The flights of the imagination

In the end, we must become ashamed of our credulity.

The flights of the imagination are most dangerous to reason. This has been the biggest cause of the mistakes among philosophers.

Men of bright fancies cn be compared to those angels covering their eyes with their wings.

On the other hand, it would be fatal if we steadily reject all the trivial suggestions of the fancy.

Section 1 showed that the understanding entirely subverts itself when it acts alone to its most general principles.

It does not leave any evidence in any proposition in philosophy or common life. We only save ourselves from this total skepticism through our fancy.

This property lets us enter with difficulty into the remote views of things.

We are not able to accompany them with so sensible an impression, as we do those, which are more easy and natural. We then establish as a general maxim, that no refined or elaborate reasoning is ever to be received?

By this, you cut off entirely all science and philosophy.

You:

• proceed on one singular quality of the imagination,
• must embrace all of them by a parity of reason, and
• expressly contradict yourself, since this maxim must be built on the preceding reasoning which is sufficiently refined and metaphysical.

What party then, shall we choose among these difficulties? If we embrace this principle and condemn all refined reasoning, we run into the most manifest absurdities.

If we reject it in favour of these reasonings, we subvert entirely the human understanding. We therefore have no choice between a false reason and none at all. I do not know what should be done in this case. This difficulty is seldom or never thought of. It is quickly forgotten even when it has been thought of. It leaves but a small impression behind it. Very refined reflections have little or no influence on us.

Yet we cannot establish it as a rule that they should not have any influence. This would imply a manifest contradiction. This means that very refined and metaphysical reflections have little or no influence on us.

But I cannot resist:

• retracting this opinion, and
• condemning it from my present feeling and experience.

The intense view of these contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so heated my brain.

I am ready to:

• reject all belief and reasoning, and
• look on no opinion even as more probable or likely than another.

Where am I, or what am I?

From what causes do I derive my existence? To what condition shall I return? Whose favour shall I court? Whose anger must I dread? What beings surround me? Whom have, I any influence, or who have any influence on me? I am confounded with all these questions.

I begin to fancy myself: in the most deplorable condition imaginable, surrounded with the deepest darkness, and utterly deprived of the use of every member and faculty. Reason cannot dispel these clouds. But fortunately, nature herself comes to my aid. It cures me of this philosophical sadness and delirium by: relaxing this bent of mind, or some lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends. After three hours’ amusement, I return to these speculations, they appear so cold, strained, and ridiculous. I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther. I find myself absolutely and necessarily determined to live, talk, and act like other people. However, I still feel perplexed because of: my natural propensity, and my animal spirits and passions. These reduce me to this indolent belief in the general maxims of the world. I am ready to: throw all my books and papers into the fire resolve never to renounce the pleasures of life for the sake of reasoning and philosophy. That is how I feel now. I must yield to the current of nature, in submitting to my senses and understanding. In this blind submission, I show most perfectly my sceptical disposition and principles. Does it follow that I must:

strive against the current of nature? It would lead me to indolence and pleasure. seclude myself from the commerce and society of men? These are so agreeable or torture my brains with subtilities and sophistries, when: I cannot be happy on the reasonableness of so painful an application I cannot arrive at the truth from them? Why do I have to waste my time?

How can it help me or mankind? All those who reason or believe anything certainly are fools.

If I must be a fool, at least my follies are natural and agreeable. Where I strive against my inclination, I have a good reason for my resistance. I will no longer wander into these dreary solitudes and rough passages. This is how I feel.

I confess that philosophy cannot oppose them. Philosophy expects a victory more from the returns of a serious good-humoured disposition, than from the force of reason and conviction. We should always preserve our skepticism. We believe that fire warms or water refreshes because it costs us too much pains to think otherwise.

Philosophers should only operate on skeptical principles and only because they are inclined to do so. Where reason is lively and mixes itself with some propensity, it should be assented to. Where it does not, it can never operate on us. When I am tired with amusement and company, and have returned to my room or to a solitary walk by a riverside, I feel my mind all collected within itself.

I am naturally inclined to think of all those subjects which I have had disputes in my reading and conversation.

I am not curious about:

• the principles of moral good and evil
• the nature and foundation of government
• the cause of those several passions and inclinations, which actuate and govern me.

I am uneasy to think that I:

• approve of one object and disapprove of another,
• call one thing beautiful and another deformed, and
• decide on truth and falsehood, reason and folly, without knowing on what principles I proceed.

The learned world is ignorant of all these particulars.

I feel an ambition to:

• teach mankind, and
• make a name by my inventions and discoveries.

People Should Study Philosophy over Religion

If this curiosity and ambition does not make me speculate outside of common life, my inquiries would come from my weakness.

Superstition is much bolder in its systems and hypotheses than philosophy. Philosophy contents itself with assigning new causes and principles to the phenomena in the visible world.

But superstition opens a world of its own.

• It presents us with new scenes, beings, and objects.

Like the minds of animals, it is almost impossible for man’s mind to rest in that narrow circle of objects which are the subject of daily conversation and action.

Therefore, we should:

• only deliberate on the choice of our guide, and
• prefer the guide which is safest and most agreeable.

I boldly recommend philosophy.

I prefer philosophy to all kinds of superstition.

Superstition arises naturally and easily from mankind’s popular opinions.

It seizes more strongly on the mind.

It is often able to disturb us in our lives and actions.

On the contrary, if philosophy is just, it can present us only with mild and moderate sentiments.

If false and extravagant, its opinions are merely the objects of a cold and general speculation.

They seldom go so far as to interrupt the course of our natural propensities.

The cynics are an extraordinary instance of philosophers.

From purely philosophical reasonings, they run into great extravagancies of conduct as any monk. Generally, the errors in religion are dangerous. Errors in philosophy are only ridiculous.

Not everyone have these two cases of the strength and weakness of the mind. There are many honest gentlemen in England who have carried their thoughts little beyond those everyday objects. I do not see them as philosophers. I do not expect them to be researchers nor proper critics.

Instead of calling them as philosophers, these down-to-earth people should be referred to the founders of philosophical systems in order to temper the fiery principles of those systems.

A warm imagination can enter into philosophy.

Hypotheses can be embraced merely for being specious and agreeable. But we can never have any steady principles nor feelings which will suit common life. If these hypotheses are removed, we might establish a set of opinions that: can be satisfactory to the human mind, and can stand the most critical examination. We should not despair of reaching this goal.

Many chimerical systems have arisen and decayed away.

This leads us to consider the shortness of that time when these questions first arose.

2,000 years, with such long interruptions and under such mighty discouragements, is a short span of time to give any tolerable perfection to the sciences.

Perhaps we are still in too early an age to discover any principles which will bear the examination of the latest posterity.

My only hope is that I may contribute a little to the advancement of knowledge, by:

• giving a different turn to the speculations of philosophers, and
• pointing out to them more distinctly those subjects, where alone they can expect assurance and conviction.

Human Nature is the only science of man.

Yet has been the most neglected. It will be sufficient for me, if I can bring it a little more into fashion.

This hope:

• composes my temper from that spleen, and
• invigorates it from that indolence, which sometimes prevails in me.

If the reader has the same easy disposition, let him follow me in my future speculations.

If not, let him:

• follow his inclination, and
• wait the returns of application and good humour.

A man who studies philosophy in this careless way is more truly skeptical than the man who feels an inclination to it, but is so overwhelmed with doubts and scruples, as totally to reject it.

A true skeptic will be diffident of his philosophical doubts and conviction. He will never refuse any innocent satisfaction which offers itself.

We should:

• do the most elaborate philosophical researches, despite our skeptical principles, and
• be positive and certain in particular points, according to how we survey them.

It is easier:

• to refrain from enquiry than to check ourselves, and
• to guard against that assurance, which always arises from an exact and full survey of an object.

On such times, we often forget our skepticism and modesty.

We use terms such as:

• ‘it is evident’
• ‘it is certain’
• ‘it is undeniable’.

A due deference to the public should perhaps prevent these.

I may have made this mistake after the example of others.

But I warn here against objections. My expressions come from my present views.

They imply:

• no dogmatical spirit, and
• no conceited idea of my own judgment.

These are my skeptical feelings alone.