The Definition of Cause

A Cause is Contiguous and Precedent to or United with its Effect and is Discovered by Experience

Cause and effect is either:

• a philosophical relation, or This is a comparison of two ideas.
• a natural relation. This is an association between two ideas.

Cause

A cause is Object A precedent and contiguous to Object B, where all the objects resembling Object A are placed in like relations of precedency and contiguity to objects that resemble Object B.

If this definition is defective because it is drawn from objects foreign to the cause, we may replace it with another definition:

A cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another and so united with it: - that the idea of the one determines the mind to create the idea of the other, and - that the impression of the one determines the mind to form a more lively idea of the other.

Should this definition also be rejected for the same reason, my only remedy is for its rejecters give a better definition.

When I accurately examine objects called ‘causes’ and ’effects’, I find in a single instance, that the one object is precedent and contiguous to the other.

In enlarging my view to consider several instances, I find only that like objects are constantly placed in like relations of succession and contiguity.

When I consider this constant conjunction’s influence, I perceive that such a relation:

• can never be an object of reasoning, and
• can operate on the mind only through the habit of transitioning from:
  • the idea of one object to the idea of its usual attendant, and
  • the impression of one object to a more lively idea of the other object.

However extraordinary these feelings may appear, it is fruitless for me to further reason on the subject.

Instead, I shall rest on them as I rest on established maxims.

We shall draw some corrollaries from this subject, in order to remove prejudices and popular errors in philosophy.

Corollary 1: From the foregoing doctrine, we learn that all causes are of the same kind.

There is no foundation for our distinction between:

• effective causes and essential causes,
• effective causes, formal causes, material causes, exemplary causes, and final causes.

Our idea of efficacy is derived from the constant conjunction of two objects.

Where there is constant conjunction, the cause is effective.

Where there is no constant conjunction, there can never be a cause.

This is why we must reject the distinction between cause and occasion when meaning anything essentially different from each other.

If constant conjunction is implied in occasion, then it is a real cause.

If not, then:

• it is no relation at all, and
• it cannot create any argument or reasoning.

Corollary 2: The same reasoning will make us conclude that:

• there is but one kind of consequence, as there is but one kind of cause, and
• the common distinction between moral and physical consequence has no foundation in nature.

This clearly appears from the explanation of consequence.

A physical consequence between cause and effect is created by the constant conjunction of objects, along with the mind’s determination.

If you remove these, then you get chance.

Objects are either conjoined or not conjoined.

The mind must either be determined or not determined to pass from one object to another.

It is impossible to admit of any medium between chance and an absolute consequence.

In weakening this conjunction and determination, you do not change the nature of the necessity.

Since even in the operation of bodies, these have different degrees of constancy and force, without producing a different kind of that relation.

Our distinction between power and its exercise, is equally without foundation.

Corollary 3: We have proven that the need for a cause to every beginning of existence is not founded on any demonstrative or intuitive arguments.

Such a reasoning is repugnant, but we can overcome it with the following reasonings: If we define a cause to be something precedent and contiguous to an effect, where all the objects resembling the cause are placed in a similar way before and contiguous to their effects, then there is no absolute nor metaphysical need for every beginning of existence to have a cause.

We shall have less difficulty of assenting to this opinion if we define cause as an object that:

• precedes and is contiguous to another, and
• is so united with it in the imagination, that:
  • the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and
  • the impression of the one creates a more lively idea of the other.

Such an influence on the mind is in itself perfectly extraordinary and incomprehensible. We can only be certain of its reality from experience and observation.

Corollary 4: Why would we believe that any object exists if we cannot form an idea of it?

All our reasonings on existence are derived from causation.

All our reasonings on causation are derived from the experienced conjunction of objects, not from any reasoning or reflection.

The same experience must:

• give us a notion of these objects, and
• remove all mystery from our conclusions.

This is so obvious.

We only needed to explain this for us to obviate objections that arise against the reasonings on matter and substance.

A full knowledge of the object is not needed for it to exist.

Only of the knowledge of its qualities, which we believe to exist, are needed.