Table of Contents
In private conversation, when any universal assertion is made about generation and essence, we know that such persons are tremendous argufiers, and are able to impart their own skill to others.
Do they not profess to make men able to dispute about law and about politics in general?
THEAETETUS: Why, no one would have anything to say to them, if they did not make these professions.
THEAETETUS: I suppose that you are referring to the precepts of Protagoras about wrestling and the other arts?
Yes. The art of disputation is a power of disputing about all things
But do you suppose this possible? for perhaps your young eyes may see things which to our duller sight do not appear.
Then why has the sophistical art such a mysterious power?
How do the Sophists make young men believe in their supreme and universal wisdom? For if they neither disputed nor were thought to dispute rightly, or being thought to do so were deemed no wiser for their controversial skill, then, to quote your own observation, no one would give them money or be willing to learn their art.
But they are willing.
Yes, and the reason, as I should imagine, is that they are supposed to have knowledge of those things about which they dispute?
They dispute about all things?
Therefore, to their disciples, they appear to be all-wise. But they are not; for that was shown to be impossible.
Then the Sophist has been shown to have a sort of conjectural or apparent knowledge only of all things, which is not the truth?
THEAETETUS: Exactly; no better description of him could be given.
Let us now take an illustration, which will still more clearly explain his nature.
I will tell you, and you shall answer me, giving your very closest attention. Suppose that a person were to profess, not that he could speak or dispute, but that he knew how to make and do all things, by a single art.
I see that you do not understand the first word that I utter, for you do not understand the meaning of ‘all.’
THEAETETUS: No, I do not.
Under all things, I include you and me, and also animals and trees.
Suppose a person to say that he will make you and me, and all creatures.
THEAETETUS: What would he mean by ‘making’? He cannot be a husbandman;—for you said that he is a maker of animals.
THEAETETUS: That must be a jest.
FOREIGNER: And when a man says that he knows all things, and can teach them to another at a small cost, and in a short time, is not that a jest?
is there any more artistic or graceful form of jest than imitation?
THEAETETUS: Certainly not; and imitation is a very comprehensive term, which includes under one class the most diverse sorts of things.
He who professes by one art to make all things is really a painter, and by the painter’s art makes resemblances of real things which have the same name with them; and he can deceive the less intelligent sort of young children, to whom he shows his pictures at a distance, into the belief that he has the absolute power of making whatever he likes.
There is an imitative art of reasoning.
It is possible to enchant the hearts of young men by words poured through their ears, when they are still at a distance from the truth of facts, by exhibiting to them fictitious arguments, and making them think that they are true, and that the speaker is the wisest of men in all things.
But as time goes on, and their hearers advance in years, and come into closer contact with realities, and have learnt by sad experience to see and feel the truth of things, are not the greater part of them compelled to change many opinions which they formerly entertained, so that the great appears small to them, and the easy difficult, and all their dreamy speculations are overturned by the facts of life?
THEAETETUS: That is my view, as far as I can judge, although, at my age, I may be one of those who see things at a distance only.
THEAETETUS: But how can he, FOREIGNER? Is there any doubt, after what has been said, that he is to be located in one of the divisions of children’s play?
Then we must place him in the class of magicians and mimics.
Now our business is not to let the animal out, for we have got him in a sort of dialectical net, and there is one thing which he decidedly will not escape.
The inference that he is a juggler.
Then, clearly, we should as soon as possible to divide the image-making art, and go down into the net, and, if the Sophist does not run away from us, to seize him according to orders and deliver him over to reason, who is the lord of the hunt, and proclaim the capture of him.
If he creeps into the recesses of the imitative art, and secretes himself in one of them, to divide again and follow him up until in some sub-section of imitation he is caught. For our method of tackling each and all is one which neither he nor any other creature will ever escape in triumph.
THEAETETUS: Well said; and let us do as you propose.
Part 4
Debates and Arguments
Part 3b
The Art of Discerning or Discriminating
Leave a Comment
Thank you for your comment!
It will appear after review.