Heroism

All of us have a wonderful partiality for ourselves.

We establish the rules of good-breeding:

• to prevent the opposition of men’s pride, and
• to render conversation agreeable and inoffensive.

This is the same way as we establish the laws of nature:

• to secure property in society, and
• to prevent the opposition of self-interest.

A man’s over-weaning conceit of himself is most disagreeable.

Everyone almost has a strong propensity to pride.

A proud person cannot:

• distinguish vice and virtue
• be sure that his esteem of his own merit is well-founded

This is why all direct expressions of pride are condemned.

That impertinent, and almost universal propensity of men to over-value themselves, has given us a prejudice against self-applause. We are apt to condemn it by a general rule whenever we encounter it. We give a privilege to men of sense with difficulty, even in their most secret thoughts.

At least, some disguise in this is absolutely requisite.

If we harbour pride, we must still:

• be outwardly modest
• prefer others to ourselves

If we observe these rules, people will respect our pride more.

A genuine and hearty pride or self-esteem, if well-concealed and well-founded, is essential to an honourable man’s character.

• It is absolutely needed to procure mankind’s esteem and approbation.

Custom requires certain deferences and mutual submissions of the different ranks of men towards each other.

Whoever exceeds in this is accused of:

• meanness, if done through interest, and
• simplicity, if done through ignorance.

We therefore need to know our rank and station in the world, whether it is fixed by our birth, fortune, employments, talents or reputation.

It is necessary to:

• feel the sentiment and passion of pride in conformity to it, and
• regulate our actions accordingly.

People say that prudence is enough to regulate our actions in this.

But I think:

• that prudence aims to conform our actions to the general usage and custom, and
• that tacit superiority would never have been established and authorized by custom, unless:
  • men were generally proud, and
  • pride was generally approved, when well-grounded.

This true because all those great actions admired by mankind are based only on pride and self-esteem.

Alexander the Great said to his soldiers when they refused to follow him to India:

Alexander

Go tell your countrymen, that you left Alexander completing the conquest of the world.

This passage was admired by the prince of Conde, as told by St Evremond.

That prince said:

Prince of Conde

“Alexander, abandoned by his soldiers, among barbarians, not yet fully subdued, felt such a dignity of right and empire in himself. He could not believe anyone could refuse to obey him. In Europe or Asia, among Greeks or Persians, all was indifferent to him. Wherever he found men, he fancied he found subjects.”

A heroic virtue is the admirable greatness and elevation of mind.

• It is merely a steady and well-established pride and self-esteem, or it partakes largely of self-esteem.

Courage, intrepidity, ambition, love of glory, magnanimity, and all the other shining virtues of that kind:

• have a strong mixture of self-esteem in them, and
• derive most of their merit from self-esteem.

This is why many religious declaimers:

• decry those virtues as purely pagan and natural, and
• represent to us the excellency of Christianity

Christianity:

• sees humility as a virtue
• frowns at pride and ambition

I shall not decide whether this virtue of humility has been rightly understood.

But I think that the world naturally esteems a well-regulated pride which secretly animates our conduct as long as it is not vanity.

The merit of pride or self-esteem is derived from 2 circumstances:

1. Its utility
2. Its agreeableness to ourselves

These:

• capacitate us for business
• give us an immediate satisfaction

When it goes beyond its just bounds, it loses its utility and even becomes prejudicial.

This is why we condemn an extravagant pride and ambition, no matter how regulated by good-breeding and politeness.

But such pride is still agreeable.

• It still conveys an elevated and sublime sensation to the person who has it.
• The sympathy with that satisfaction considerably reduces the blame which naturally attends its dangerous influence on his behaviour.

Accordingly, an excessive courage and magnanimity, especially under misfortune contributes greatly to a hero’s character while it leads him into difficulties he would never have met otherwise.

Heroism, or military glory, is much admired by mankind.

Men consider it as the most sublime kind of merit.

Men of cool reflection are not so sanguine in their praises of it.

The infinite confusions and disorder it has caused in the world reduce much of its merit in their eyes.

They always paint out the evils produced by heroism in human society: the subversion of empires, the devastation of provinces, and the sack of cities.

As long as these are present to us, we are more inclined to hate than admire the ambition of heroes. But when we view the hero himself, there is something so dazzling in his character. Its mere contemplation so elevates the mind, that we cannot refuse to admire it. The pain we receive from its prejudice of society is over-powered by a stronger and more immediate sympathy.

Thus, our explanation of the merit or demerit which attends pride serves as a strong argument for the preceding hypothesis. It shows the effects of those above-explained principles in all our judgments on pride.

This reasoning will be advantageous to us by: showing that the distinction of vice and virtue arises from: the four principles of the advantage, and the pleasure of the person himself and others. affording us a strong proof of some under-parts of that hypothesis.

Any in-breeding or expression of pride and haughtiness is displeasing to us merely because it: shocks our own pride, and leads us by sympathy into a comparison which causes humility. An insolence of this kind is blamed even in a person: who has always been civil to us, and whose name is only known to us in history. It follows that our disapprobation proceeds from: a sympathy with others, and the reflection that such a proud person would be highly displeasing to those who converse with him.

We sympathize with those people in their uneasiness.

Their uneasiness proceeds partly from a sympathy with the person who insults them.

A double rebound of the sympathy occurs.

This is a principle very similar to what we have observed. (Book 2, Part 2, Sec. 5)