Zeno of Citium: Founder of Stoicism

³⁶

The Stoics introductory science deals first with perception and sensation, because:

• the criterion by which the truth of facts is ascertained is a kind of perception
• the judgment which expresses the belief, and the comprehension, and the understanding of a thing, a judgment which precedes all others, cannot exist without perception.

Perception leads the way. Then thought, finding vent in expressions, explains in words the feelings which it derives from perception.

But there is a difference between φαντασία and φάντασμα. For φάντασμα is a conception of the intellect, such as takes place in sleep; but φαντασία is an impression, τύπωσις, produced on the mind, that is to say, an alteration, ἀλλοίωσις, as Chrysippus states in the twelfth book of his treatise on the Soul.

We must not take this impression to resemble that made by a seal, since it is impossible to conceive that there should be many impressions made at the same time on the same thing.

But φαντασία is understood to be that which is impressed, and formed, and imprinted by a real object, according to a real object, in such a way as it could not be by any other than a real object; and, according to their ideas of the φαντασίαι, some are sensible, and some are not. Those they call sensible, which are derived by us from some one or more senses; and those they call not sensible, which emanate directly from the thought, as for instance, those which relate to incorporeal objects, or any others which are embraced by reason.

Those which are sensible, are produced by a[278] real object, which imposes itself on the intelligence, and compels its acquiescence; and there are also some others, which are simply apparent, mere shadows, which resemble those which are produced by real objects.

These φαντασίαι are divided into rational and irrational; those which are rational belong to animals capable of reason; those which are irrational to animals destitute of reason. Those which are rational are thoughts; those which are irrational have no name; but are again subdivided into artificial and not artificial. At all events, an image is contemplated in a different light by a man skilful in art, from that in which it is viewed by a man ignorant of art.

By sensation, the Stoics understand a species of breath which proceeds from the dominant portion of the soul to the senses, whether it be a sensible perception, or an organic disposition, which, according to the notions of some of them, is crippled and vicious. They also call sensation the energy, or active exercise, of the sense. According to them, it is to sensation that we owe our comprehension of white and black, and rough and smooth: from reason, that we derive the notions which result from a demonstration, those for instance which have for their object the existence of Gods, and of Divine Providence. For all our thoughts are formed either by indirect perception, or by similarity, or analogy, or transposition, or combination, or opposition.

By a direct perception, we perceive those things which are the objects of sense; by similarity, those which start from some point present to our senses; as, for instance, we form an idea of Socrates from his likeness. We draw our conclusions by analogy, adopting either an increased idea of the thing, as of Tityus, or the Cyclops; or a diminished idea, as of a pigmy.

So, too, the idea of the centre of the world was one derived by analogy from what we perceived to be the case of the smaller spheres. We use transposition when we fancy eyes in a man’s breast; combination, when we take in the idea of a Centaur; opposition, when we turn our thoughts to death. Some ideas we also derive from comparison, for instance, from a comparison of words and places.

There is also nature; as by nature we comprehend what is just and good. And privation, when for instance, we form a notion of a man without hands. Such are the doctrines of[279] the Stoics, on the subject of phantasia, and sensation, and thought.

³⁷ They say that the proper criterion of truth is the comprehension, φαντασία; that is to say, one which is derived from a real object, as Chrysippus asserts in the twelfth book of his Physics.

He is followed by Antipater and Apollodorus. For Boethus leaves a great many criteria, such as intellect, sensation, appetite, and knowledge; but Chrysippus dissents from his view, and in the first book of his treatise on Reason, says, that sensation and preconception are the only criteria. And preconception is, according to him, a comprehensive physical notion of general principles. But others of the earlier Stoics admit right reason as one criterion of the truth; for instance, this is the opinion of Posidonius, and is advanced by him in his essay on Criteria.

³⁸ On the subject of logical speculation, there appears to be a great unanimity among the greater part of the Stoics, in beginning with the topic of the voice.

Diogenes the Babylonian defines voice in his essay on the Voice as a percussion of the air.

The voice of a beast is a mere percussion of the air by some impetus.

But the voice of a man is articulate, and is emitted by intellect. It is perfected after 14 years.

The voice is a body. This is laid down by:

• Archedemus in his book on the Voice
• Diogenes
• Antipater
• Chrysippus, in volume 2 of his Physics

For everything which makes anything, is a body; and the voice makes something when it proceeds to those who hear from those who speak.

A word (λέξις), again, is, according to Diogenes, a voice consisting of letters, as “Day.”

A sentence (λόγος) is a significant voice, sent out by the intellect, as for instance, “It is day;” but dialect is a peculiar style imprinted on the utterance of nations, according to their race; and causes varieties in the Greek language, being a sort of local habit, as for instance, the Attics say θάλαττα, and the Ionians say ἡμέρη. The elements of words are the twenty-four letters; and the word letter is used in a triple division of sense, meaning the element itself, the graphical sign of the element, and the name, as Alpha.

There are seven vowels, α, ε, η, ι, ο, υ, ω; six mutes, β, γ, δ, κ, π, τ. But voice is different from[280] a word, because voice is a sound; but a word is an articulate sound. And a word differs from a sentence, because a sentence is always significative of something, but a word by itself has no signification, as for instance, βλίτρι.

But this is not the case with a sentence. Again, there is a difference between speaking and pronouncing; the sounds are pronounced, but what are spoken are things which are capable of being spoken of.

XXXIX. Diogenes tells us in his treatise on Voice that sentences have 5 parts. He is followed by Chrysippus.

There is the noun, the common noun, the verb, the conjunction, and the article. Antipater adds also quality, in his treatise upon Words and the things expressed by them. And a common noun (προσηγορία) is, according to Diogenes, a part of a sentence signifying a common quality, as for instance, man, horse. But a noun is a part of a sentence signifying a peculiar quality, such as Diogenes, Socrates. A verb is a part of a sentence signifying an uncombined categorem, as Diogenes (ὁ Διογένης) or, as others define it, an element of a sentence, devoid of case, signifying something compound in reference to some person or persons, as, “I write,” “I say.” A conjunction is a part of a sentence destitute of case, uniting the divisions of the sentence. An article is an element of a sentence, having cases, defining the genders of nouns and their numbers, as ὁ, ἡ, τὸ, οἱ, αἱ, τὰ.

XL. The excellences of a sentence are 5:

1. Good Greek

Good Greek (Ἑλληνισμὸς) is a correct style, according to art, keeping aloof from any vulgar form of expression.

2. clearness

clearness is a style which states that which is conceived in the mind in such a way that it is easily known

3. conciseness

conciseness is a style which embraces all that is necessary to the clear explanation of the subject under discussion

4. suitableness

suitableness is a style suited to the subject

5. elegance

Elegance is a style which avoids all peculiarity of expression.

Of the vices of a sentence, on the other hand, barbarism is a use of words contrary to that in vogue among the well-educated Greeks; solecism is a sentence incongruously put together.