Proofs

All the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward feeling.

The mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will.

All our ideas are copies of our impressions. I have 2 proofs for this.

Proof 1

¹⁴ When we analyze our thoughts or ideas, we always find that they resolve themselves into the simple ideas that were copied from a precedent feeling .

We find upon scrutiny that even those ideas which initially seem to be the most wide of this origin are derived from sentiment.

The idea of God is an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being.

This arises from:

• reflecting on the operations of our own mind
• augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom

We may prosecute this enquiry to what length we please.

Yet we shall always find that every idea which we examine is copied from a similar impression.

Some might assert that this position is not universally true nor without exception.

• They have only one easy method of refuting it.

They produce an idea which they think is not derived from impression.

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Proof 2

A man might not get a kind of sensation because of a defect of the organ.

Yet we always find that he is as little susceptible of the correspondent ideas.

A blind man has no notion of colours.

A deaf man has no notion of sounds.

Restore either of them that sense that he lacks and you will also open an inlet for the ideas.

He them finds no difficulty in conceiving these objects.

The case is the same, if the object, proper for exciting any sensation, has never been applied to the organ.

A Laplander or Negro has no notion of wine.

But he has a latent feeling of drunkeness in his mind.

A man of mild manners can form no idea of extreme cruelty.

A selfish heart cannot easily conceive the heights of friendship and generosity.

Other beings may have many senses that we do not.

The ideas that those senses produce have never been introduced to us because we lack the actual feeling and sensation.

¹⁶ There is, however, one contradictory phenomenon, which may prove that it is not absolutely impossible for ideas to arise, independent of their correspondent impressions.

The several ideas of colour and sound are different from each other yet resembling.

Each of the different shades of the same colour produces a distinct idea, independent of the rest.

Through the continual gradation of shades, one colour can insensibly turn into what is most remote from it.

Suppose a person has seen all the colours except one particular shade of blue.

Place blue before him, with all its shades from dark to light, but is missing that one shade.

He will perceive a blank where that shade is missing.

He will be able to supply this deficiency from his own imagination.

This is proof that the simple ideas are not always derived from the correspondent impressions.

This instance is so singular that it:

• is scarcely worth our observing
• does not change my general maxim*

¹⁷ All ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally faint and obscure.

The mind has a slender hold of them.

They tend to be confounded with other resembling ideas.

When we have often employed any term, though without a distinct meaning, we are apt to imagine it has a determinate idea annexed to it.

On the contrary, all impressions, that is, all sensations, either outward or inward, are strong and vivid: the limits between them are more exactly determined: nor is it easy to fall into any error or mistake with regard to them.

When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion.

By bringing ideas into so clear a light we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute, which may arise, concerning their nature and reality.1