The Doctrine of Free Will

The error of distinguishing power from its actual use is not all caused by the scholastic doctrine of free-will.

According to that doctrine, motives do not:

• deprive us of free-will
• take away our power of acting or not acting

A man has no power if he cannot do what he wants.

I do not feel that I have fallen into my enemy’s power if he approaches me in the streets with a sword.

I know that:

• the fear of the law is as strong as the fear of physical pain

• I am safe because of the law

But he acquires power over me if I let him.

Assume:

• Person 1 has motives to not act
• Person 2 has no motives to not act

Their only difference is that:

• Person 1 will never act.
• Person 2 will probably act.

We:

• assign the idea of power of acting to those who have no motives for restraining action
• do not assign the idea of power to those who have motives for restraint

Thus:

• power always has a reference to its actual or probable use

• we consider a person having ability if he can actually or probably do it

Our passions always regard the real existence of objects.

• We always judge of this reality from past instances.
• Power consists in the possibility or probability of any action, as discovered by experience.

Whenever a person who wants to hurt me loses the restraints that prevent him from hurting me, then he might get the power to hurt me.

I would then feel uneasy.

And so the passions are:

• greatly affected by events that are certain and infallible
• somewhat affected by events that are possible and contingent