Rebellion
Table of Contents
The distinction of moral good and evil is founded on the pleasure or pain resulting from the view of any sentiment or character.
That pleasure or pain must be known to the person who feels it.
It follows that: *22
- there is just so much vice or virtue in any character, and
- we can never be mistaken in this.
Our judgments on the origin of any vice or virtue is not so certain as those concerning their degrees.
In this case, the question does not regard any philosophical origin of an obligation, but a plain matter of fact.
Thus, it is not easily conceived how we can fall into an error.
A man who acknowledges himself to be bound to another for a certain sum, must certainly know:
- whether it is by his own bond or by his father’s hand,
- of his mere goodwill or for money lent him,
- under what conditions, and
- why he has bound himself.
Similarly, there is a moral obligation to submit to government because everyone thinks so.
This obligation does not arise from a promise.
Since no one has ever yet dreamed of ascribing it to a promise.
Magistrates nor subjects have formed this idea of our civil duties.
Footnote 22:
This proposition must hold strictly true with regard to every quality determined by sentiment.
Afterwards, we shall consider in what sense we can talk of a right or a wrong taste in morals, eloquence, or beauty.
Mankind’s general sentiments are uniform
They render such questions of small importance.
Rebellion
Magistrates do not derive their authority from a promise or original contract.
If this were the sanction of government, our rulers would never receive it tacitly.
Since what is given tacitly can never have such influence on mankind, as what is performed openly.
A tacit promise is where the will is signified by more diffuse signs other than those of speech.
- But there must be a will, no matter how silent or tacit.
But if you ask the people whether they had ever consented to the authority of their rulers, or promised to obey them, they would think very strangely of you.
They would reply that it did not depend on their consent, but that they were born to such an obedience.
Because of this opinion, we frequently see the people imagine such persons to be their natural rulers.
Their rulers might have come from that line of rulers, from a long time ago. But now they might be deprived of all power and authority. No man would voluntarily choose them today or give them any promise of obedience.
Does a government then have no authority over the people, because they never consented to it?
Will a government see the attempt of such a free choice as arrogance and impiety?
The government punishes them very freely for treason and rebellion.
According to this system, the government reduces itself to common injustice.
If you say that by living in its territory, they in effect consented to the established government, I answer that this can only be true where they think the affair depends on their choice. Besides those philosophers, few or no one has ever yet imagined this.
A rebel never waged war against the sovereign as his first act upon reaching legal age.
As a child, he never showed that he could not be obedient.
On the contrary, we find that civil laws punish this crime at the same legal age as any other crime without our consent.
There should be some intermediate time for a tacit consent to be supposed in crimes of rebellion.
A man living under an absolute government would owe no allegiance to that government.
Since the nature of the absolute government does not depend on consent. But as an absolute government is as natural and common a government as any, it must occasion some obligation. The men subjected to it always think so.
- This is a clear proof that we do not commonly esteem our allegiance to be derived from our consent or promise.
Another poof is that when we make an express promise, we always distinguish between the two obligations.
The promise adds more force to the allegiance, than in a repetition of the same promise.
Where no promise is given, a man does not look on his allegiance as broken. But he keeps those two duties of honour and allegiance perfectly distinct and separate.
These philosophers thought that their unity was a very subtle invention.
This is a convincing proof that it is not a true unity.
Since no man can give a promise, or be restrained by its obligation that is unknown to himself.