The Sovereign Good

TO THE QUEEN OF SWEDEN.

LETTER I.

MADAM,

Monsieur Chanut told that you wanted my opinion on the Sovereign Good, as the ancient philosophers spoke of it.

One may consider the goodness of each thing in itself, without relating it to anything else; in which sense it is evident that God is the Sovereign Good, because He is incomparably more perfect than creatures; but one may also relate it to ourselves, and in this sense I see nothing that we ought to esteem as good except what belongs to us in some way, and is such that it is a perfection for us to possess it. Thus the ancient philosophers, who, not being enlightened by the light of Faith, knew nothing of supernatural beatitude, considered only the goods that we can possess in this life; and it was among these that they sought which was the Sovereign—that is to say, the chief and the greatest. But in order that I may determine it, I consider that we ought to esteem as goods in our regard only those things that we possess, or that we have the power to acquire; and this being granted, it seems to me that the Sovereign Good of all men together is a collection or assemblage of all the goods, both of the soul and of the body and of fortune, that can be found in any men; but that the Sovereign Good of each individual in particular is something quite different, and consists only in a firm will to do well, and in the contentment that it produces. The reason for this is that I observe no other good that seems to me so great, nor that is entirely within the power of each individual. For as for the goods of the body and of fortune, they do not depend absolutely on us; and those of the soul all relate to two principal things, namely, knowing and willing what is good; but knowledge is often beyond our powers; hence there remains only our will, of which we can absolutely dispose. And I do not see that it is possible to dispose of it better than if one always has a firm and constant resolution to perform exactly all the things that one shall judge to be the best, and to employ all the powers of one’s mind in coming to know them well. It is in this alone that all the virtues consist; it is this alone that, properly speaking, deserves praise and glory; finally, it is from this alone that there always results the greatest and most solid contentment in life: thus I judge that it is in this that the Sovereign Good consists. And in this way I think I reconcile the two most contrary and most celebrated opinions of the ancients—namely, that of Zeno, who placed it in virtue, or in honor, and that of Epicurus, who placed it in contentment, to which he gave the name of pleasure. For just as all vices come only from uncertainty and from weak faith that follows upon ignorance, and that gives rise to remorse; so virtue consists only in the resolution and vigor with which one applies oneself to doing the things one believes to be good, provided that this vigor comes not from obstinacy, but from one’s knowing that one has examined them as much as one is morally able to do; and although what one then does may be evil, one is nevertheless assured that one is doing one’s duty; whereas if one performs some virtuous action, but at the same time thinks one is doing wrong, or neglects to find out the truth of the matter, one does not act as a virtuous man. As for honor and praise, they are often attributed to other goods of fortune; but because I am assured that Your Majesty sets more store by your virtue than by your crown, I shall not fear to say here that it does not seem to me that there is anything but this virtue that one has just reason to praise. All other goods deserve only to be esteemed, and not to be honored or praised, except insofar as one presupposes that they have been acquired, or obtained from God, through the right use of free will. For honor and praise are a kind of reward, and there is nothing but what depends on the will that one has grounds to reward or to punish. It remains for me here to prove that it is from this right use of free will that the greatest and most solid contentment of life proceeds, which seems to me not difficult; because, carefully considering in what pleasure or delight consists, and generally all the kinds of contentment that one can have, I observe in the first place that there is none that is not entirely in the soul, although many depend on the body; just as it is also the soul that sees, although it is through the mediation of the eyes. Then, I observe that there is nothing that can give contentment to the soul except the opinion it has of possessing some good; and that often this opinion is in it only a very confused representation, and even that its union with the body is the reason why it ordinarily represents to itself certain goods as incomparably greater than they are; but that if it distinctly knew their just value, its contentment would always be proportionate to the greatness of the good from which it would proceed. I also observe that the greatness of a good in our regard ought not to be measured only by the value of the thing in which it consists, but principally also by the manner in which it relates to us; and that besides free will being in itself the noblest thing that can be in us, inasmuch as it renders us in some way like God and seems to exempt us from being subject to Him, and that consequently its right use is the greatest of all our goods, it is also that which is most properly ours and which matters most to us; from which it follows that it is only from it that our greatest contentments can proceed. Thus one sees, for example, that peace of mind and the inner satisfaction felt in themselves by those who know that they never fail to do their best, both in knowing the good and in acquiring it, is a pleasure incomparably sweeter, more lasting, and more solid than all those that come from elsewhere. I omit here many other things, because, representing to myself the number of affairs that arise in the conduct of a great kingdom, and of which Your Majesty herself takes the cares, I dare not ask for a longer audience; but I am sending to Monsieur Chanut some writings in which I have put my sentiments at greater length touching the same matter, so that if it pleases Your Majesty to see them, he may oblige me by presenting them to you,

From Egmond, this 20th November 1647.