Book 1

Aph. 25.* [Possibly the Vedántí may remonstrate] ‘We are not asserters of any Six Categories, like the Vaiśeshikas and others.’

Aph. 26.* Even although this be not compulsory [that the categories be six, or sixteen], there is no acceptance of the inconsistent; else we come to the level of children, and madmen, and the like.

Aph. 27.* [The bondage] thereof moreover, is not caused by any influence of objects from all eternity.

Aph. 28.* Also [in my opinion, as well as in yours, apparently], between the external and the internal there is not the relation of influenced and influencer; because there is a local separation; as there is between him that stays at Srughna and him that stays at Páṭaliputra.

Aph. 29.* [It is impossible that the soul’s bondage should arise] from an influence received in the same place [where the object is; because, in that case], there would be no distinction between the two, [the bond and the free].

Aph. 30.* If [the heretic, wishing to save his theory suggests that a difference between the two cases (see § 29) does exist] in virtue of the unseen, [i.e., of merit and demerit, then he will find his answer in the next aphorism].

Aph. 31.* They cannot stand in the relation of deserver and bestower, since the two do not belong to one and the same time.

Aph. 32.* If [the heretic suggests that] the case is like that of the ceremonies in regard to a son, [then he will find his reply by looking forward].

Aph. 33.* [Your illustration proves nothing;] for, in that case, there is no one permanent soul which could be consecrated by the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c.

Aph. 34.* Since there is no such thing as a permanent result [on the heretical view], the momentariness [of bondage, also, is to be admitted].

Aph. 35.* No, [things are not momentary in their duration]; for the absurdity of this is proved by recognition.

Aph. 36.* And [things are not momentary;] because this is contradicted by Scripture and reasoning.

Aph. 37.* And [we reject the argument of this heretic;] because his instance is not a fact.

Aph. 38.* It is not between two things coming simultaneously into existence, that the relation of cause and effect exists.

Aph. 39.* Because, when the antecedent departs the consequent is unfit [to arise, and survive it].

Aph. 40.* Moreover, not [on the theory of the momentary duration of things can there be such a relation as that of cause and effect]; because, while the one [the antecedent] exists, the other [the consequent] is incompatible, because the two keep always asunder.3

Aph. 41.* If there were merely antecedence, then there would be no determination [of a substantial or material cause, as distinguished from an instrumental cause].

Aph. 42.* Not Thought alone exists; because there is the intuition of the external.

Aph. 43.* Then, since, if the one does not exist, the other does not exist, there is a void, [i.e., nothing exists at all].

Aph. 44.* The reality is a void: what is perishes; because to perish is the habit of things.

Aph. 45.* This is a mere counter-assertion of unintelligent persons.

Aph. 46.* Moreover, this [nihilistic theory is not a right one]; because it has the same fortune as both the views [which were confuted just before].

Aph. 47.* In neither way [whether as a means, or as an end,] is this [annihilation] the soul’s aim.

Aph. 48.* Not from any kind of motion [such as its entrance into a body, does the soul’s bondage result].

Aph. 49.* Because this is impossible for what is inactive, [or in other words without motion]

Aph. 50.* [We cannot admit that the soul is other than all-pervading; because] by its being limited, since it would come under the same conditions as jars, &c., there would be a contradiction to our tenet [of its imperishableness].

Aph. 51.* The text regarding the motion [of the soul], moreover, is [applicable, only] because of the junction of an attendant;1 as in the case of the Ether [or Space, which moves not, though we talk of the space enclosed in a jar, as moving with the jar].

Aph. 52.* Nor, moreover, [does the bondage of the soul result from the merit or demerit arising] from works; because these belong not thereto.

Aph. 53.*4 If the case were otherwise [than as I say], then it [the bondage of the soul might extend unduly, even to the emancipated]

Aph. 54.* This [opinion, that the bondage of the soul arises from any of causes alleged by the heretics,] is contrary to such texts as the one that declares it [the soul] to be without qualities: and so much for that point.

Aph. 55.* Moreover, the conjunction thereof does not, through non-discrimination, take place [in the case of the emancipated]; nor is there a parity, p. 58 [in this respect, between the emancipated and the unemancipated].