The Truths of Reason

1. I begin with the preliminary question of the conformity of faith with reason, and the use of philosophy in theology, because:

• it has much influence on the main subject of my treatise
• M. Bayle introduces it everywhere.

I assume that:

• 2 truths cannot contradict each other
• the object of faith is the truth God has revealed in an extraordinary way
• reason is the linking together of truths
  • especially (when it is compared with faith) of those whereto the human mind can attain naturally without being aided by the light of faith.

This definition of strict and true reason has surprised some persons accustomed to inveigh against reason taken in a vague sense.

They replied that they had never heard of it. The truth is that they have never talked to people who have clearly understood these subjects.

They have confessed to me, nevertheless, that one could not find fault with reason, understood in the sense which I gave to it.

Reason is sometimes contrasted with experience.

Reason consists in the linking together* of truths.

*Superphysics Note: This is consistent with our definition of logic as the connection of ideas. We define reason as the ability to use logic to explain cause and effect in general.

Reason connects truths from experience, in order to draw mixed conclusions.

Pure and simple reason, as distinct from experience, only has to do with truths independent of the senses.

One may compare faith with experience, since faith depends on the experience of those who have seen the miracles.

It is similar as us relying on the experience of those who have seen China.

The inward motion of the Holy Spirit* takes possession of souls and persuades them and prompts them to good without always having need of motives..

*Superphysics Note: We call this the Positive Force, or Yang in Taoism or Shiva in Hinduism, which has an inward motion towards the aether. Yin or Shakti has an outward motion, towards matter.

² There are 2 kinds of truths of reason:

1. The ‘Eternal Verities’

These are altogether necessary, so that the opposite implies contradiction.

Examples are the truths whose necessity is logical, metaphysical or geometrical, which one cannot deny without being led into absurdities.

2. The Positive

These are the laws which God has given to Nature.

We learn them either:

• by experience. a posteriori, o
• by reason, a priori, that is, by considerations of the fitness of things which have caused their choice.

This fitness of things has also its rules and reasons. But it is the free choice of God which causes preference for what is fitting and brings it into existence. It is not caused by a geometrical necessity,

Thus, physical necessity is founded on moral necessity. It is based on the wise one’s choice which is worthy of his wisdom.

Both of these should be distinguished from geometrical necessity.

This physical necessity:

• makes order in Nature
• has the rules of motion and other general laws which God laid down for things when he gave them being.

God gave such laws not without reason. He chooses nothing from caprice and as though by chance or in pure indifference. But the general reasons of good and of order, which have prompted him to the choice, may be overcome in some cases by stronger reasons of a superior order.

³ Thus, God can:

• exempt creatures from the laws he has prescribed for them
• produce in them that which their nature does not bear by performing a miracle.

When they have risen to perfections and faculties nobler than those whereto they can by their nature attain, the Schoolmen call this faculty an ‘Obediential Power’.

It is a power which the thing acquires by obeying the command of him who can give that which the thing has not.

The Schoolmen, however, usually give impossible instances of this power. For example, they say that God can give the creature the faculty to create.

It may be that there are which

God might perform miracles through the ministry of angels, where the laws of Nature are not violated. Rather, the skill of angels have more skill than ours.

The laws of Nature are subject to be dispensed from by the Law-giver. Whereas the eternal truths, for instance those of geometry, admit no dispensation. Faith cannot contradict them.

Thus, there cannot be any invincible objection to truth.

For if it is a question of proof which is founded upon principles or incontestable facts and formed by a linking together of eternal truths, the conclusion is certain and essential. Only that which is contrary to it is false. Otherwise, two contradictories might be true at the same time.

If the objection is not conclusive, it can only form a probable argument which has no force against faith. This is because it is agreed that the Mysteries of religion are contrary to appearances.

M. Bayle declares, in his posthumous Reply to M. le Clerc, that he does not claim that there are demonstrations contrary to the truths of faith.

As a result all these insuperable difficulties, these so-called wars between reason and faith, vanish away.

⁴ Protestant and Roman theologians admit these maxims when they handle the matter with attention.

All that is said against reason has no force save against a kind of counterfeit reason, corrupted and deluded by false appearances.

It is the same with our notions of the justice and the goodness of God, which are spoken of sometimes as if we had neither any idea nor any definition of their nature.

But in that case we should have no ground for ascribing these attributes to him, or lauding him for them. His goodness and his justice as well as his wisdom differ from ours only because they are infinitely more perfect.

Thus the simple notions, the necessary truths and the conclusive results of philosophy [76]cannot be contrary to revelation.

When some philosophical maxims are rejected in theology, the reason is that they are considered to have only a physical or moral necessity, which speaks only of that which takes place usually, and is consequently founded on appearances, but which may be withheld if God so pleases.

⁵ There is often some confusion in the expressions of those who set at variance philosophy and theology, or faith and reason.

They confuse the terms ’explain’, ‘comprehend’, ‘prove’, ‘uphold’.

M. Bayle is not always free from this confusion.

Mysteries may be explained sufficiently to justify belief in them. But one cannot comprehend them, nor give understanding of how they come to pass.

Thus even in natural philosophy, we explain up to a certain point sundry perceptible qualities, but in an imperfect manner, for we do not comprehend them.

It is impossible to prove Mysteries by reason. This is because all that can be proved a priori, or by pure reason, can be comprehended.

All that remains for us then, after having believed in the Mysteries by reason of the proofs of the truth of religion (which are called ‘motives of credibility’) is to be able to uphold them against objections.

Without that our belief in them would have no firm foundation; for all that which can be refuted in a sound and conclusive manner cannot but be false.

Such proofs of the truth of religion as can give only a moral certainty would be balanced and even outweighed by such objections as would give an absolute certainty, provided they were convincing and altogether conclusive.

This little might suffice me to remove the difficulties concerning the use of reason and philosophy in relation to religion if one had not to deal all too often with prejudiced persons.

But as the subject is important and it has fallen into a state of confusion, it will be well to take it in greater detail.