The Relation of Laws to the Nature of monarchical Government

Chapter 4: The Relation of Laws to the Nature of monarchical Government

THE intermediate, subordinate, and dependent powers constitute the nature of monarchical government; I mean of that in which a single person governs by fundamental laws. I said, the intermediate, subordinate, and dependent powers: and indeed,

In monarchies, the prince is the source of all power, political and civil.

These fundamental laws necessarily suppose the intermediate channels through which the power flows; for, if there be only the momentary and capricious will of a single person to govern the state, nothing can be fixed, and of course there is no fundamental law.

The nobility is:

• the most natural intermediate and subordinate power
• essential to a monarchy.

Its fundamental maxim is, No monarch, no nobility; no nobility, no monarch: but there may be a despotic prince.

Some people have tried to suppress the nobility’s jurisdiction in some countries in Europe. They did not perceive that they were driving at the very thing that was done by the parliament of England.

Abolish the privileges of the lords, the clergy, and cities in a monarchy and you will soon have either:

• a popular state, or
• a despotic government.

The courts of a considerable kingdom in Europe have, for many ages, been striking at the patrimonial jurisdiction of the lords and clergy. We do not pretend to censure these sage magistrates; but we leave it to the public to judge how far this may alter the constitution.

I hope that the privileges of the clergy be fixed. The question is not, whether their jurisdiction was justly established; but, whether it be really established; whether it constitutes a part of the laws of the country, and is in every respect relative to those laws; whether, between two powers acknowledged independent, the conditions ought not to be reciprocal; and whether it be not equally the duty of a good subject to defend the prerogative of the prince, and to maintain the limits which from time immemorial he has prescribed to his authority.

The ecclesiastic power is so dangerous in a republic. Yet it is extremely proper in a monarchy, especially the absolute kind. The Church was the only barrier against arbitrary power in Spain and Portugal, since the subversion of their laws.

The ocean’s waves are stopped by weeds and pebbles that lie scattered along the shore. Likewise, the power of monarchs is restrained by the smallest obstacles and their natural pride is subdued by supplication and prayer.

The English, to favour their liberty, have abolished all the intermediate powers of which their monarchy was composed. They have a great deal of reason to be jealous of this liberty: were they ever to be so unhappy as to lose it, they would be one of the most servile nations upon earth.

Mr. Law, through ignorance both of a republican and monarchical constitution, was one of the greatest promoters of absolute power in Europe. Besides the violent and extraordinary changes owing to his direction, he would fain suppress all the intermediate ranks, and abolish the political communities.

He was dissolving* the monarchy by his chimerical reimbursements, and seemed as if he even wanted to redeem the constitution.

It is not enough to have intermediate powers in a monarchy. There must be also a depositary of the laws. This depositary can only be the judges of the supreme courts of justice, who promulge the new laws, and revive the obsolete.

The natural ignorance of the nobility, their indolence, and contempt of civil government, require there should be a body invested with a power of reviving and executing the laws, which would be otherwise buried in oblivion.

The prince’s council are not a proper depositary. They are naturally the depositary of the momentary will of the prince, and not of the fundamental laws. Besides, the prince’s council is continually changing. It is neither permanent nor numerous; neither has it a sufficient share of the confidence of the people; consequently it is incapable to set them right in difficult conjunctures, or to reduce them to proper obedience.

Despotic governments, where there are no fundamental laws, have no such kind of depositary. Hence, religion generally has so much influence in those countries, because it forms a kind of permanent depositary. If this cannot be said of religion, it may of the customs that are respected instead of laws.

Chapter 5: The Laws relative to the Nature of a despotic Government

A despot’s senses continually tell him that:

• he is everything
• his subjects are nothing

So he is naturally lazy, voluptuous, and ignorant.

And so he neglects the management of public affairs.

If he delegated the administration to many, there would be continual disputes among them.

So he naturally chooses a vizir to represent him.

The creation of a vizir is a fundamental law of this government.

It is related of a pope, that he had started an infinite number of difficulties against his election, from a thorough conviction of his incapacity.

At length he was prevailed on to accept of the pontificate, and resigned the administration entirely to his nephew.

He was soon struck with surprize, and said, “I should never have thought that these things were so easy.”

The same may be said of the princes of the East, who, being educated in a prison, where eunuchs corrupt their hearts and debase their understandings, and where they are frequently kept ignorant of their high rank, when drawn forth in order to be placed on the throne, they are at first confounded.

But, as soon as they have chosen a vizir, and abandoned themselves in their seraglio to the most brutal passions, pursuing, in the midst of a prostituted court, every capricious extravagance, they could never have dreamt to find matters so easy.

The more extensive the empire, the larger the seraglio.

Consequently, the more voluptuous the prince.

Hence the more nations such a sovereign has to rule, the less he attends to the cares of government.

The more important his affairs, the less he makes them the subject of his deliberations.