The Cosmos
Table of Contents
Sagredo, do not sneer at this prudent scheme, which it seems to me you propose sarcastically. For it is
Not long a famous philosopher composed a book on the soul in which, discussing Aristotle’s opinion as to its mortality or immortality, he adduced many texts beyond those already quoted by Alexander.
As to those, he asserted that Aristotle was not even dealing with such matters there, let alone deciding anything about them, and he gave others which he himself had discovered in various remote places and which tended to the damaging side. Being advised that this would make trouble for him in getting a license to publish it, he wrote back to his friend that he would nevertheless get one quickly, since if no other obstacle came up he would have no difficulty altering the doctrine of Aristotle; for with other texts and other expositions he could maintain the contrary opinion, and it would still agree with the sense of Aristotle.
Oh, what a doctor this is’ I am his to command; for he will not let himself be imposed upon by Aristotle, but Will lead him by the nose and make him speak to his own purpose! See how important it is to know how to take time by the forelock! One ought not to get into the position of doing business with Hercules when he is under the Furies and enraged, but rather when he is telling stories among the Lydian maids.
Oh, the inexpressible baseness of abject minds! To make themselves slaves willingly; to accept decrees as inviolable; to place themselves under obligation and to call themselves persuaded and convinced by arguments that are so “powerful” and “clearly conclusive” that they themselves cannot tell the purpose for which they were written, or what conclusion they serve to prove’ But let us call it a greater madness that among themselves they are even in doubt whether this very author held to the affirmative or the negative side. Now what is this but to make an oracle out of a log of wood, and run to it for answers; to fear it, revere it, and adore it?
But if Aristotle is to be abandoned, whom shall we have for a guide in philosophy? Suppose you name some author.
We need guides in forests and in unknown lands, but on plains and in open places only the blind need guides. It is better for such people to stay at home, but anyone with eyes in his head and his wits about him could serve as a guide for them.
In saying this, I do not mean that a person should not listen to Aristotle; indeed, I applaud the reading and careful study of his works, and I reproach only those who give themselves up as slaves to him in such a way as to subscribe blindly to everything he says and take it as an inviolable decree without looking for any other reasons.
This abuse carries with it another profound disorder, that other people do not try harder to comprehend the strength of his demonstrations. And what is more revolting in a public dispute, when someone is dealing with demonstrable conclusions, than to hear him interrupted by a text (often written to some quite different purpose) thrown into his teeth by an opponent?
If, indeed, you wish to continue in this method of studying, then put aside the name of philosophers and call yourselves historians, or memory experts; for it is not proper that those who never philosophize should usurp the honorable title of philosopher.
But we had better get back to shore, lest we enter into a boundless ocean and not get out of it all day. So put forward the arguments and demonstrations, Simplicio–either yours or Aristotle’s–but not just texts and bare authorities, because our discourses must relate to the sensible world and not to one on paper. And since in yesterday’s argument the earth was lifted up out of darkness and exposed to the open sky, and the attempt to number it among the bodies we call heavenly was shown to be not so hopeless and prostrate a proposition that it remained without a spark of life, we should follow this up by examining that other proposition which holds it to be probable that the earth is fixed and utterly immovable as to its entire globe, and see what chance there is of making it movable, and with what motion.
Now because I am undecided about this question, whereas Simplicio has his mind made up with Aristotle on the side of immovability, he shall give the reasons for his opinion step by step, and I the answers and the arguments of the other side, while Sagredo shall tell us the workings of his mind and the side toward which he feels it drawn.
That suits me very well, provided that I retain the freedom to bring up whatever common sense may dictate to me from time to time.
I beg you to do so. I believe that writers on the subject have left out few of the easier and, so to speak, more material considerations, so that only those are lacking and may be wished for which are subtler and more recondite. And to look into these, what ingenuity can be more fitting than that of Sagredo’s acute and penetrating wit?
Describe me as you like, Salviati, but please let us not get into another kind of digression–the ceremonial. For now I am a philosopher, and am at school and not at court (al Broio).
Then let the beginning Of OUT reflections be the consideration that whatever motion comes to be attributed to the earth must necessarily remain imperceptible to us and as if nonexistent, so long as we look only at terrestrial objects; for as inhabitants of the earth, we consequently participate in the same motion. But on the other hand it is indeed just as necessary that it display itself very generally in all other visible bodies and objects which, being separated from the earth, do not take part in this movement.
So the true method of investigating whether any motion can be attributed to the earth, and if so what it may be, is to observe and consider whether bodies separated from the earth exhibit some appearance of motion which belongs equally to all. For a motion which is perceived only, for example, in the moon, and which does not affect Venus or Jupiter or the other stars, cannot in any way be the earth’s or anything but the moon’s.
Now there is one motion which is most general and supreme over all, and it is that by which the sun, moon, and all other planets and fixed stars–in a word, the whole universe, the earth alone excepted–appear to be moved as a unit from east to west in the space of twenty-four hours. This, in so far as first appearances are concerned, may just as logically belong to the earth alone as to the rest of the universe, since the same appearances would prevail as much in the one situation as in the other.
Thus it is that Aristotle and Ptolemy, who thoroughly understood this consideration, in their attempt to prove the earth immovable do not argue against any other motion than this diurnal one, though Aristotle does drop a hint against another motion ascribed to it by an ancient writer of which we shall speak in the proper place.
I am convinced of the force of your argument, but it raises a question for me from which I do not know how to free myself, and it is this: Copernicus attributed to the earth another motion than the diurnal. By the rule just affirmed, this ought to remain imperceptible to all observations on the earth, but be visible in the rest of the universe. It seems to me that one may deduce as a necessary consequence either that he was grossly mistaken in assigning to the earth a motion corresponding to no appearance in the heavens generally, or that if the correspondent motion does exist, then Ptolemy was equally at fault in not explaining it away, as he explained away the other.
This is very reasonably questioned, and when we come to treat of the other movement you Will see how greatly Copernicus surpassed Ptolemy in acuteness and penetration of mind by seeing what the latter did not-I mean the wonderful correspondence with which such a movement is reflected in all the other heavenly bodies.
Let us go back to the earth’s motion, so that we may then hear their refutation from Simplicio.
First, let us consider only the immense bulk of the starry sphere in contrast With the smallness of the terrestrial globe, which is contained in the former so many millions of times.
Now if we think of the velocity of motion required to make a complete rotation in a single day and night, I cannot persuade myself that anyone could be found who would think it the more reasonable and credible thing that it was the celestial sphere which did the turning, and the terrestrial globe which remained fixed.
If, throughout the whole variety of effects that could exist in nature as dependent upon these motions, all the same consequences followed indifferently to a hairsbreadth from both positions, still my first general impression of them would be this:
It is irrational to assert that the whole universe is moving just so that the earth remains Fixed.
- This is like a man climbing a tower to get a view of the city, and then demand that the whole countryside revolve around him so that would not need to turn his head.
There are many and great advantages from the new theory.
But perhaps Aristotle, Ptolemy, and Simplicio should marshal their advantages against us.
I have not seen any difference, and so there can be no difference.
Motion exists relatively:
- to things that lack motion and
- among things which all share equally in any motion
In both cases, motion does not act, and seems to not not exist.
Thus the goods in a ship leaving Venice for Aleppo stand still and do not move with the ship.
But relative to the sacks, boxes, and bundles in the ship and the ship itself, the motion from Venice to Syria is as nothing.
- It does not alter their relation among themselves.
This is so because it is common to all of them and all share equally in it.
If, from the cargo in the ship, a sack were shifted from a chest one single inch, this alone would be more of a movement for it than the two-thousand-mile journey made by all of them together.
SIMP. This is good, sound doctrine, and entirely Peripatetic.
SALV. I should have thought it somewhat older. I question whether Aristotle entirely understood it when selecting it from some good school of thought, and whether he has not, by altering it in his Writings, made it a source of confusion among those who wish to maintain everything he said.
When he wrote that everything which is moved is moved upon something immovable, I think he only made equivocal the saying that whatever moves, moves with respect to something motionless. This proposition suffers no difficulties at all, whereas the other has many.
SAGR. Please do not break the thread, but continue with the argument already begun.