THE LOVE OF FAME

The secondary causes of pride and humility in the opinions of others has an equal influence on the affections.

Our reputation, character, and name are considerations of vast weight and importance. ◦ Even the other causes of pride; virtue, beauty and riches have little influence when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others. • To account for this phenomenon, we need to take some compass and first explain the nature of sympathy.

The Importance of Sympathy

The most remarkable quality of human nature, in itself and its consequences, is our propensity to: ◦ sympathize with others ◦ receive their inclinations and sentiments by communication, however different or even contrary to our own. • This is conspicuous in: ◦ children ▪ They implicitly embrace every opinion proposed to them. ◦ in men of the greatest judgment and understanding ▪ They find it very difficult to follow their own reason or inclination, in opposing those of their friends and daily companions. • To this principle we should ascribe the great uniformity in the humours and turn of thinking of those of the same nation. ◦ This resemblance arises more from sympathy, than from any influence of the soil and climate which continues the same. ▪ However, soil and climate cannot keep a nation’s character the same for a century. • A good-natured man finds himself instantly of the same humour with his company. ◦ Even the proudest and most surly take a tincture from their countrymen and acquaintance. • A cheerful countenance infuses a sensible complacency and serenity into my mind. ◦ An angry or sorrowful one throws a sudden dump on me. • I feel the following more from communication than from my own natural temper and disposition: ◦ Hatred, resentment, esteem, love, courage, mirth and melancholy. • This remarkable phenomenon: ◦ merits our attention ◦ must be traced up to its first principles. • When any affection is infused by sympathy, it is at first known only by: ◦ its effects ◦ those external signs in the countenance and conversation which convey its idea. • This idea: ◦ is presently converted into an impression ◦ acquires a force and vivacity to: ▪ become the very passion itself ▪ produce an equal emotion, as any original affection. • No matter how instantaneous this change of the idea into an impression may be, it proceeds from certain views. ◦ These views will not escape a philosopher’s strict scrutiny though they may escape the scrutiny of the person who makes them. • The idea or impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us ◦ Our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person. ◦ It is impossible to imagine that anything can go beyond it. • Therefore, whatever object is related to ourselves, must be conceived with a little vivacity of conception according to the foregoing principles. ◦ Though this relation is not as strong as the relation of causation, it must still have a considerable influence. • Resemblance and contiguity are relations not to be neglected, especially when we are informed of the real existence of the resembling or contiguous object by: ◦ an inference from cause and effect ◦ the observation of external signs. • Nature has preserved a great resemblance among all humans. ◦ We never remark any passion or principle in others, of which we may not find a parallel in ourselves. • The case is the same with the fabric of the mind and the body. ◦ However the parts may differ in shape or size, their structure and composition are generally the same. • There is a very remarkable resemblance which preserves itself amidst all their variety. ◦ This resemblance must very much contribute to make us: ▪ enter into the sentiments of others ▪ embrace them with facility and pleasure. • Besides the general resemblance of our natures, we find that where there is any peculiar similarity in our manners, character, country, or language, it facilitates the sympathy. ◦ The stronger the relation is between ourselves and any object, the more easily the imagination: ▪ makes the transition ▪ conveys to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person. • Resemblance is not the only relation which has this effect. ◦ It receives new force from other relations that may accompany it. • The sentiments of others have little influence when: ◦ far removed from us ◦ the relation of contiguity is required to make them communicate themselves entirely. • The relations of blood is a species of causation. ◦ It may sometimes contribute to the same effect; as also acquaintance, which operates in the same way with education and custom; as we shall see more fully afterwards (Part 2, Sec. 4). • When all these relations are united together, they: ◦ convey our own consciousness to the idea of the sentiments or passions of others ◦ make us conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner. • In the beginning of this treatise, I have remarked that: ◦ all ideas are borrowed from impressions ◦ these two kinds of perceptions differ only in the degrees of force and vivacity which they strike the soul. • The component part of ideas and impressions are precisely alike. ◦ The manner and order of their appearance may be the same. • Therefore, the different degrees of their force and vivacity are the only particulars that distinguish them. • This difference may be removed by a relation between the impressions and ideas. ◦ It is no wonder an idea of a sentiment or passion may by this means be enlivened as to become the very sentiment or passion. • The lively idea of any object always approaches is impression. ◦ We may: ▪ feel sickness and pain from the mere force of imagination ▪ make a malady real by often thinking of it. • This is most remarkable in the opinions and affections. ◦ A lively idea is converted into an impression principally in the opinions and affections. • Our affections depend more on ourselves and the mind’s internal operations, than on any other impressions. ◦ This is why they arise more naturally from: ▪ the imagination ▪ every lively idea we form of them. ◦ This is the nature and cause of sympathy. ▪ This is how we enter so deeply into the opinions and affections of others, whenever we discover them. • What is principally remarkable in this whole affair is the strong confirmation these phenomena give to the foregoing system on the understanding • Consequently, to the present one concerning the passions; since these are analogous to each other. • When we sympathize with the passions and sentiments of others, these movements: ◦ appear at first in our mind as mere ideas. ◦ are conceived to belong to another person, as we conceive any other matter of fact. • The ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very impressions they represent. ◦ The passions arise in conformity to the images we form of them. • All this: ◦ is an object of the plainest experience. ◦ does not depend on any hypothesis of philosophy. • Science can only be admitted to explain the phenomena ◦ They are so clear of themselves that there is little occasion to employ it. • The relation of cause and effect convinces of the reality of the passion we sympathize with. ◦ Besides this, we must be assisted by the relations of resemblance and contiguity, in order to feel the sympathy in its full perfection. • These relations can: ◦ entirely convert an idea into an impression ◦ convey the vivacity of the latter into the former perfectly as to lose nothing of it in the transition. • We may easily conceive how the relation of cause and effect alone, may serve to strengthen and enliven an idea. ◦ In sympathy, there is an evident conversion of an idea into an impression. ◦ This conversion arises from the relation of objects to our self. ◦ Our self is always intimately present to us. • If we compare all these circumstances, we shall find that sympathy: ◦ is exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding. ◦ even contains something more surprising and extraordinary. • We will now view sympathy’s influence on pride and humility, when they arise from: ◦ praise and blame ◦ reputation and infamy. • No person is ever praised by another for any quality which would not produce a pride in the person who has it. ◦ The praises turn on a person’s power, riches, family, or virtue. ▪ All of these are subjects of vanity. • If a person considered himself in the same light he appears to his admirer, he would: ◦ first receive a separate pleasure ◦ afterwards receive a pride or self-satisfaction, according to the hypothesis above explained. • Nothing is more natural than for us to embrace the opinions of others in this, from: ◦ sympathy ▪ It renders all their sentiments intimately present to us. ◦ reasoning ▪ It makes us regard their judgment as a kind of argument for what they affirm. • These two principles of authority and sympathy influence almost all our opinions. ◦ They must have a peculiar influence when we judge of our own worth and character. ◦ Such judgments are always attended with passion (Book 1, Part 3, Sec. 10). • Nothing tends more to disturb our understanding, and precipitate us into any opinions, however unreasonable, than their connection with passion which: ◦ diffuses itself over the imagination ◦ gives an additional force to every related idea. • Being conscious of great partiality in our own favour, we are: ◦ peculiarly pleased with anything that confirms the good opinion we have of ourselves ◦ easily shocked with whatever opposes it. • All this appears very probable in theory. • But to bestow a full certainty on this reasoning, we must examine the phenomena of the passions and see if they agree with it. • Among these phenomena, is that where we receive more satisfaction from the approbation of people we esteem, than of those we hate and despise. ◦ Similarly, we are: ▪ principally mortified with the contempt of persons, whose judgment we value. ▪ slightly indifferent about the opinions of the rest of mankind. • But if the mind received, from any original instinct, a desire of fame and aversion to infamy: ◦ fame and infamy would influence us without distinction. ◦ every opinion would equally excite that desire or aversion. ▪ A fool’s judgment would be another person’s judgment and that of a wise man. ▪ These would be only inferior in its influence on our own judgment. • We are better pleased with the approbation of a wise man than with that of a fool. • We receive an additional satisfaction from the former, when it is obtained after a long and intimate acquaintance. • The praises of others never give us much pleasure, unless they: ◦ concur with our own opinion ◦ extol us for those qualities we chiefly excel in. • A mere soldier values little eloquence. ◦ A civilian, courage ◦ A bishop, humour, or ◦ A merchant, learning. • The world’s opinions on a quality, which one person does not have, will give that person little pleasure because they never will be able to draw his own opinion after them. • Men of good families but narrow circumstances usually leave their friends and country. ◦ They rather seek their livelihood by mean and mechanical employments among strangers, than among those who are acquainted with their birth and education. • They say, we shall be unknown where we go. ◦ Nobody will suspect from what family we are sprung. ◦ We shall be removed from all our friends and acquaintance. ◦ Our poverty and meanness will sit easier on us. • I find that these sentiments afford very convincing arguments for my present purpose. 1. The uneasiness of being contemned depends on sympathy. ◦ That sympathy depends on the relation of objects to ourselves, since we are most uneasy under the contempt of persons related to us by blood and contiguous in place. ◦ Hence we seek to reduce this sympathy and uneasiness by: ▪ separating these relations ▪ placing ourselves: • in a contiguity to strangers • at a distance from relations. 2. Relations are requisite to sympathy, not absolutely considered as relations, but by their influence in converting our ideas of the sentiments of others into the very sentiments, through the association between: ◦ the idea of their persons ◦ the idea of our own ▪ For here the relations of kindred and contiguity both subsist; but not being united in the same persons, they contribute in a less degree to the sympathy. 3. The reduction of sympathy by the separation of relations is worthy of our attention. ◦ Suppose I am placed in a poor condition among strangers and consequently am lightly treated. ◦ I find myself easier in that situation than when I was everyday exposed to the contempt of my kindred and countrymen. ▪ Here I feel a double contempt from my relations. ▪ But they are absent; from those about me, but they are strangers. ▪ This double contempt is likewise strengthened by the two relations of kindred and contiguity. ◦ But the persons, who are connected with me by those two relations, are not the same. ▪ This difference of ideas: • separates the impressions arising from the contempt • keeps them from running into each other. ◦ My neighbours’ contempt has a certain influence, as has also that of my kindred. ▪ But these influences are: • distinct • never unite as when the contempt proceeds from persons who are both my neighbours and kindred. ◦ This phenomenon is analogous to the system of pride and humility above-explained. ▪ This system may seem so extraordinary to vulgar apprehensions. 4. A person in these circumstances naturally: ◦ conceals his birth from those with whom he lives ◦ is very uneasy if any one suspects him to be of a family much superior to his present fortune and way of living. ▪ Everything in this world is judged of by comparison. ▪ An immense fortune for a private gentleman is beggary for a prince. ▪ A peasant would think himself happy in what cannot afford necessaries for a gentleman. ▪ When a man has been used to a more splendid way of living, or thinks himself entitled to it by his birth and quality, everything below is disagreeable and even shameful • He very much conceals his pretensions to a better fortune. • He himself knows his misfortunes. • But as those, with whom he lives. are ignorant of them, he: ◦ has the disagreeable reflection and comparison suggested only by his own thoughts ◦ never receives it by a sympathy with others; which must contribute very much so his ease and satisfaction. • This hypothesis is that the pleasure we receive from praise arises from a communication of sentiments. ◦ Any objections to this will confirm this hypothesis. • Popular fame may be agreeable even to a man who despises the vulgar, because their multitude gives them additional weight and authority. • Plagiaries are delighted with praises which they know they do not deserve. ◦ This is a kind of castle-building where the imagination: ▪ amuses itself with its own fictions ▪ strives to render them firm and stable by a sympathy with the sentiments of others. • Proud men are most shocked with contempt because of the opposition between pride and the passion received by sympathy. • Similarly, a violent lover is very much displeased when you blame and condemn his love. ◦ Even if your opposition can only influence by: ▪ its hold of himself ▪ his sympathy with you. • Whatever you say has no effect on him if he despises you or perceives you are joking.