cause his imagination to waver (see 2.44 note).

Thus, although the man is assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we shall never say that he is certain.

For by certainty we mean something positive (2.43 and note), not merely the absence of doubt.

To remove every scruple, I will point out some of the advantages which follow therefrom.

They will be better appreciated in Part 5.

To fully explain the foregoing proposition, I will:

• draw attention to a few additional points and
• answer the objections advanced against our doctrine.

I warn my readers to:

• accurately distinguish between:
  • an idea, or conception of the mind, and
  • the images of things which we imagine.
• distinguish between the idea and words we use to signify things.

Images, words, and ideas are by many persons either:

• entirely confused together, or
• not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care,

Hence, people are generally ignorant, how absolutely necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will, for:

• philosophic purposes and
• the wise ordering of life.

Those who think that ideas consist in images formed in us by contact with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas of those things, whereof we can form no mental picture, are not ideas, but only figments, which we invent by the free decree of our will.

They thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate pictures on a panel.

Filled with this misconception, they do not see that an idea, as an idea, involves an affirmation or negation.

Those who confuse words with ideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves, think that they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm, or deny.

This misconception will easily be laid aside by one who reflects on the nature of knowledge.

He sees that it does not involve the conception of extension.

He will therefore clearly understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does not consist in the image of anything, nor in words.

The essence of words and images is put together by bodily motions, which does not involve the conception of thought.

The objections against my doctrine

1. The will has a wider scope than the understanding, and is different from it.

They think so because they assert that:

• they do not need to increase their faculty of affirmation or negation, in order to affirm or negate an infinity of things which we do not perceive.
• they need to increase their faculty of understanding.

The will is thus distinguished from the intellect.

The will becomes finite and the intellect infinite.

2. Experience seems to teach us clearly that we can suspend our judgment before affirming or negating the things we perceive.

This is confirmed by the fact that no one is deceived, as he perceives anything, but only as he assents or dissents.

He who feigns a winged horse, does not admit that a winged horse exists.

That is, he is not deceived, unless he admits that a winged horse does exist.

Therefore, nothing seems to be taught more clearly by experience, than that the will or faculty of assent is free and different from the faculty of understanding.

3. One affirmation does not apparently contain more reality than another.

In other words, we do not seem to need for affirming, that what is true is true, any greater power than for affirming, that what is false is true.

However, we have seen that one idea has more reality or perfection than another, for as objects are some more excellent than others, so also are the ideas of them some more excellent than others.

This also seems to point to a difference between the understanding and the will.

4. If man does not act from free will, what will happen if the incentives to action are equally balanced, as in the case of Buridan’s ass?

Will he perish of hunger and thirst?

If I say that he would, I shall seem to have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of a man rather than an actual man.

If I say that he would not, he would then determine his own action, and would consequently possess the faculty of going and doing whatever he liked.

Other objections might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence everything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the task of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as possible.

Responses to Objections

1. The will has a wider scope than the understanding, if by the understanding be meant only clear and distinct ideas.

But I deny that the will has a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of forming conceptions. nor do I see why the faculty of volition should be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling.

For, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot affirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, by the same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) an infinite number of bodies.

If there is an infinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor, consequently, by any faculty of volition.

But it may still be urged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive them, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of perception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have already.

If God wished to bring it about that we should understand an infinite number of other entities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater understanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that which we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities.

The will is a universal entity or idea, whereby we explain all particular volitions.

In other words, it is common to all such volitions.

Our opponents maintain that this idea, common or universal to all volitions, is a faculty.

It is little to be wondered at that they assert that such a faculty extends itself into the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding.

For what is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of an infinite number of individuals.

To the second objection I reply by denying that we have a free power of suspending our judgment. When we say that anyone suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that he does not perceive the matter in question adequately.

Therefore, suspension of judgment is strictly speaking, a perception, and not free will.

To illustrate the point, let us suppose a boy imagines a horse and nothing else.

He will necessarily regard the horse as present since:

• this imagination involves the horse’s existence (2.17. Coroll.), and
• the boy does not perceive anything which would exclude the horse’s existence.

He will not be able to doubt of its existence, although he is not certain of it.

We have daily experience of such a state of things in dreams.

No one would maintain that while he is dreaming, he has the free power of:

• suspending his judgment on the things in his dream, and
• bringing it about that he should not dream those things he sees in his dreams.

Yet even in dreams we suspend our judgment when we dream that we are dreaming. Further, no one can be deceived, so far as actual perception extends—that is, I grant that the mind’s imaginations, regarded in themselves, do not involve error (2.17. note).

But I deny, that a man does not, in the act of perception, make any affirmation.

For what is the perception of a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings?

If the mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would regard the same as present to itself.

It cannot doubt its existence.

No faculty of dissent, unless the imagination of a winged horse is joined to an idea which precludes the existence of the said horse, or unless the mind perceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse is inadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the existence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on the subject.

I think that I have anticipated my answer to the third objection= that the will is something universal which is predicated of all ideas, and that the will only signifies that which is common to all ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose adequate essence must, therefore, as it is thus conceived in the abstract, be in every idea, and be, in this respect alone, the same in all, not in so far as it is considered as constituting the idea’s essence= for, in this respect, particular affirmations differ one from the other, as much as do ideas. For instance, the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle, differs from the affirmation which involves the idea of a triangle, as much as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle. I absolutely deny that we need an equal power of thinking to affirm that that which is true is true, and to affirm that that which is false is true. If we regard the mind, these two affirmations are in the same relation to one another as being and not—being. for there is nothing positive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality of falsehood (2.35 note, and 47 note). We must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived when we confuse= universals with singulars, and the entities of reason and abstractions with realities.

As for the fourth objection, I admit that a man placed in the equilibrium described (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst, a certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant from him) would die of hunger and thirst. If I am asked, whether such an man should be considered an ass rather than a man. I answer, that I do not know= how a man, who hangs himself, should be considered or how we should consider children, fools, madmen, etc. It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this doctrine as bearing on conduct. This may be easily gathered from what has been said. The doctrine is good. It teaches us to= act solely according to God’s decree, and partake in the Divine nature, and so much the more, as we perform more perfect actions and understand God more. Such a doctrine completely tranquilizes our spirit. It also shows us that our highest happiness or blessedness is solely in the knowledge of God, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid us. We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true estimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by God with high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, as for having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and the service of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom. 2. It teaches us how we should conduct ourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters not in our power, and do not follow from our nature. It shows us that we should await and endure fortune’s smiles or frowns with an equal mind. We see that all things follow from the eternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows from the essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two right angles. 3. This doctrine raises social life, as it teaches us to hate no man, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to be angry with any. It tells us that each should be content with his own, and helpful to his neighbour, not from any womanish pity, favour, or superstition. It should solely be by the guidance of reason, according as the time and occasion demand, as I will show in Part 3. 4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the commonwealth. It teaches how citizens should be governed and led, not to become slaves, but so that they may freely do the best things. I have thus fulfilled my promise at the beginning of this note. I have clearly explained the nature and properties of the human mind at sufficient length, considering the subject’s difficulty. I have laid a foundation which can be the basis of many excellent, useful, and essential conclusions –>