Heroism

All of us:

• have a wonderful partiality for ourselves, and would mutually cause the greatest indignation in each other if we always vented our sentiments by the: immediate presence of so disagreeable a subject of comparison, and contrariety of our judgments.

We establish the rules of good-breeding: to prevent the opposition of men’s pride, and to render conversation agreeable and inoffensive.

This is the same way as we establish the laws of nature: to secure property in society, and to prevent the opposition of self-interest.

Nothing is more disagreeable than a man’s over-weaning conceit of himself. Everyone almost has a strong propensity to pride.

No one can: well distinguish in himself between the vice and virtue, and be certain that his esteem of his own merit is well-founded.

This is why all direct expressions of pride are condemned. Men of sense and merit are not exempted from this rule. They cannot be openly proud more than other people. They will be more applauded if they show reserve.

That impertinent, and almost universal propensity of men to over-value themselves, has given us a prejudice against self-applause. We are apt to condemn it by a general rule whenever we encounter it. We give a privilege to men of sense with difficulty, even in their most secret thoughts.

At least, some disguise in this is absolutely requisite. If we harbour pride in our breasts, we must: carry a fair outside, and have the appearance of modesty and mutual deference in our behaviour.

We must always be ready to: prefer others to ourselves, treat them with a kind of deference, even though they are our equals, and seem always the lowest and least in the company, if we are not very much distinguished above them.

If we observe these rules in our conduct, people will have more indulgence for our secret sentiments, when we discover them in an oblique manner.

No one will assert:
    that the humility required by good-breeding and decency goes beyond the outside, or
    that a thorough sincerity in this is a real part of our duty.

On the contrary, a genuine and hearty pride or self-esteem, if well-concealed and well-founded, is essential to an honourable man’s character. It is absolutely needed to procure mankind’s esteem and approbation.

Custom requires certain deferences and mutual submissions of the different ranks of men towards each other.

Whoever exceeds in this is accused of: meanness, if done through interest, and simplicity, if done through ignorance.

We therefore need to know our rank and station in the world, whether it is fixed by our birth, fortune, employments, talents or reputation. It is necessary to: feel the sentiment and passion of pride in conformity to it, and regulate our actions accordingly.

People say that prudence is enough to regulate our actions in this. But I think: that prudence aims to conform our actions to the general usage and custom, and that tacit superiority would never have been established and authorized by custom, unless: men were generally proud, and pride was generally approved, when well-grounded.

This reasoning acquires new force, when we observe that all those great actions and sentiments admired by mankind, are founded only on pride and self-esteem.
    Alexander the Great says "Go" to his soldiers, when they refused to follow him to India.
    "Go tell your countrymen, that you left Alexander completing the conquest of the world."
        This passage was always particularly admired by the prince of Conde, as we learn from St Evremond.

That prince said:
    "Alexander, abandoned by his soldiers, among barbarians, not yet fully subdued, felt such a dignity of right and empire in himself.
    He could not believe anyone could refuse to obey him.
    In Europe or Asia, among Greeks or Persians, all was indifferent to him.
    Wherever he found men, he fancied he found subjects."

A heroic virtue is the character of greatness and elevation of mind which we admire.
    It is merely a steady and well-established pride and self-esteem, or it partakes largely of self-esteem.

Courage, intrepidity, ambition, love of glory, magnanimity, and all the other shining virtues of that kind: have a strong mixture of self-esteem in them, and derive a great part of their merit from self-esteem.

Accordingly, many religious declaimers: decry those virtues as purely pagan and natural, and represent to us the excellency of Christianity which: places humility in the rank of virtues, and corrects the judgment of the world who admire the efforts of pride and ambition.

I shall not decide whether this virtue of humility has been rightly understood. I am content with the concession, that the world naturally esteems a well-regulated pride which secretly animates our conduct, without breaking out into indecent expressions of vanity.

The merit of pride or self-esteem is derived from two circumstances: its utility its agreeableness to ourselves These capacitate us for business and give us an immediate satisfaction. When it goes beyond its just bounds, it loses its utility and even becomes prejudicial. This is why we condemn an extravagant pride and ambition, no matter how regulated by good-breeding and politeness. But such pride is still agreeable. It still conveys an elevated and sublime sensation to the person who has it. The sympathy with that satisfaction considerably reduces the blame which naturally attends its dangerous influence on his behaviour. Accordingly, an excessive courage and magnanimity, especially when it displays itself under the frowns of fortune: contributes greatly to a hero’s character, and will render a person the admiration of posterity, while it: ruins his affairs, and leads him into difficulties he would never have met otherwise.

Heroism, or military glory, is much admired by mankind.

Men consider it as the most sublime kind of merit.

Men of cool reflection are not so sanguine in their praises of it. The infinite confusions and disorder it has caused in the world reduce much of its merit in their eyes. They always paint out the evils produced by heroism in human society: the subversion of empires, the devastation of provinces, and the sack of cities. As long as these are present to us, we are more inclined to hate than admire the ambition of heroes. But when we view the hero himself, there is something so dazzling in his character. Its mere contemplation so elevates the mind, that we cannot refuse to admire it. The pain we receive from its prejudice of society is over-powered by a stronger and more immediate sympathy.

Thus, our explanation of the merit or demerit which attends pride serves as a strong argument for the preceding hypothesis. It shows the effects of those above-explained principles in all our judgments on pride. This reasoning will be advantageous to us by: showing that the distinction of vice and virtue arises from: the four principles of the advantage, and the pleasure of the person himself and others. affording us a strong proof of some under-parts of that hypothesis.

Any in-breeding or expression of pride and haughtiness is displeasing to us merely because it:
    shocks our own pride, and
    leads us by sympathy into a comparison which causes humility.
An insolence of this kind is blamed even in a person:
    who has always been civil to us, and
    whose name is only known to us in history.
It follows that our disapprobation proceeds from:
    a sympathy with others, and
    the reflection that such a proud person would be highly displeasing to those who converse with him.

We sympathize with those people in their uneasiness. Their uneasiness proceeds partly from a sympathy with the person who insults them. A double rebound of the sympathy occurs. This is a principle very similar to what we have observed. (Book 2, Part 2, Sec. 5)