Liberty And Necessity

The direct passions are the impressions arising immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure. Of this kind are:

• desire and aversion
• grief and joy
• hope and fear.

The most remarkable of the immediate effect of pain and pleasure is the WILL.

• The will is not one of the passions.
• Yet the full understanding of its nature and properties is necessary to explain the passions.

I mean ‘will’ as nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious of when we knowingly create any new:

• motion of our body, or
• perception of our mind.

Like pride and humility, love and hatred, it is impossible to define ‘will’. ◦ We shall cut off all those complex definitions and distinctions made by philosophers. ◦ We shall instead examine that long disputed question on liberty and necessity. ▪ This occurs so naturally in treating of the will.

The operations of external bodies are necessary. ◦ There are no traces of indifference or liberty in: ▪ the communication of their motion ▪ their attraction and mutual cohesion. • Every object is determined by an absolute fate to a certain degree and direction of its motion. ◦ It can no more depart from its precise line of movement, than it can convert itself into an angel, spirit, or any superior substance. • Therefore, the actions of matter are instances of necessary actions. ◦ Whatever is in this respect on the same footing with matter, must be acknowledged to be necessary. • We shall examine matter so that we may know: ◦ whether this is the case with the mind’s actions. ◦ why we conclude one body or action to be the infallible cause of another, considering the necessity of its operations.

The ultimate connection of any objects is discoverable by our senses or by reason in no single instance. ◦ We can never penetrate so far into the essence and construction of bodies, as to perceive the principle of their mutual influence. ◦ We are acquainted only with their constant union. ◦ The necessity arises from the constant union. • If objects had no uniform and regular conjunction with each other, we would never arrive at any idea of cause and effect. ◦ The necessity, which enters into the idea of cause and effect, is nothing but a determination of the mind to: ▪ pass from one object to its usual attendant ▪ infer the existence of one from that of the other. • Here are two considerations essential to necessity: ◦ the constant union ◦ the inference of the mind. • Wherever we discover these, we must acknowledge a necessity. • The actions of matter have no necessity, but what is derived from these circumstances. • We do not discover their connection by any insight into the essence of bodies. ◦ The absence of this insight, while the union and inference remain, will never remove the necessity. • The observation of the union which produces the inference. ◦ It might be sufficient to prove a constant union in the mind’s actions to establish the inference, along with their necessity. • I shall examine these particulars apart to give my reasoning more force. ◦ I shall first prove that our actions have a constant union with our motives, tempers, and circumstances, before I consider our inferences from them.

A very general view of common human affairs will be sufficient to prove this.

Whether we consider mankind according to the difference of sexes, ages, governments, conditions, or educational methods, the same uniformity and regular operation of natural principles are discernible. ◦ Like causes still produce like effects; in the same manner as in the mutual action of the elements and powers of nature.

There are different trees which regularly produce fruit, whose relish is different from each other. ◦ This regularity is an instance of necessity and causes in external bodies. • But are the products of Guienne and of Champagne more regularly different than the sentiments, actions, and passions of man and woman? ◦ Men are distinguished by their force and maturity. ◦ Women are distinguished by their delicacy and softness.

• Are the changes of our body from infancy to old age more regular and certain than those of our mind and conduct?
• Would a man expecting a four-year old infant to lift a 300 pound weight, be more ridiculous than a man who expects an infant to look for a philosophical reasoning, or a prudent and well-concerted action?

• The cohesion of the parts of matter arises from natural and necessary principles, whatever difficulty we may find in explaining them.
    ◦ We must allow that:
        ▪ human society is founded on like principles
        ▪ our reason in the latter case is better than even that in the former.
            • Because we:
                ◦ observe that men always seek society
                ◦ can explain the principles of this universal propensity.
• Is it more certain that two flat pieces of marble will unite together, than a young male and female savage will copulate?
    ◦ Do the children from this copulation arise more uniformly, than the parents who care for their safety?
    ◦ After they have grown up, are the inconveniencies in their separation from their parents more certain than their:
        ▪ foresight of these inconveniencies
        ▪ avoidance through a close union and confederacy?

The skin, pores, muscles, nerves, sentiments, actions and manners of a day-labourer are different from those of a man of quality. ◦ The different stations of life influence the whole external and internal fabric. ◦ Different stations arise necessarily and uniformly from the necessary and uniform principles of human nature. • Men cannot: ◦ live without society ◦ be associated without government. ▪ Government makes a distinction of property. • It establishes the different ranks of men. • This produces industry, traffic, manufactures, law-suits, war, leagues, alliances, voyages, travels, cities, fleets, ports, and all those other actions and objects, which cause such a diversity. ◦ It also maintains such an uniformity in human life.

Few people would believe a traveler telling us about a climate in the 50th degree of northern latitude where all the fruits:

• ripen in the winter
• decay in the summer, contrary to that of England

A traveler would have little credit if he tells us of people exactly of the same with those in Plato’s republic or those in Hobbes’s Leviathan.

There is a general course of nature in:

• human actions
• the operations of the sun and climate.

There are also characters peculiar to different nations and persons, as well as common to mankind. ◦ The knowledge of these characters is founded on the observation of an uniformity in their actions. ◦ This uniformity forms the very essence of necessity.

The only way to elude this argument is to deny that uniformity of human actions on which it is founded.

As long as actions have a constant union and connection with the agent’s situation and temper, we really allow the thing. no matter bow we may refuse to acknowledge the necessity.

Some might find a pretext to deny this regular union and connection. ◦ For what is more capricious than human actions? ◦ What more inconstant than men’s desires? ◦ What creature departs more widely from right reason and from his own character and disposition? • An hour, a moment is sufficient to: ◦ make him change from one extreme to another ◦ overturn what cost the greatest pain and labour to establish. • Necessity is regular and certain. ◦ Human conduct is irregular and uncertain. ◦ The one, therefore, proceeds not from the other.

I reply that in judging of the actions of men we must proceed on the same maxims, as when we reason concerning external objects. • When any phenomena are constantly and invariably conjoined together, they acquire such a connection in the imagination. ◦ It passes from one to the other, without any doubt or hesitation.

But below this, there are many inferior degrees of evidence and probability. ◦ One single contrariety of experiment does not entirely destroy all our reasoning. • The mind balances the contrary experiments. ◦ It deducts the inferior from the superior and proceeds with the remaining assurance or evidence. • Even when these contrary experiments are entirely equal, we do not remove the notion of causes and necessity. ◦ But supposing that the usual contrariety proceeds from the operation of contrary and concealed causes, we conclude that the chance or indifference lies only in our judgement from our imperfect knowledge. ◦ It does not lie in the things themselves which are equally necessary in every case. ▪ Though it appears not equally constant or certain. • No union can be more constant and certain than the union of some actions with some motives and characters. ◦ If in other cases, the union is uncertain, it is no more than what happens in the operations of body. ◦ We cannot conclude anything from the one irregularity, which will not follow equally from the other.

Mad-men have no liberty. ◦ But if we judge their actions, these have less regularity and constancy than the actions of wise-men. ◦ Consequently, they are farther removed from necessity. • Therefore, our way of thinking in this is absolutely inconsistent. ◦ It is a natural consequence of these confused ideas and undefined terms which we commonly use in our reasonings, especially on the present subject.

• The union between motives and actions has the same constancy as the union in any natural operations.
    ◦ We must now show that its influence on the understanding is also the same in determining us to infer the existence of one from that of another.
• If this appears, then there is no known circumstance that enters into the connection and production of the actions of matter, that is not to be found in all of the mind’s operations.
    ◦ Consequently, we cannot attribute necessity to the one and refuse into the other.

• No philosopher has a judgement so riveted to this fantastical system of liberty, to:
    ◦ not acknowledge the force of moral evidence
    ◦ not proceed on it both in speculation and practice, as on a reasonable foundation.

Moral evidence is nothing but a conclusion concerning the actions of men, derived from the consideration of their motives, temper and situation.

Thus when we see certain characters or figures described on paper, we infer that the person who produced them would affirm such facts:

• the death of Caesar
• the success of Augustus
• the cruelty of Nero.

Remembering many other concurrent testimonies. we conclude that:

• those facts were once really existant
• so many men without any interest would never conspire to deceive us, especially since they must expose themselves to the derision of all their contemporaries in the attempt, when these facts were asserted to be recent and universally known.

The same kind of reasoning runs through politics, war, commerce, economy. ◦ It mixes itself so entirely in human life. ▪ It is impossible to act or subsist a moment without having recourse to it. • A prince who imposes a tax on his subjects, expects their compliance. ◦ A general who conducts an army, makes account of courage. ◦ A merchant looks for fidelity and skill in his factor or super-cargo. ◦ A man who orders his dinner, does not doubt the obedience of his servants. • In short, nothing more nearly interests us than our own actions and those of others. ◦ Most of our reasonings is employed in judgements concerning them. • Whoever reasons after this manner, does ipso facto believe: ◦ the actions of the will to arise from necessity ◦ that he does not know what he means when he denies it.

• All the objects we call the cause and effect are as distinct and separate from each other as any two things in nature,
    ◦ We can never infer the existence of the  one from the existence of the other.
• It is only from experience and the observation of their constant union that we are able to form this inference.
    ◦ The inference is nothing but the effects of custom on the imagination.
• We must not be content with saying that the idea of cause and effect arises from objects constantly united.
    ◦ We must affirm that:
        ▪ it is the very same with the idea of those objects
        ▪ the necessary connection is not discovered by a conclusion of the understanding, but is merely a perception of the mind.
• We have the idea of causes and necessity, whenever:
    ◦ we observe the same union
    ◦ the union operates in the same way on the belief and opinion.
        ▪ Though perhaps we may avoid those expressions.
• Motion in one body in all past instances that have fallen under our observation, is followed on impulse by motion in another.
    ◦ It is impossible for the mind to penetrate further.
• From this constant union, the mind forms the idea of cause and effect.
    ◦ By its influence, the mind feels the necessity.
• As there is the same constancy and influence in moral evidence, I ask no more.
    ◦ What remains can only be a dispute of words.
• When we consider how aptly natural and moral evidence cement together, and form only one chain of argument between them, we allow that they are:
    ◦ of the same nature
    ◦ derived from the same principles.
• A prisoner, who has neither money nor interest, discovers the impossibility of his escape from both:
    ◦ the obstinacy of the guard
    ◦ the walls and bars surrounding him.
        ▪ In his attempts for freedom, he chooses rather to work on the stone and iron than on the inflexible nature of the guard.
• The same prisoner, when conducted to the scaffold, foresees his death both from:
    ◦ the constancy and fidelity of his guards
    ◦ the operation of the ax.
• His mind runs along a train of ideas:
    ◦ the soldiers’ refusal to let him escape
    ◦ the executioner’s action
    ◦ the separation of the head and body
        ▪ bleeding, convulsive motions, and death.

But the mind feels no difference between this chain of natural causes and voluntary actions in passing from one link to another. ◦ nor is it less certain of the future event than if it were connected with the present impressions of the memory and senses by a train of causes cemented together by a physical necessity. • The same experienced union has the same effect on the mind, whether the united objects are motives, volitions and actions; or figure and motion. • We may change the names of things. ◦ But their nature and their operation on the understanding never change. • No one can ever refute these reasonings than by: ◦ altering my definitions ◦ assigning a different meaning to ’cause’, ‘effect’, ‘necessity’, ‘liberty’, and ‘chance’. • According to my definitions, necessity makes an essential part of causation; and consequently liberty, by removing necessity, removes also causes, and is the very same thing with chance.

Chance is commonly thought to imply a contradiction.

• Chance is directly contrary to experience.
• There are always the same arguments against liberty or free-will.

If any one alters the definitions, I cannot argue with him, until I know his own definitions.