People Should Study Philosophy over Religion

If this curiosity and ambition does not make me speculate outside of common life, my inquiries would come from my weakness.

Superstition is much bolder in its systems and hypotheses than philosophy. Philosophy contents itself with assigning new causes and principles to the phenomena in the visible world.

But superstition opens a world of its own.

• It presents us with new scenes, beings, and objects.

Like the minds of animals, it is almost impossible for man’s mind to rest in that narrow circle of objects which are the subject of daily conversation and action.

Therefore, we should:

• only deliberate on the choice of our guide, and
• prefer the guide which is safest and most agreeable.

I boldly recommend philosophy.

I prefer philosophy to all kinds of superstition.

Superstition arises naturally and easily from mankind’s popular opinions.

It seizes more strongly on the mind.

It is often able to disturb us in our lives and actions.

On the contrary, if philosophy is just, it can present us only with mild and moderate sentiments.

If false and extravagant, its opinions are merely the objects of a cold and general speculation.

They seldom go so far as to interrupt the course of our natural propensities.

The cynics are an extraordinary instance of philosophers.

From purely philosophical reasonings, they run into great extravagancies of conduct as any monk.

Generally, the errors in religion are dangerous.

Errors in philosophy are only ridiculous.

Not everyone have these two cases of the strength and weakness of the mind.

There are many honest gentlemen in England who have carried their thoughts little beyond those everyday objects.

I do not see them as philosophers.

I do not expect them to be researchers nor proper critics.

Instead of calling them as philosophers, these down-to-earth people should be referred to the founders of philosophical systems in order to temper the fiery principles of those systems.

A warm imagination can enter into philosophy.

Hypotheses can be embraced merely for being specious and agreeable.

But we can never have any steady principles nor feelings which will suit common life.

If these hypotheses are removed, we might establish a set of opinions that:

• can be satisfactory to the human mind, and
• can stand the most critical examination.

We should not despair of reaching this goal.

Many chimerical systems have arisen and decayed away.

This leads us to consider the shortness of that time when these questions first arose.

2,000 years, with such long interruptions and under such mighty discouragements, is a short span of time to give any tolerable perfection to the sciences.

Perhaps we are still in too early an age to discover any principles which will bear the examination of the latest posterity.

My only hope is that I may contribute a little to the advancement of knowledge, by:

• giving a different turn to the speculations of philosophers, and
• pointing out to them more distinctly those subjects, where alone they can expect assurance and conviction.

Human Nature is the only science of man.

Yet has been the most neglected. It will be sufficient for me, if I can bring it a little more into fashion.

This hope:

• composes my temper from that spleen, and
• invigorates it from that indolence, which sometimes prevails in me.

If the reader has the same easy disposition, let him follow me in my future speculations.

If not, let him:

• follow his inclination, and
• wait the returns of application and good humour.

A man who studies philosophy in this careless way is more truly skeptical than the man who feels an inclination to it, but is so overwhelmed with doubts and scruples, as totally to reject it.

A true skeptic will be diffident of his philosophical doubts and conviction. He will never refuse any innocent satisfaction which offers itself.

We should:

• do the most elaborate philosophical researches, despite our skeptical principles, and
• be positive and certain in particular points, according to how we survey them.

It is easier:

• to refrain from enquiry than to check ourselves, and
• to guard against that assurance, which always arises from an exact and full survey of an object.

On such times, we often forget our skepticism and modesty.

We say:

• ‘it is evident’
• ‘it is certain’
• ‘it is undeniable’.

A due deference to the public should perhaps prevent these.

I may have made this mistake after the example of others.

But I warn here against objections. My expressions come from my present views.

They imply:

• no dogmatical spirit, and
• no conceited idea of my own judgment.

These are my skeptical feelings alone.