The Mixture of Benevolence and Anger with Compassion and Malice

Pity and malice arise from the imagination, according to how it places its object.

When our fancy directly considers the sentiments of others and enters deep into them, it makes us sensible of all the passions it surveys, but in a particular manner of grief or sorrow.

On the contrary, when we compare the sentiments of others to our own, we feel a sensation directly opposite to the original one.

We feel:

• a joy from the grief of others
• a grief from their joy.

But these are only the first foundations of pity and malice.

Other passions are afterwards confounded with them.

There is always a mixture of:

• love or tenderness with pity
• hatred or anger with malice.

But this mixture seems initially contradictory to my system.

Pity is an uneasiness and malice is a joy arising from the misery of others.

• Pity should naturally produce hatred.
• Malice should naturally produce love.

I reconcile this contradiction in the following way.

To cause a transition of passions, a double relation of impressions and ideas is required.

One relation is insufficient to produce this effect.

The present sensation alone or momentary pain or pleasure does not determine the character of any passion.

Instead, the sensation’s whole bent or tendency from the beginning to the end determines it.

One impression may be related to another when:

• their sensations are resembling
• their impulses or directions are similar and correspondent

This cannot take place in pride and humility.

• Because these are only pure sensations, without any direction or tendency to action.

We should look for instances of this peculiar relation of impressions only in affections that are attended with a certain desire, such as those of love and hatred.

Benevolence or the appetite which attends love, is:

• a desire of the happiness of the person beloved
• an aversion to his misery

Anger or the appetite which attends hatred, is:

• a desire of the misery of the person hated
• an aversion to his happiness

Therefore, a desire of the happiness of another and aversion to his misery, are similar to benevolence.

A desire of his misery and aversion to his happiness are correspondent to anger.

Pity is a desire of another’s happiness and aversion to his misery, as malice is the contrary appetite.

• Pity, then, is related to benevolence and malice is related to anger.

Benevolence has been already found to be connected with love by a natural and original quality.

• Anger is connected with hatred.

By this chain, pity and malice are connected with love and hatred.

This hypothesis is founded on sufficient experience.

A man, who has resolved to do an action from whatever motive, naturally runs into every other motive which may:

• fortify that resolution
• give it authority and influence on the mind.

To confirm us in any design, we search for motives drawn from interest, from honour, from duty.

What wonder, then, that pity and benevolence, malice, and anger, being the same desires arising from different principles, should so totally mix together as to be undistinguishable?

As to the connection between benevolence and love, anger and hatred, being original and primary, it admits of no difficulty.

We may add to this another experiment, viz, that benevolence and anger, and consequently love and hatred, arise when our happiness or misery have any dependance on the happiness or misery of another person, without any farther relation.

I doubt not but this experiment will appear so singular as to excuse us for stopping a moment to consider it.

Suppose that 2 persons of the same trade seek employment in a town that is unable to maintain both.

The success of one is perfectly incompatible with the success of the other

Whatever is for the interest of either is contrary to that of his rival, and so vice versa.

Suppose that two merchants living in different parts of the world enter into partnership.

• The advantage or loss of one becomes immediately the advantage or loss of his partner.
• The same fortune necessarily attends both.

In the first case, hatred always follows on the contrariety of interests.

In the second, love arises from their union.

Let us consider to what principle we can ascribe these passions.

If we regard only the present sensation, love and hatred do not arise from the double relations of impressions and ideas.

In the case of rivalry, the pleasure and advantage of my antagonist causes my pain and loss.

• To counter-balance this, his pain and loss causes my pleasure and advantage.
• I receive from him a superior degree of satisfaction if he is unsuccessful.

In the same way, the success of a partner rejoices me.

His misfortunes afflict me in an equal proportion.

In many cases, the latter sentiment may preponderate.

I always:

• hate my rival
• love my partner, whatever be their fortune.

This love of a partner cannot proceed from the relation or connection between us, in the same way as I love a brother or countryman.

A rival has almost as close a relation to me as a partner.

My partner’s pleasure is my pleasure.

His pain is my pain.

My rival’s pleasure causes my pain.

His pain causes my pleasure.

The connection of cause and effect is the same in both cases.

If in the one case, the cause and effect have a farther relation of resemblance, they have that of contrariety in the other;

• which, being also a species of resemblance, leaves the matter pretty equal.

The only explanation we can give of this phenomenon is derived from that principle of a parallel direction above-mentioned.

Our concern for our own interest gives us:

• a pleasure in our partner’s pleasure
• a pain in our partner’s pain

This is in the same way when we feel a sensation correspondent to the sensations which appear in anyone with us, through sympathy.

On the other hand, the same concern for our interest makes us feel:

• a pain in our rival’s pleasure
• a pleasure in our rival’s pain

This is the same contrariety of sentiments that arises from comparison and malice.

A parallel direction of the affections, proceeding from interest, can cause benevolence or anger.

No wonder the same parallel direction, from sympathy and comparison, has the same effect.

It is impossible to:

• do good to others, from whatever motive, without feeling some kindness and goodwill towards them.
• injure another person, without causing hatred in that person and even in ourselves.

These phenomena may partly be accounted for from other principles.