Superphysics Superphysics
Chapter 3

The Principles of Physics

by Lucien Poincaré
60 minutes  • 12679 words

§ 1. The Principles of Physics: The Principles of Mechanics affected by recent discoveries—Is mass indestructible?—Landolt and Heydweiller’s experiments —Lavoisier’s law only approximately true—Curie’s principle of symmetry. § 2. The Principle of the Conservation of Energy: Its evolution: Bernoulli, Lavoisier and Laplace, Young, Rumford, Davy, Sadi Carnot, and Robert Mayer—Mayer’s drawbacks—Error of those who would make mechanics part of energetics—Verdet’s predictions—Rankine inventor of energetics—Usefulness of Work as standard form of energy—Physicists who think matter form of energy— Objections to this—Philosophical value of conservation doctrine. § 3. The Principle of Carnot and Clausius: Originality of Carnot’s principle that fall of temperature necessary for production of work by heat— Clausius’ postulate that heat cannot pass from cold to hot body without accessory phenomena—Entropy result of this—Definition of entropy—Entropy tends to increase incessantly—A magnitude which measures evolution of system—Clausius’ and Kelvin’s deduction that heat end of all energy in Universe—Objection to this— Carnot’s principle not necessarily referable to mechanics —Brownian movements—Lippmann’s objection to kinetic hypothesis. § 4. Thermodynamics: Historical work of Massieu, Willard Gibbs, Helmholtz, and Duhem—Willard Gibbs founder of thermodynamic statics, Van t’Hoff its reviver—The Phase Law—Raveau explains it without thermodynamics. § 5. Atomism: Connection of subject with preceding Hannequin’s essay on the atomic hypothesis—Molecular physics in disfavour—Surface-tension, etc., vanishes when molecule reached—Size of molecule—Kinetic theory of gases—Willard Gibbs and Boltzmann introduce into it law of probabilities—Mean free path of gaseous molecules—Application to optics—Final division of matter.

Facts conscientiously observed lead by induction to the enunciation of a certain number of laws or general hypotheses which are the principles already referred to. These principal hypotheses are, in the eyes of a physicist, legitimate generalizations, the consequences of which we shall be able at once to check by the experiments from which they issue.

Among the principles almost universally adopted until lately figure prominently those of mechanics—such as the principle of relativity, and the principle of the equality of action and reaction. We will not detail nor discuss them here, but later on we shall have an opportunity of pointing out how recent theories on the phenomena of electricity have shaken the confidence of physicists in them and have led certain scholars to doubt their absolute value.

The principle of Lavoisier, or principle of the conservation of mass, presents itself under two different aspects according to whether mass is looked upon as the coefficient of the inertia of matter or as the factor which intervenes in the phenomena of universal attraction, and particularly in gravitation. We shall see when we treat of these theories, how we have been led to suppose that inertia depended on velocity and even on direction. If this conception were exact, the principle of the invariability of mass would naturally be destroyed. Considered as a factor of attraction, is mass really indestructible?

A few years ago such a question would have seemed singularly audacious. And yet the law of Lavoisier is so far from self-evident that for centuries it escaped the notice of physicists and chemists. But its great apparent simplicity and its high character of generality, when enunciated at the end of the eighteenth century, rapidly gave it such an authority that no one was able to any longer dispute it unless he desired the reputation of an oddity inclined to paradoxical ideas.

It is important, however, to remark that, under fallacious metaphysical appearances, we are in reality using empty words when we repeat the aphorism, “Nothing can be lost, nothing can be created,” and deduce from it the indestructibility of matter. This indestructibility, in truth, is an experimental fact, and the principle depends on experiment. It may even seem, at first sight, more singular than not that the weight of a bodily system in a given place, or the quotient of this weight by that of the standard mass—that is to say, the mass of these bodies—remains invariable, both when the temperature changes and when chemical reagents cause the original materials to disappear and to be replaced by new ones. We may certainly consider that in a chemical phenomenon annihilations and creations of matter are really produced; but the experimental law teaches us that there is compensation in certain respects.

The discovery of the radioactive bodies has, in some sort, rendered popular the speculations of physicists on the phenomena of the disaggregation of matter. We shall have to seek the exact meaning which ought to be given to the experiments on the emanation of these bodies, and to discover whether these experiments really imperil the law of Lavoisier.

For some years different experimenters have also effected many very precise measurements of the weight of divers bodies both before and after chemical reactions between these bodies. Two highly experienced and cautious physicists, Professors Landolt and Heydweiller, have not hesitated to announce the sensational result that in certain circumstances the weight is no longer the same after as before the reaction. In particular, the weight of a solution of salts of copper in water is not the exact sum of the joint weights of the salt and the water. Such experiments are evidently very delicate; they have been disputed, and they cannot be considered as sufficient for conviction. It follows nevertheless that it is no longer forbidden to regard the law of Lavoisier as only an approximate law; according to Sandford and Ray, this approximation would be about 1/2,400,000. This is also the result reached by Professor Poynting in experiments regarding the possible action of temperature on the weight of a body; and if this be really so, we may reassure ourselves, and from the point of view of practical application may continue to look upon matter as indestructible.

The principles of physics, by imposing certain conditions on phenomena, limit after a fashion the field of the possible. Among these principles is one which, notwithstanding its importance when compared with that of universally known principles, is less familiar to some people. This is the principle of symmetry, more or less conscious applications of which can, no doubt, be found in various works and even in the conceptions of Copernican astronomers, but which was generalized and clearly enunciated for the first time by the late M. Curie. This illustrious physicist pointed out the advantage of introducing into the study of physical phenomena the considerations on symmetry familiar to crystallographers; for a phenomenon to take place, it is necessary that a certain dissymmetry should previously exist in the medium in which this phenomenon occurs. A body, for instance, may be animated with a certain linear velocity or a speed of rotation; it may be compressed, or twisted; it may be placed in an electric or in a magnetic field; it may be affected by an electric current or by one of heat; it may be traversed by a ray of light either ordinary or polarized rectilineally or circularly, etc.:—in each case a certain minimum and characteristic dissymmetry is necessary at every point of the body in question.

This consideration enables us to foresee that certain phenomena which might be imagined a priori cannot exist. Thus, for instance, it is impossible that an electric field, a magnitude directed and not superposable on its image in a mirror perpendicular to its direction, could be created at right angles to the plane of symmetry of the medium; while it would be possible to create a magnetic field under the same conditions.

This consideration thus leads us to the discovery of new phenomena; but it must be understood that it cannot of itself give us absolutely precise notions as to the nature of these phenomena, nor disclose their order of magnitude.

§ 2. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE CONSERVATION OF ENERGY

Dominating not physics alone, but nearly every other science, the principle of the conservation of energy is justly considered as the grandest conquest of contemporary thought. It shows us in a powerful light the most diverse questions; it introduces order into the most varied studies; it leads to a clear and coherent interpretation of phenomena which, without it, appear to have no connexion with each other; and it supplies precise and exact numerical relations between the magnitudes which enter into these phenomena.

The boldest minds have an instinctive confidence in it, and it is the principle which has most stoutly resisted that assault which the daring of a few theorists has lately directed to the overthrow of the general principles of physics. At every new discovery, the first thought of physicists is to find out how it accords with the principle of the conservation of energy. The application of the principle, moreover, never fails to give valuable hints on the new phenomenon, and often even suggests a complementary discovery. Up till now it seems never to have received a check, even the extraordinary properties of radium not seriously contradicting it; also the general form in which it is enunciated gives it such a suppleness that it is no doubt very difficult to overthrow.

I do not claim to set forth here the complete history of this principle, but I will endeavour to show with what pains it was born, how it was kept back in its early days and then obstructed in its development by the unfavourable conditions of the surroundings in which it appeared. It first of all came, in fact, to oppose itself to the reigning theories; but, little by little, it acted on these theories, and they were modified under its pressure; then, in their turn, these theories reacted on it and changed its primitive form.

It had to be made less wide in order to fit into the classic frame, and was absorbed by mechanics; and if it thus became less general, it gained in precision what it lost in extent. When once definitely admitted and classed, as it were, in the official domain of science, it endeavoured to burst its bonds and return to a more independent and larger life. The history of this principle is similar to that of all evolutions.

It is well known that the conservation of energy was, at first, regarded from the point of view of the reciprocal transformations between heat and work, and that the principle received its first clear enunciation in the particular case of the principle of equivalence. It is, therefore, rightly considered that the scholars who were the first to doubt the material nature of caloric were the precursors of R. Mayer; their ideas, however, were the same as those of the celebrated German doctor, for they sought especially to demonstrate that heat was a mode of motion.

Without going back to early and isolated attempts like those of Daniel Bernoulli, who, in his hydrodynamics, propounded the basis of the kinetic theory of gases, or the researches of Boyle on friction, we may recall, to show how it was propounded in former times, a rather forgotten page of the Mémoire sur la Chaleur, published in 1780 by Lavoisier and Laplace: “Other physicists,” they wrote, after setting out the theory of caloric, “think that heat is nothing but the result of the insensible vibrations of matter…. In the system we are now examining, heat is the vis viva resulting from the insensible movements of the molecules of a body; it is the sum of the products of the mass of each molecule by the square of its velocity…. We shall not decide between the two preceding hypotheses; several phenomena seem to support the last mentioned—for instance, that of the heat produced by the friction of two solid bodies. But there are others which are more simply explained by the first, and perhaps they both operate at once.” Most of the physicists of that period, however, did not share the prudent doubts of Lavoisier and Laplace. They admitted, without hesitation, the first hypothesis; and, four years after the appearance of the Mémoire sur la Chaleur, Sigaud de Lafond, a professor of physics of great reputation, wrote: “Pure Fire, free from all state of combination, seems to be an assembly of particles of a simple, homogeneous, and absolutely unalterable matter, and all the properties of this element indicate that these particles are infinitely small and free, that they have no sensible cohesion, and that they are moved in every possible direction by a continual and rapid motion which is essential to them…. The extreme tenacity and the surprising mobility of its molecules are manifestly shown by the ease with which it penetrates into the most compact bodies and by its tendency to put itself in equilibrium throughout all bodies near to it.”

It must be acknowledged, however, that the idea of Lavoisier and Laplace was rather vague and even inexact on one important point. They admitted it to be evident that “all variations of heat, whether real or apparent, undergone by a bodily system when changing its state, are produced in inverse order when the system passes back to its original state.” This phrase is the very denial of equivalence where these changes of state are accompanied by external work.

Laplace, moreover, himself became later a very convinced partisan of the hypothesis of the material nature of caloric, and his immense authority, so fortunate in other respects for the development of science, was certainly in this case the cause of the retardation of progress.

The names of Young, Rumford, Davy, are often quoted among those physicists who, at the commencement of the nineteenth century, caught sight of the new truths as to the nature of heat. To these names is very properly added that of Sadi Carnot. A note found among his papers unquestionably proves that, before 1830, ideas had occurred to him from which it resulted that in producing work an equivalent amount of heat was destroyed. But the year 1842 is particularly memorable in the history of science as the year in which Jules Robert Mayer succeeded, by an entirely personal effort, in really enunciating the principle of the conservation of energy. Chemists recall with just pride that the Remarques sur les forces de la nature animée, contemptuously rejected by all the journals of physics, were received and published in the Annalen of Liebig. We ought never to forget this example, which shows with what difficulty a new idea contrary to the classic theories of the period succeeds in coming to the front; but extenuating circumstances may be urged on behalf of the physicists.

Robert Mayer had a rather insufficient mathematical education, and his Memoirs, the Remarques, as well as the ulterior publications, Mémoire sur le mouvement organique et la nutrition and the Matériaux pour la dynamique du ciel, contain, side by side with very profound ideas, evident errors in mechanics. Thus it often happens that discoveries put forward in a somewhat vague manner by adventurous minds not overburdened by the heavy baggage of scientific erudition, who audaciously press forward in advance of their time, fall into quite intelligible oblivion until rediscovered, clarified, and put into shape by slower but surer seekers. This was the case with the ideas of Mayer. They were not understood at first sight, not only on account of their originality, but also because they were couched in incorrect language.

Mayer was, however, endowed with a singular strength of thought; he expressed in a rather confused manner a principle which, for him, had a generality greater than mechanics itself, and so his discovery was in advance not only of his own time but of half the century. He may justly be considered the founder of modern energetics.

Freed from the obscurities which prevented its being clearly perceived, his idea stands out to-day in all its imposing simplicity. Yet it must be acknowledged that if it was somewhat denaturalised by those who endeavoured to adapt it to the theories of mechanics, and if it at first lost its sublime stamp of generality, it thus became firmly fixed and consolidated on a more stable basis.

The efforts of Helmholtz, Clausius, and Lord Kelvin to introduce the principle of the conservation of energy into mechanics, were far from useless. These illustrious physicists succeeded in giving a more precise form to its numerous applications; and their attempts thus contributed, by reaction, to give a fresh impulse to mechanics, and allowed it to be linked to a more general order of facts. If energetics has not been able to be included in mechanics, it seems indeed that the attempt to include mechanics in energetics was not in vain.

In the middle of the last century, the explanation of all natural phenomena seemed more and more referable to the case of central forces. Everywhere it was thought that reciprocal actions between material points could be perceived, these points being attracted or repelled by each other with an intensity depending only on their distance or their mass. If, to a system thus composed, the laws of the classical mechanics are applied, it is shown that half the sum of the product of the masses by the square of the velocities, to which is added the work which might be accomplished by the forces to which the system would be subject if it returned from its actual to its initial position, is a sum constant in quantity.

This sum, which is the mechanical energy of the system, is therefore an invariable quantity in all the states to which it may be brought by the interaction of its various parts, and the word energy well expresses a capital property of this quantity. For if two systems are connected in such a way that any change produced in the one necessarily brings about a change in the other, there can be no variation in the characteristic quantity of the second except so far as the characteristic quantity of the first itself varies—on condition, of course, that the connexions are made in such a manner as to introduce no new force. It will thus be seen that this quantity well expresses the capacity possessed by a system for modifying the state of a neighbouring system to which we may suppose it connected.

Now this theorem of pure mechanics was found wanting every time friction took place—that is to say, in all really observable cases. The more perceptible the friction, the more considerable the difference; but, in addition, a new phenomenon always appeared and heat was produced. By experiments which are now classic, it became established that the quantity of heat thus created independently of the nature of the bodies is always (provided no other phenomena intervene) proportional to the energy which has disappeared. Reciprocally, also, heat may disappear, and we always find a constant relation between the quantities of heat and work which mutually replace each other.

It is quite clear that such experiments do not prove that heat is work. We might just as well say that work is heat. It is making a gratuitous hypothesis to admit this reduction of heat to mechanism; but this hypothesis was so seductive, and so much in conformity with the desire of nearly all physicists to arrive at some sort of unity in nature, that they made it with eagerness and became unreservedly convinced that heat was an active internal force.

Their error was not in admitting this hypothesis; it was a legitimate one since it has proved very fruitful. But some of them committed the fault of forgetting that it was an hypothesis, and considered it a demonstrated truth. Moreover, they were thus brought to see in phenomena nothing but these two particular forms of energy which in their minds were easily identified with each other.

From the outset, however, it became manifest that the principle is applicable to cases where heat plays only a parasitical part. There were thus discovered, by translating the principle of equivalence, numerical relations between the magnitudes of electricity, for instance, and the magnitudes of mechanics. Heat was a sort of variable intermediary convenient for calculation, but introduced in a roundabout way and destined to disappear in the final result.

Verdet, who, in lectures which have rightly remained celebrated, defined with remarkable clearness the new theories, said, in 1862: “Electrical phenomena are always accompanied by calorific manifestations, of which the study belongs to the mechanical theory of heat. This study, moreover, will not only have the effect of making known to us interesting facts in electricity, but will throw some light on the phenomena of electricity themselves.”

The eminent professor was thus expressing the general opinion of his contemporaries, but he certainly seemed to have felt in advance that the new theory was about to penetrate more deeply into the inmost nature of things. Three years previously, Rankine also had put forth some very remarkable ideas the full meaning of which was not at first well understood. He it was who comprehended the utility of employing a more inclusive term, and invented the phrase energetics. He also endeavoured to create a new doctrine of which rational mechanics should be only a particular case; and he showed that it was possible to abandon the ideas of atoms and central forces, and to construct a more general system by substituting for the ordinary consideration of forces that of the energy which exists in all bodies, partly in an actual, partly in a potential state.

By giving more precision to the conceptions of Rankine, the physicists of the end of the nineteenth century were brought to consider that in all physical phenomena there occur apparitions and disappearances which are balanced by various energies. It is natural, however, to suppose that these equivalent apparitions and disappearances correspond to transformations and not to simultaneous creations and destructions. We thus represent energy to ourselves as taking different forms—mechanical, electrical, calorific, and chemical—capable of changing one into the other, but in such a way that the quantitative value always remains the same. In like manner a bank draft may be represented by notes, gold, silver, or bullion. The earliest known form of energy, i.e. work, will serve as the standard as gold serves as the monetary standard, and energy in all its forms will be estimated by the corresponding work. In each particular case we can strictly define and measure, by the correct application of the principle of the conservation of energy, the quantity of energy evolved under a given form.

We can thus arrange a machine comprising a body capable of evolving this energy; then we can force all the organs of this machine to complete an entirely closed cycle, with the exception of the body itself, which, however, has to return to such a state that all the variables from which this state depends resume their initial values except the particular variable to which the evolution of the energy under consideration is linked. The difference between the work thus accomplished and that which would have been obtained if this variable also had returned to its original value, is the measure of the energy evolved.

In the same way that, in the minds of mechanicians, all forces of whatever origin, which are capable of compounding with each other and of balancing each other, belong to the same category of beings, so for many physicists energy is a sort of entity which we find under various aspects. There thus exists for them a world, which comes in some way to superpose itself upon the world of matter—that is to say, the world of energy, dominated in its turn by a fundamental law similar to that of Lavoisier. [5] This conception, as we have already seen, passes the limit of experience; but others go further still. Absorbed in the contemplation of this new world, they succeed in persuading themselves that the old world of matter has no real existence and that energy is sufficient by itself to give us a complete comprehension of the Universe and of all the phenomena produced in it. They point out that all our sensations correspond to changes of energy, and that everything apparent to our senses is, in truth, energy. The famous experiment of the blows with a stick by which it was demonstrated to a sceptical philosopher that an outer world existed, only proves, in reality, the existence of energy, and not that of matter. The stick in itself is inoffensive, as Professor Ostwald remarks, and it is its vis viva, its kinetic energy, which is painful to us; while if we possessed a speed equal to its own, moving in the same direction, it would no longer exist so far as our sense of touch is concerned.

On this hypothesis, matter would only be the capacity for kinetic energy, its pretended impenetrability energy of volume, and its weight energy of position in the particular form which presents itself in universal gravitation; nay, space itself would only be known to us by the expenditure of energy necessary to penetrate it. Thus in all physical phenomena we should only have to regard the quantities of energy brought into play, and all the equations which link the phenomena to one another would have no meaning but when they apply to exchanges of energy. For energy alone can be common to all phenomena.

This extreme manner of regarding things is seductive by its originality, but appears somewhat insufficient if, after enunciating generalities, we look more closely into the question. From the philosophical point of view it may, moreover, seem difficult not to conclude, from the qualities which reveal, if you will, the varied forms of energy, that there exists a substance possessing these qualities. This energy, which resides in one region, and which transports itself from one spot to another, forcibly brings to mind, whatever view we may take of it, the idea of matter.

Helmholtz endeavoured to construct a mechanics based on the idea of energy and its conservation, but he had to invoke a second law, the principle of least action. If he thus succeeded in dispensing with the hypothesis of atoms, and in showing that the new mechanics gave us to understand the impossibility of certain movements which, according to the old, ought to have been but never were experimentally produced, he was only able to do so because the principle of least action necessary for his theory became evident in the case of those irreversible phenomena which alone really exist in Nature. The energetists have thus not succeeded in forming a thoroughly sound system, but their efforts have at all events been partly successful. Most physicists are of their opinion, that kinetic energy is only a particular variety of energy to which we have no right to wish to connect all its other forms.

If these forms showed themselves to be innumerable throughout the Universe, the principle of the conservation of energy would, in fact, lose a great part of its importance. Every time that a certain quantity of energy seemed to appear or disappear, it would always be permissible to suppose that an equivalent quantity had appeared or disappeared somewhere else under a new form; and thus the principle would in a way vanish. But the known forms of energy are fairly restricted in number, and the necessity of recognising new ones seldom makes itself felt. We shall see, however, that to explain, for instance, the paradoxical properties of radium and to re-establish concord between these properties and the principle of the conservation of energy, certain physicists have recourse to the hypothesis that radium borrows an unknown energy from the medium in which it is plunged. This hypothesis, however, is in no way necessary; and in a few other rare cases in which similar hypotheses have had to be set up, experiment has always in the long run enabled us to discover some phenomenon which had escaped the first observers and which corresponds exactly to the variation of energy first made evident.

One difficulty, however, arises from the fact that the principle ought only to be applied to an isolated system. Whether we imagine actions at a distance or believe in intermediate media, we must always recognise that there exist no bodies in the world incapable of acting on each other, and we can never affirm that some modification in the energy of a given place may not have its echo in some unknown spot afar off. This difficulty may sometimes render the value of the principle rather illusory.

Similarly, it behoves us not to receive without a certain distrust the extension by certain philosophers to the whole Universe, of a property demonstrated for those restricted systems which observation can alone reach. We know nothing of the Universe as a whole, and every generalization of this kind outruns in a singular fashion the limit of experiment.

Even reduced to the most modest proportions, the principle of the conservation of energy retains, nevertheless, a paramount importance; and it still preserves, if you will, a high philosophical value. M.J. Perrin justly points out that it gives us a form under which we are experimentally able to grasp causality, and that it teaches us that a result has to be purchased at the cost of a determined effort.

We can, in fact, with M. Perrin and M. Langevin, represent this in a way which puts this characteristic in evidence by enunciating it as follows: “If at the cost of a change C we can obtain a change K, there will never be acquired at the same cost, whatever the mechanism employed, first the change K and in addition some other change, unless this latter be one that is otherwise known to cost nothing to produce or to destroy.” If, for instance, the fall of a weight can be accompanied, without anything else being produced, by another transformation—the melting of a certain mass of ice, for example—it will be impossible, no matter how you set about it or whatever the mechanism used, to associate this same transformation with the melting of another weight of ice.

We can thus, in the transformation in question, obtain an appropriate number which will sum up that which may be expected from the external effect, and can give, so to speak, the price at which this transformation is bought, measure its invariable value by a common measure (for instance, the melting of the ice), and, without any ambiguity, define the energy lost during the transformation as proportional to the mass of ice which can be associated with it. This measure is, moreover, independent of the particular phenomenon taken as the common measure.

§ 3. THE PRINCIPLE OF CARNOT AND CLAUSIUS

The principle of Carnot, of a nature analogous to the principle of the conservation of energy, has also a similar origin. It was first enunciated, like the last named, although prior to it in time, in consequence of considerations which deal only with heat and mechanical work. Like it, too, it has evolved, grown, and invaded the entire domain of physics. It may be interesting to examine rapidly the various phases of this evolution. The origin of the principle of Carnot is clearly determined, and it is very rare to be able to go back thus certainly to the source of a discovery. Sadi Carnot had, truth to say, no precursor. In his time heat engines were not yet very common, and no one had reflected much on their theory. He was doubtless the first to propound to himself certain questions, and certainly the first to solve them.

It is known how, in 1824, in his Réflexions sur la puissance motrice du feu, he endeavoured to prove that “the motive power of heat is independent of the agents brought into play for its realization,” and that “its quantity is fixed solely by the temperature of the bodies between which, in the last resort, the transport of caloric is effected”—at least in all engines in which “the method of developing the motive power attains the perfection of which it is capable”; and this is, almost textually, one of the enunciations of the principle at the present day. Carnot perceived very clearly the great fact that, to produce work by heat, it is necessary to have at one’s disposal a fall of temperature. On this point he expresses himself with perfect clearness: “The motive power of a fall of water depends on its height and on the quantity of liquid; the motive power of heat depends also on the quantity of caloric employed, and on what might be called—in fact, what we shall call—the height of fall, that is to say, the difference in temperature of the bodies between which the exchange of caloric takes place.”

Starting with this idea, he endeavours to demonstrate, by associating two engines capable of working in a reversible cycle, that the principle is founded on the impossibility of perpetual motion.

His memoir, now celebrated, did not produce any great sensation, and it had almost fallen into deep oblivion, which, in consequence of the discovery of the principle of equivalence, might have seemed perfectly justified. Written, in fact, on the hypothesis of the indestructibility of caloric, it was to be expected that this memoir should be condemned in the name of the new doctrine, that is, of the principle recently brought to light.

It was really making a new discovery to establish that Carnot’s fundamental idea survived the destruction of the hypothesis on the nature of heat, on which he seemed to rely. As he no doubt himself perceived, his idea was quite independent of this hypothesis, since, as we have seen, he was led to surmise that heat could disappear; but his demonstrations needed to be recast and, in some points, modified.

It is to Clausius that was reserved the credit of rediscovering the principle, and of enunciating it in language conformable to the new doctrines, while giving it a much greater generality. The postulate arrived at by experimental induction, and which must be admitted without demonstration, is, according to Clausius, that in a series of transformations in which the final is identical with the initial stage, it is impossible for heat to pass from a colder to a warmer body unless some other accessory phenomenon occurs at the same time.

Still more correctly, perhaps, an enunciation can be given of the postulate which, in the main, is analogous, by saying: A heat motor, which after a series of transformations returns to its initial state, can only furnish work if there exist at least two sources of heat, and if a certain quantity of heat is given to one of the sources, which can never be the hotter of the two. By the expression “source of heat,” we mean a body exterior to the system and capable of furnishing or withdrawing heat from it.

Starting with this principle, we arrive, as does Clausius, at the demonstration that the output of a reversible machine working between two given temperatures is greater than that of any non-reversible engine, and that it is the same for all reversible machines working between these two temperatures.

This is the very proposition of Carnot; but the proposition thus stated, while very useful for the theory of engines, does not yet present any very general interest. Clausius, however, drew from it much more important consequences. First, he showed that the principle conduces to the definition of an absolute scale of temperature; and then he was brought face to face with a new notion which allows a strong light to be thrown on the questions of physical equilibrium. I refer to entropy.

It is still rather difficult to strip entirely this very important notion of all analytical adornment. Many physicists hesitate to utilize it, and even look upon it with some distrust, because they see in it a purely mathematical function without any definite physical meaning. Perhaps they are here unduly severe, since they often admit too easily the objective existence of quantities which they cannot define. Thus, for instance, it is usual almost every day to speak of the heat possessed by a body. Yet no body in reality possesses a definite quantity of heat even relatively to any initial state; since starting from this point of departure, the quantities of heat it may have gained or lost vary with the road taken and even with the means employed to follow it. These expressions of heat gained or lost are, moreover, themselves evidently incorrect, for heat can no longer be considered as a sort of fluid passing from one body to another.

The real reason which makes entropy somewhat mysterious is that this magnitude does not fall directly under the ken of any of our senses; but it possesses the true characteristic of a concrete physical magnitude, since it is, in principle at least, measurable. Various authors of thermodynamical researches, amongst whom M. Mouret should be particularly mentioned, have endeavoured to place this characteristic in evidence.

Consider an isothermal transformation. Instead of leaving the heat abandoned by the body subjected to the transformation—water condensing in a state of saturated vapour, for instance—to pass directly into an ice calorimeter, we can transmit this heat to the calorimeter by the intermediary of a reversible Carnot engine. The engine having absorbed this quantity of heat, will only give back to the ice a lesser quantity of heat; and the weight of the melted ice, inferior to that which might have been directly given back, will serve as a measure of the isothermal transformation thus effected. It can be easily shown that this measure is independent of the apparatus used. It consequently becomes a numerical element characteristic of the body considered, and is called its entropy. Entropy, thus defined, is a variable which, like pressure or volume, might serve concurrently with another variable, such as pressure or volume, to define the state of a body.

It must be perfectly understood that this variable can change in an independent manner, and that it is, for instance, distinct from the change of temperature. It is also distinct from the change which consists in losses or gains of heat. In chemical reactions, for example, the entropy increases without the substances borrowing any heat. When a perfect gas dilates in a vacuum its entropy increases, and yet the temperature does not change, and the gas has neither been able to give nor receive heat. We thus come to conceive that a physical phenomenon cannot be considered known to us if the variation of entropy is not given, as are the variations of temperature and of pressure or the exchanges of heat. The change of entropy is, properly speaking, the most characteristic fact of a thermal change.

It is important, however, to remark that if we can thus easily define and measure the difference of entropy between two states of the same body, the value found depends on the state arbitrarily chosen as the zero point of entropy; but this is not a very serious difficulty, and is analogous to that which occurs in the evaluation of other physical magnitudes—temperature, potential, etc.

A graver difficulty proceeds from its not being possible to define a difference, or an equality, of entropy between two bodies chemically different. We are unable, in fact, to pass by any means, reversible or not, from one to the other, so long as the transmutation of matter is regarded as impossible; but it is well understood that it is nevertheless possible to compare the variations of entropy to which these two bodies are both of them individually subject.

Neither must we conceal from ourselves that the definition supposes, for a given body, the possibility of passing from one state to another by a reversible transformation. Reversibility is an ideal and extreme case which cannot be realized, but which can be approximately attained in many circumstances. So with gases and with perfectly elastic bodies, we effect sensibly reversible transformations, and changes of physical state are practically reversible. The discoveries of Sainte-Claire Deville have brought many chemical phenomena into a similar category, and reactions such as solution, which used to be formerly the type of an irreversible phenomenon, may now often be effected by sensibly reversible means. Be that as it may, when once the definition is admitted, we arrive, by taking as a basis the principles set forth at the inception, at the demonstration of the celebrated theorem of Clausius: The entropy of a thermally isolated system continues to increase incessantly.

It is very evident that the theorem can only be worth applying in cases where the entropy can be exactly defined; but, even when thus limited, the field still remains vast, and the harvest which we can there reap is very abundant.

Entropy appears, then, as a magnitude measuring in a certain way the evolution of a system, or, at least, as giving the direction of this evolution. This very important consequence certainly did not escape Clausius, since the very name of entropy, which he chose to designate this magnitude, itself signifies evolution. We have succeeded in defining this entropy by demonstrating, as has been said, a certain number of propositions which spring from the postulate of Clausius; it is, therefore, natural to suppose that this postulate itself contains in potentia the very idea of a necessary evolution of physical systems. But as it was first enunciated, it contains it in a deeply hidden way.

No doubt we should make the principle of Carnot appear in an interesting light by endeavouring to disengage this fundamental idea, and by placing it, as it were, in large letters. Just as, in elementary geometry, we can replace the postulate of Euclid by other equivalent propositions, so the postulate of thermodynamics is not necessarily fixed, and it is instructive to try to give it the most general and suggestive character.

MM. Perrin and Langevin have made a successful attempt in this direction. M. Perrin enunciates the following principle: An isolated system never passes twice through the same state. In this form, the principle affirms that there exists a necessary order in the succession of two phenomena; that evolution takes place in a determined direction. If you prefer it, it may be thus stated: Of two converse transformations unaccompanied by any external effect, one only is possible. For instance, two gases may diffuse themselves one in the other in constant volume, but they could not conversely separate themselves spontaneously.

Starting from the principle thus put forward, we make the logical deduction that one cannot hope to construct an engine which should work for an indefinite time by heating a hot source and by cooling a cold one. We thus come again into the route traced by Clausius, and from this point we may follow it strictly.

Whatever the point of view adopted, whether we regard the proposition of M. Perrin as the corollary of another experimental postulate, or whether we consider it as a truth which we admit a priori and verify through its consequences, we are led to consider that in its entirety the principle of Carnot resolves itself into the idea that we cannot go back along the course of life, and that the evolution of a system must follow its necessary progress.

Clausius and Lord Kelvin have drawn from these considerations certain well-known consequences on the evolution of the Universe. Noticing that entropy is a property added to matter, they admit that there is in the world a total amount of entropy; and as all real changes which are produced in any system correspond to an increase of entropy, it may be said that the entropy of the world is continually increasing. Thus the quantity of energy existing in the Universe remains constant, but transforms itself little by little into heat uniformly distributed at a temperature everywhere identical. In the end, therefore, there will be neither chemical phenomena nor manifestation of life; the world will still exist, but without motion, and, so to speak, dead.

These consequences must be admitted to be very doubtful; we cannot in any certain way apply to the Universe, which is not a finite system, a proposition demonstrated, and that not unreservedly, in the sharply limited case of a finite system. Herbert Spencer, moreover, in his book on First Principles, brings out with much force the idea that, even if the Universe came to an end, nothing would allow us to conclude that, once at rest, it would remain so indefinitely. We may recognise that the state in which we are began at the end of a former evolutionary period, and that the end of the existing era will mark the beginning of a new one.

Like an elastic and mobile object which, thrown into the air, attains by degrees the summit of its course, then possesses a zero velocity and is for a moment in equilibrium, and then falls on touching the ground to rebound, so the world should be subjected to huge oscillations which first bring it to a maximum of entropy till the moment when there should be produced a slow evolution in the contrary direction bringing it back to the state from which it started. Thus, in the infinity of time, the life of the Universe proceeds without real stop.

This conception is, moreover, in accordance with the view certain physicists take of the principle of Carnot. We shall see, for example, that in the kinetic theory we are led to admit that, after waiting sufficiently long, we can witness the return of the various states through which a mass of gas, for example, has passed in its series of transformations.

If we keep to the present era, evolution has a fixed direction—that which leads to an increase of entropy; and it is possible to enquire, in any given system to what physical manifestations this increase corresponds. We note that kinetic, potential, electrical, and chemical forms of energy have a great tendency to transform themselves into calorific energy. A chemical reaction, for example, gives out energy; but if the reaction is not produced under very special conditions, this energy immediately passes into the calorific form. This is so true, that chemists currently speak of the heat given out by reactions instead of regarding the energy disengaged in general.

In all these transformations the calorific energy obtained has not, from a practical point of view, the same value at which it started. One cannot, in fact, according to the principle of Carnot, transform it integrally into mechanical energy, since the heat possessed by a body can only yield work on condition that a part of it falls on a body with a lower temperature. Thus appears the idea that energies which exchange with each other and correspond to equal quantities have not the same qualitative value. Form has its importance, and there are persons who prefer a golden louis to four pieces of five francs. The principle of Carnot would thus lead us to consider a certain classification of energies, and would show us that, in the transformations possible, these energies always tend to a sort of diminution of quality—that is, to a degradation.

It would thus reintroduce an element of differentiation of which it seems very difficult to give a mechanical explanation. Certain philosophers and physicists see in this fact a reason which condemns a priori all attempts made to give a mechanical explanation of the principle of Carnot.

It is right, however, not to exaggerate the importance that should be attributed to the phrase degraded energy. If the heat is not equivalent to the work, if heat at 99° is not equivalent to heat at 100°, that means that we cannot in practice construct an engine which shall transform all this heat into work, or that, for the same cold source, the output is greater when the temperature of the hot source is higher; but if it were possible that this cold source had itself the temperature of absolute zero, the whole heat would reappear in the form of work. The case here considered is an ideal and extreme case, and we naturally cannot realize it; but this consideration suffices to make it plain that the classification of energies is a little arbitrary and depends more, perhaps, on the conditions in which mankind lives than on the inmost nature of things.

In fact, the attempts which have often been made to refer the principle of Carnot to mechanics have not given convincing results. It has nearly always been necessary to introduce into the attempt some new hypothesis independent of the fundamental hypotheses of ordinary mechanics, and equivalent, in reality, to one of the postulates on which the ordinary exposition of the second law of thermodynamics is founded. Helmholtz, in a justly celebrated theory, endeavoured to fit the principle of Carnot into the principle of least action; but the difficulties regarding the mechanical interpretation of the irreversibility of physical phenomena remain entire. Looking at the question, however, from the point of view at which the partisans of the kinetic theories of matter place themselves, the principle is viewed in a new aspect. Gibbs and afterwards Boltzmann and Professor Planck have put forward some very interesting ideas on this subject. By following the route they have traced, we come to consider the principle as pointing out to us that a given system tends towards the configuration presented by the maximum probability, and, numerically, the entropy would even be the logarithm of this probability. Thus two different gaseous masses, enclosed in two separate receptacles which have just been placed in communication, diffuse themselves one through the other, and it is highly improbable that, in their mutual shocks, both kinds of molecules should take a distribution of velocities which reduce them by a spontaneous phenomenon to the initial state.

We should have to wait a very long time for so extraordinary a concourse of circumstances, but, in strictness, it would not be impossible. The principle would only be a law of probability. Yet this probability is all the greater the more considerable is the number of molecules itself. In the phenomena habitually dealt with, this number is such that, practically, the variation of entropy in a constant sense takes, so to speak, the character of absolute certainty.

But there may be exceptional cases where the complexity of the system becomes insufficient for the application of the principle of Carnot;—as in the case of the curious movements of small particles suspended in a liquid which are known by the name of Brownian movements and can be observed under the microscope. The agitation here really seems, as M. Gouy has remarked, to be produced and continued indefinitely, regardless of any difference in temperature; and we seem to witness the incessant motion, in an isothermal medium, of the particles which constitute matter. Perhaps, however, we find ourselves already in conditions where the too great simplicity of the distribution of the molecules deprives the principle of its value.

M. Lippmann has in the same way shown that, on the kinetic hypothesis, it is possible to construct such mechanisms that we can so take cognizance of molecular movements that vis viva can be taken from them. The mechanisms of M. Lippmann are not, like the celebrated apparatus at one time devised by Maxwell, purely hypothetical. They do not suppose a partition with a hole impossible to be bored through matter where the molecular spaces would be larger than the hole itself. They have finite dimensions. Thus M. Lippmann considers a vase full of oxygen at a constant temperature. In the interior of this vase is placed a small copper ring, and the whole is set in a magnetic field. The oxygen molecules are, as we know, magnetic, and when passing through the interior of the ring they produce in this ring an induced current. During this time, it is true, other molecules emerge from the space enclosed by the circuit; but the two effects do not counterbalance each other, and the resulting current is maintained. There is elevation of temperature in the circuit in accordance with Joule’s law; and this phenomenon, under such conditions, is incompatible with the principle of Carnot.

It is possible—and that, I think, is M. Lippmann’s idea—to draw from his very ingenious criticism an objection to the kinetic theory, if we admit the absolute value of the principle; but we may also suppose that here again we are in presence of a system where the prescribed conditions diminish the complexity and render it, consequently, less probable that the evolution is always effected in the same direction.

In whatever way you look at it, the principle of Carnot furnishes, in the immense majority of cases, a very sure guide in which physicists continue to have the most entire confidence.

§ 4. THERMODYNAMICS

To apply the two fundamental principles of thermodynamics, various methods may be employed, equivalent in the main, but presenting as the cases vary a greater or less convenience.

In recording, with the aid of the two quantities, energy and entropy, the relations which translate analytically the two principles, we obtain two relations between the coefficients which occur in a given phenomenon; but it may be easier and also more suggestive to employ various functions of these quantities. In a memoir, of which some extracts appeared as early as 1869, a modest scholar, M. Massieu, indicated in particular a remarkable function which he termed a characteristic function, and by the employment of which calculations are simplified in certain cases.

In the same way J.W. Gibbs, in 1875 and 1878, then Helmholtz in 1882, and, in France, M. Duhem, from the year 1886 onward, have published works, at first ill understood, of which the renown was, however, considerable in the sequel, and in which they made use of analogous functions under the names of available energy, free energy, or internal thermodynamic potential. The magnitude thus designated, attaching, as a consequence of the two principles, to all states of the system, is perfectly determined when the temperature and other normal variables are known. It allows us, by calculations often very easy, to fix the conditions necessary and sufficient for the maintenance of the system in equilibrium by foreign bodies taken at the same temperature as itself.

One may hope to constitute in this way, as M. Duhem in a long and remarkable series of operations has specially endeavoured to do, a sort of general mechanics which will enable questions of statics to be treated with accuracy, and all the conditions of equilibrium of the system, including the calorific properties, to be determined. Thus, ordinary statics teaches us that a liquid with its vapour on the top forms a system in equilibrium, if we apply to the two fluids a pressure depending on temperature alone. Thermodynamics will furnish us, in addition, with the expression of the heat of vaporization and of, the specific heats of the two saturated fluids.

This new study has given us also most valuable information on compressible fluids and on the theory of elastic equilibrium. Added to certain hypotheses on electric or magnetic phenomena, it gives a coherent whole from which can be deduced the conditions of electric or magnetic equilibrium; and it illuminates with a brilliant light the calorific laws of electrolytic phenomena.

But the most indisputable triumph of this thermodynamic statics is the discovery of the laws which regulate the changes of physical state or of chemical constitution. J.W. Gibbs was the author of this immense progress. His memoir, now celebrated, on “the equilibrium of heterogeneous substances,” concealed in 1876 in a review at that time of limited circulation, and rather heavy to read, seemed only to contain algebraic theorems applicable with difficulty to reality. It is known that Helmholtz independently succeeded, a few years later, in introducing thermodynamics into the domain of chemistry by his conception of the division of energy into free and into bound energy: the first, capable of undergoing all transformations, and particularly of transforming itself into external action; the second, on the other hand, bound, and only manifesting itself by giving out heat. When we measure chemical energy, we ordinarily let it fall wholly into the calorific form; but, in reality, it itself includes both parts, and it is the variation of the free energy and not that of the total energy measured by the integral disengagement of heat, the sign of which determines the direction in which the reactions are effected.

But if the principle thus enunciated by Helmholtz as a consequence of the laws of thermodynamics is at bottom identical with that discovered by Gibbs, it is more difficult of application and is presented under a more mysterious aspect. It was not until M. Van der Waals exhumed the memoir of Gibbs, when numerous physicists or chemists, most of them Dutch—Professor Van t’Hoff, Bakhius Roozeboom, and others—utilized the rules set forth in this memoir for the discussion of the most complicated chemical reactions, that the extent of the new laws was fully understood.

The chief rule of Gibbs is the one so celebrated at the present day under the name of the Phase Law. We know that by phases are designated the homogeneous substances into which a system is divided; thus carbonate of lime, lime, and carbonic acid gas are the three phases of a system which comprises Iceland spar partially dissociated into lime and carbonic acid gas. The number of phases added to the number of independent components—that is to say, bodies whose mass is left arbitrary by the chemical formulas of the substances entering into the reaction—fixes the general form of the law of equilibrium of the system; that is to say, the number of quantities which, by their variations (temperature and pressure), would be of a nature to modify its equilibrium by modifying the constitution of the phases.

Several authors, M. Raveau in particular, have indeed given very simple demonstrations of this law which are not based on thermodynamics; but thermodynamics, which led to its discovery, continues to give it its true scope. Moreover, it would not suffice merely to determine quantitatively those laws of which it makes known the general form. We must, if we wish to penetrate deeper into details, particularize the hypothesis, and admit, for instance, with Gibbs that we are dealing with perfect gases; while, thanks to thermodynamics, we can constitute a complete theory of dissociation which leads to formulas in complete accord with the numerical results of the experiment. We can thus follow closely all questions concerning the displacements of the equilibrium, and find a relation of the first importance between the masses of the bodies which react in order to constitute a system in equilibrium.

The statics thus constructed constitutes at the present day an important edifice to be henceforth classed amongst historical monuments. Some theorists even wish to go a step beyond. They have attempted to begin by the same means a more complete study of those systems whose state changes from one moment to another. This is, moreover, a study which is necessary to complete satisfactorily the study of equilibrium itself; for without it grave doubts would exist as to the conditions of stability, and it alone can give their true meaning to questions relating to displacements of equilibrium.

The problems with which we are thus confronted are singularly difficult. M. Duhem has given us many excellent examples of the fecundity of the method; but if thermodynamic statics may be considered definitely founded, it cannot be said that the general dynamics of systems, considered as the study of thermal movements and variations, are yet as solidly established.

§ 5. ATOMISM

It may appear singularly paradoxical that, in a chapter devoted to general views on the principles of physics, a few words should be introduced on the atomic theories of matter.

Very often, in fact, what is called the physics of principles is set in opposition to the hypotheses on the constitution of matter, particularly to atomic theories. I have already said that, abandoning the investigation of the unfathomable mystery of the constitution of the Universe, some physicists think they may find, in certain general principles, sufficient guides to conduct them across the physical world. But I have also said, in examining the history of those principles, that if they are to-day considered experimental truths, independent of all theories relating to matter, they have, in fact, nearly all been discovered by scholars who relied on molecular hypotheses: and the question suggests itself whether this is mere chance, or whether this chance may not be ordained by higher reasons.

In a very profound work which appeared a few years ago, entitled Essai critique sur l’hypothese des atomes, M. Hannequin, a philosopher who is also an erudite scholar, examined the part taken by atomism in the history of science. He notes that atomism and science were born, in Greece, of the same problem, and that in modern times the revival of the one was closely connected with that of the other. He shows, too, by very close analysis, that the atomic hypothesis is essential to the optics of Fresnel and of Cauchy; that it penetrates into the study of heat; and that, in its general features, it presided at the birth of modern chemistry and is linked with all its progress. He concludes that it is, in a manner, the soul of our knowledge of Nature, and that contemporary theories are on this point in accord with history: for these theories consecrate the preponderance of this hypothesis in the domain of science.

If M. Hannequin had not been prematurely cut off in the full expansion of his vigorous talent, he might have added another chapter to his excellent book. He would have witnessed a prodigious budding of atomistic ideas, accompanied, it is true, by wide modifications in the manner in which the atom is to be regarded, since the most recent theories make material atoms into centres constituted of atoms of electricity. On the other hand, he would have found in the bursting forth of these new doctrines one more proof in support of his idea that science is indissolubly bound to atomism.

From the philosophical point of view, M. Hannequin, examining the reasons which may have called these links into being, arrives at the idea that they necessarily proceed from the constitution of our knowledge, or, perhaps, from that of Nature itself. Moreover, this origin, double in appearance, is single at bottom. Our minds could not, in fact, detach and come out of themselves to grasp reality and the absolute in Nature. According to the idea of Descartes, it is the destiny of our minds only to take hold of and to understand that which proceeds from them.

Thus atomism, which is, perhaps, only an appearance containing even some contradictions, is yet a well-founded appearance, since it conforms to the laws of our minds; and this hypothesis is, in a way, necessary.

We may dispute the conclusions of M. Hannequin, but no one will refuse to recognise, as he does, that atomic theories occupy a preponderating part in the doctrines of physics; and the position which they have thus conquered gives them, in a way, the right of saying that they rest on a real principle. It is in order to recognise this right that several physicists—M. Langevin, for example—ask that atoms be promoted from the rank of hypotheses to that of principles. By this they mean that the atomistic ideas forced upon us by an almost obligatory induction based on very exact experiments, enable us to co-ordinate a considerable amount of facts, to construct a very general synthesis, and to foresee a great number of phenomena.

It is of moment, moreover, to thoroughly understand that atomism does not necessarily set up the hypothesis of centres of attraction acting at a distance, and it must not be confused with molecular physics, which has, on the other hand, undergone very serious checks. The molecular physics greatly in favour some fifty years ago leads to such complex representations and to solutions often so undetermined, that the most courageous are wearied with upholding it and it has fallen into some discredit. It rested on the fundamental principles of mechanics applied to molecular actions; and that was, no doubt, an extension legitimate enough, since mechanics is itself only an experimental science, and its principles, established for the movements of matter taken as a whole, should not be applied outside the domain which belongs to them. Atomism, in fact, tends more and more, in modern theories, to imitate the principle of the conservation of energy or that of entropy, to disengage itself from the artificial bonds which attached it to mechanics, and to put itself forward as an independent principle.

Atomistic ideas also have undergone evolution, and this slow evolution has been considerably quickened under the influence of modern discoveries. These reach back to the most remote antiquity, and to follow their development we should have to write the history of human thought which they have always accompanied since the time of Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius. The first observers who noticed that the volume of a body could be diminished by compression or cold, or augmented by heat, and who saw a soluble solid body mix completely with the water which dissolved it, must have been compelled to suppose that matter was not dispersed continuously throughout the space it seemed to occupy. They were thus brought to consider it discontinuous, and to admit that a substance having the same composition and the same properties in all its parts—in a word, perfectly homogeneous—ceases to present this homogeneity when considered within a sufficiently small volume.

Modern experimenters have succeeded by direct experiments in placing in evidence this heterogeneous character of matter when taken in small mass. Thus, for example, the superficial tension, which is constant for the same liquid at a given temperature, no longer has the same value when the thickness of the layer of liquid becomes extremely small. Newton noticed even in his time that a dark zone is seen to form on a soap bubble at the moment when it becomes so thin that it must burst. Professor Reinold and Sir Arthur Rücker have shown that this zone is no longer exactly spherical; and from this we must conclude that the superficial tension, constant for all thicknesses above a certain limit, commences to vary when the thickness falls below a critical value, which these authors estimate, on optical grounds, at about fifty millionths of a millimetre.

From experiments on capillarity, Prof. Quincke has obtained similar results with regard to layers of solids. But it is not only capillary properties which allow this characteristic to be revealed. All the properties of a body are modified when taken in small mass; M. Meslin proves this in a very ingenious way as regards optical properties, and Mr Vincent in respect of electric conductivity. M. Houllevigue, who, in a chapter of his excellent work, Du Laboratoire à l’Usine, has very clearly set forth the most interesting considerations on atomic hypotheses, has recently demonstrated that copper and silver cease to combine with iodine as soon as they are present in a thickness of less than thirty millionths of a millimetre. It is this same dimension likewise that is possessed, according to M. Wiener, by the smallest thicknesses it is possible to deposit on glass. These layers are so thin that they cannot be perceived, but their presence is revealed by a change in the properties of the light reflected by them.

Thus, below fifty to thirty millionths of a millimetre the properties of matter depend on its thickness. There are then, no doubt, only a few molecules to be met with, and it may be concluded, in consequence, that the discontinuous elements of bodies—that is, the molecules—have linear dimensions of the order of magnitude of the millionth of a millimetre. Considerations regarding more complex phenomena, for instance the phenomena of electricity by contact, and also the kinetic theory of gases, bring us to the same conclusion.

The idea of the discontinuity of matter forces itself upon us for many other reasons. All modern chemistry is founded on this principle; and laws like the law of multiple proportions, introduce an evident discontinuity to which we find analogies in the law of electrolysis. The elements of bodies we are thus brought to regard might, as regards solids at all events, be considered as immobile; but this immobility could not explain the phenomena of heat, and, as it is entirely inadmissible for gases, it seems very improbable it can absolutely occur in any state. We are thus led to suppose that these elements are animated by very complicated movements, each one proceeding in closed trajectories in which the least variations of temperature or pressure cause modifications.

The atomistic hypothesis shows itself remarkably fecund in the study of phenomena produced in gases, and here the mutual independence of the particles renders the question relatively more simple and, perhaps, allows the principles of mechanics to be more certainly extended to the movements of molecules.

The kinetic theory of gases can point to unquestioned successes; and the idea of Daniel Bernouilli, who, as early as 1738, considered a gaseous mass to be formed of a considerable number of molecules animated by rapid movements of translation, has been put into a form precise enough for mathematical analysis, and we have thus found ourselves in a position to construct a really solid foundation. It will be at once conceived, on this hypothesis, that pressure is the resultant of the shocks of the molecules against the walls of the containing vessel, and we at once come to the demonstration that the law of Mariotte is a natural consequence of this origin of pressure; since, if the volume occupied by a certain number of molecules is doubled, the number of shocks per second on each square centimetre of the walls becomes half as much. But if we attempt to carry this further, we find ourselves in presence of a serious difficulty. It is impossible to mentally follow every one of the many individual molecules which compose even a very limited mass of gas. The path followed by this molecule may be every instant modified by the chance of running against another, or by a shock which may make it rebound in another direction.

The difficulty would be insoluble if chance had not laws of its own. It was Maxwell who first thought of introducing into the kinetic theory the calculation of probabilities. Willard Gibbs and Boltzmann later on developed this idea, and have founded a statistical method which does not, perhaps, give absolute certainty, but which is certainly most interesting and curious. Molecules are grouped in such a way that those belonging to the same group may be considered as having the same state of movement; then an examination is made of the number of molecules in each group, and what are the changes in this number from one moment to another. It is thus often possible to determine the part which the different groups have in the total properties of the system and in the phenomena which may occur.

Such a method, analogous to the one employed by statisticians for following the social phenomena in a population, is all the more legitimate the greater the number of individuals counted in the averages; now, the number of molecules contained in a limited space—for example, in a centimetre cube taken in normal conditions—is such that no population could ever attain so high a figure. All considerations, those we have indicated as well as others which might be invoked (for example, the recent researches of M. Spring on the limit of visibility of fluorescence), give this result:—that there are, in this space, some twenty thousand millions of molecules. Each of these must receive in the space of a millimetre about ten thousand shocks, and be ten thousand times thrust out of its course. The free path of a molecule is then very small, but it can be singularly augmented by diminishing the number of them. Tait and Dewar have calculated that, in a good modern vacuum, the length of the free path of the remaining molecules not taken away by the air-pump easily reaches a few centimetres.

By developing this theory, we come to consider that, for a given temperature, every molecule (and even every individual particle, atom, or ion) which takes part in the movement has, on the average, the same kinetic energy in every body, and that this energy is proportional to the absolute temperature; so that it is represented by this temperature multiplied by a constant quantity which is a universal constant.

This result is not an hypothesis but a very great probability. This probability increases when it is noted that the same value for the constant is met with in the study of very varied phenomena; for example, in certain theories on radiation. Knowing the mass and energy of a molecule, it is easy to calculate its speed; and we find that the average speed is about 400 metres per second for carbonic anhydride, 500 for nitrogen, and 1850 for hydrogen at 0° C. and at ordinary pressure. I shall have occasion, later on, to speak of much more considerable speeds than these as animating other particles.

The kinetic theory has permitted the diffusion of gases to be explained, and the divers circumstances of the phenomenon to be calculated. It has allowed us to show, as M. Brillouin has done, that the coefficient of diffusion of two gases does not depend on the proportion of the gases in the mixture; it gives a very striking image of the phenomena of viscosity and conductivity; and it leads us to think that the coefficients of friction and of conductivity are independent of the density; while all these previsions have been verified by experiment. It has also invaded optics; and by relying on the principle of Doppler, Professor Michelson has succeeded in obtaining from it an explanation of the length presented by the spectral rays of even the most rarefied gases.

But however interesting are these results, they would not have sufficed to overcome the repugnance of certain physicists for speculations which, an imposing mathematical baggage notwithstanding, seemed to them too hypothetical. The theory, moreover, stopped at the molecule, and appeared to suggest no idea which could lead to the discovery of the key to the phenomena where molecules exercise a mutual influence on each other. The kinetic hypothesis, therefore, remained in some disfavour with a great number of persons, particularly in France, until the last few years, when all the recent discoveries of the conductivity of gases and of the new radiations came to procure for it a new and luxuriant efflorescence. It may be said that the atomistic synthesis, but yesterday so decried, is to-day triumphant.

The elements which enter into the earlier kinetic theory, and which, to avoid confusion, should be always designated by the name of molecules, were not, truth to say, in the eyes of the chemists, the final term of the divisibility of matter. It is well known that, to them, except in certain particular bodies like the vapour of mercury and argon, the molecule comprises several atoms, and that, in compound bodies, the number of these atoms may even be fairly considerable. But physicists rarely needed to have recourse to the consideration of these atoms. They spoke of them to explain certain particularities of the propagation of sound, and to enunciate laws relating to specific heats; but, in general, they stopped at the consideration of the molecule.

The present theories carry the division much further. I shall not dwell now on these theories, since, in order to thoroughly understand them, many other facts must be examined. But to avoid all confusion, it remains understood that, contrary, no doubt, to etymology, but in conformity with present custom, I shall continue in what follows to call atoms those particles of matter which have till now been spoken of; these atoms being themselves, according to modern views, singularly complex edifices formed of elements, of which we shall have occasion to indicate the nature later.

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