Experiment 7

Experiment 7

Let us here suppose an identity of passions along with a relation of ideas.

A transition of the passions from the one object to the other is here in all reason to be expected.

Since the relation of ideas is supposed still to continue, and identity of impressions must produce a stronger connection, than the most perfect resemblance, that can be imagined.

If a double relation of impressions and ideas is able to produce a transition from one to the other, much more an identity of impressions with a relation of ideas.

When we love or hate anyone, the passions seldom continue within their first bounds.

They:

• extend themselves towards all the contiguous objects
• include his friends and relations

Nothing is more natural than to bear a kindness to one brother because of our friendship for another, without any further examination of his character.

A quarrel with one person gives us a hatred for his whole innocent family.

Instances of this kind are everywhere.

There is only one difficulty in this experiment.

All passions pass easily from one object to another related to it.

Yet this transition is made with greater facility, where the more considerable object is first presented, and the lesser follows it, than where this order is reversed, and the lesser takes the precedence.

Thus, it is more natural for us to love:

• the son because of the father, than the father because of the son
• the servant for the master, than the master for the servant
• the subject for the prince, than the prince for the subject

We more readily hate a whole family if we have a quarrel with its head, than if we are displeased with a son, servant, or some inferior member. ◦ In short, our passions, like other objects, descend with greater facility than they ascend.

The difficulty of explaining this phenomenon comes from the fact that the imagination:

• passes from remote to contiguous objects with more facility than from contiguous to remote
• changes more easily the less for the greater, than the greater for the less.

Whatever has the greatest influence is most noticed.

Whatever is most noticed, presents itself most readily to the imagination.

We are more apt to over-look what is trivial in any subject than what appears of considerable moment, especially if the considerable one:

• takes the precedence
• first engages our attention

When we consider the Jupiter’s satellites, our fancy naturally forms the idea of Jupiter.

It is more natural for us to overlook its satellites if we first reflect on Jupiter.

The mention of an empire’s provinces conveys our thought to the seat of the empire.

But the fancy does not return with the same facility to the consideration of the provinces.

The idea of the servant makes us think of the master.

The idea of the subject carries our view to the prince.

But the same relation does not have an equal influence in conveying us back again.

This is the foundation of Cornelia’s reproach to her sons. ◦ They should be ashamed she should be more known by the title of the daughter of Scipio than by that of the mother of the Gracchi. ◦ She exhorted them to render themselves as illustrious and famous as their grandfather. ◦ Otherwise, the people’s imagination, passing from her who was intermediate, and placed in an equal relation to both, would: ▪ always leave them ▪ denominate her by what was more considerable and of greater moment. • This principle is the foundation of the: ◦ common custom of making wives bear the name of their husbands ◦ ceremony of giving the precedency to those we honour and respect. • We can find many other obvious instances to confirm this principle. • The fancy finds the same facility in passing from the lesser to the greater, as from remote to contiguous. ◦ Why does this easy transition of ideas not assist the transition of passions in the former case, as well as in the latter? • The virtues of a friend or brother first produce love, and then pride. ◦ Because the imagination passes from remote to contiguous, according to its propensity. • Our own virtues do not produce pride first and then love, to a friend or brother. ◦ Because the passage in that case would be from contiguous to remote, contrary to its propensity. • But the love or hatred of an inferior does not readily cause any passion to the superior, even if that is the imagination’s natural propensity. • While the love or hatred of a superior, causes a passion to the inferior, contrary to its propensity. • In short, the same facility of transition operates not in the same manner upon superior and inferior as upon contiguous and remote. • These two phaenomena appear contradictory, and require some attention to be reconciled. • The transition of ideas is here made contrary to the natural propensity of the imagination. ◦ The imagination must be overpowered by some stronger principle of another kind. ◦ As there is nothing ever present to the mind but impressions and ideas, this principle must necessarily lie in the impressions. • Impressions or passions are connected only by their resemblance. • Where any two passions place the mind in the same or in similar dispositions, it very naturally passes from the one to the other. • A repugnance in the dispositions produces a difficulty in the transition of the passions. • But this repugnance may arise from a difference of degree as well as of kind. • We do not experience a greater difficulty in passing suddenly from a small degree of love to a small degree of hatred, than from a small to a great degree of either of these affections.

When calm or only moderately agitated, a man is so different from himself when disturbed with a violent passion. ◦ It is not easy to pass from the one extreme state to the other, without a considerable interval between them.

The difficulty is not less, if it be not rather greater, in passing from the strong passion to the weak, than in passing from the weak to the strong, provided that: ◦ the one passion on its appearance destroys the other ◦ they do not both exist at once.

But the case is entirely altered when the passions:

• unite together
• actuate the mind at the same time.

A weak passion, when added to a strong, does not make so considerable a change in the disposition, as a strong when added to a weak.

This is why there is a closer connection between the great degree and the small, than between the small degree and the great.

The degree of any passion depends on:

• the nature of its object
• an affection directed to a person considerable in our eyes.

This affection for such a person fills and possesses the mind much more than one for a person we esteem of less consequence.

The contradiction between the propensities of the imagination and passion displays itself. ◦ When we turn our thought to a great and a small object, the imagination finds more facility in passing from the small to the great, than from the great to the small. ◦ But the affections find a greater difficulty. • The affections are a more powerful principle than the imagination. ◦ No wonder they prevail over it and draw the mind to their side. • A passion directed to the great idea always produces a similar passion towards the lesser idea, when the great and little are related. ◦ The idea of the servant conveys our thought most readily to the master. ◦ But the hatred or love of the master produces anger or goodwill with greater facility to the servant. • The strongest passion in this case takes the precedence. ◦ The addition of the weaker passion makes no considerable change on the disposition. ◦ The passage is by that means rendered more easy and natural between them. • A relation of ideas which ceases to produce its usual effect of facilitating the transition of ideas, also ceases to operate on the passions. ◦ We find the same property of the impressions in this experiment. • Two different degrees of the same passion are surely related. ◦ But if the smaller is first present, it has little or no tendency to introduce the greater. ◦ Because the addition of the great to the little, produces a more sensible alteration on the temper, than the addition of the little to the great. • These phenomena are convincing proofs of this hypothesis. • These proofs will be confirmed if we consider how the mind here reconciles the contradiction between the passions and the imagination. ◦ The fancy passes with more facility from the less to the greater, than from the greater to the less. ◦ But on the contrary, a violent passion produces more easily a feeble, than that does a violent. ◦ In this opposition, the passion in the end prevails over the imagination. ◦ but it is commonly by complying with it, and by seeking another quality, which may counter-balance that principle, from whence the opposition arises. • When we love the father of a family, we think little of his children or servants. ◦ But when they are present with us, the nearness and contiguity: ▪ increases their magnitude ▪ removes that opposition made by the fancy to the transition of the affections. • If the imagination finds a difficulty in passing from greater to less, it finds an equal facility in passing from remote to contiguous. ◦ This brings the matter to an equality. ◦ It leaves the way open from the one passion to the other.

Experiment 8

The transition from love or hatred to pride or humility is easier than from pride or humility to love or hatred.

The imagination’s difficulty, in passing from contiguous to remote, is the cause why we do not have any instance of the latter transition of the affections.

One exception is when the very cause of the pride and humility is placed in some other person.

In that case, the imagination:

• is necessitated to consider the person
• cannot possibly confine its view to ourselves.

Nothing more readily produces kindness and affection to any person, than his approbation of our conduct and character. ◦ As on the other hand, nothing inspires us with a stronger hatred, than his blame or contempt.

The original passion is pride or humility. ◦ Its object is the self.

This is transfused into love or hatred. ◦ Its object is some other person, despite the rule that the imagination passes with difficulty from contiguous to remote.

But the transition in this case is not made merely because of the relation between ourselves and the person. ◦ It is made because that very person is the real cause of our first passion. ▪ Consequently, he is intimately connected with it. ◦ It is his approbation that produces pride; and disapprobation, humility.

No wonder, the imagination returns with the related passions of love and hatred. ◦ This is not a contradiction, but an exception to the rule. ◦ It is an exception that arises from the same reason with the rule itself.

This exception is a confirmation of the rule.

The same principle appears in all eight experiments.

Pride and humility, love and hatred are produced by a transition from a double relation of impressions and ideas.

An object without a relation (first experiment), or with but one (second and third experiments), never produces either of these passions.

The passion (fourth experiment) always varies in conformity to the relation.

Where the relation, by any particular circumstance, does not have its usual effect of producing a transition either of ideas or of impressions (sixth experiment), it:

• ceases to operate on the passions
• does not give rise to pride or love, humility or hatred.

This rule still holds good even under the appearance of its contrary (seventh and eighth experiments).

Relation is frequently experienced to have no effect when a particular circumstance prevents the transition.

When that circumstance does not prevent the transition, it arises from some other circumstance which counter-balances it.

Thus, the variations, and the variations of these variations, resolve themselves into the general principle.