6 Reasons why coalition politics may lead to a multi-party system

In spite of these worrying trends, there are 6 reasons why coalition politics may lead to the development of a multi-party system.

1. The three major political parties, the PPP, PML-N and ANP, were quick to build a consensus against President Musharraf. But the parties differed in their approach to his removal from office.

The PML-N was vocal in demanding Musharraf’s removal (and are currently demanding his trial) and the reinstatement of the judges, while the PPP was less confrontational and searched for ways to define a basis for a workable relationship with Musharraf. The PPP also wished to dilute the issue of the restoration of the judges, which strained the coalition, as the PML- N’s expectation was that the judges would be promptly restored. When that did not happen, the PML-N’s ministers resigned from the coalition and the party withdrew from the government.

This jolted the coalition, and the PML-N chose to become the opposition party in the National Assembly. The transition has been bumpy and is likely to remain so.

2. There is an emerging consensus on the political role of the military.

The political parties remained focused on ensuring the removal of Musharraf, who resigned in August 2008. His departure helped define power-sharing with the military rather than establish the supremacy of the civilian leaders. The Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, took a number of steps, such as withdrawing serving military officer from civilian positions.

3. The leaders of the political parties have realized that they must refrain from repeating the mistakes of the 1990s when confrontation between the PPP and PML-N paved the way for military intervention.

Therefore, despite the confrontational politics and brinksmanship at the height of the lawyers’ protest in 2008, the PPP and PML-N leaders kept the channel of communication open. The leadership of the parliamentary parties seemed eager to sustain the dialogue in order to dispel any mistrust. This spirit was best reflected in the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment which swept away Musharraf’s constitutional changes.

4. There is a strong desire among leaders who were either jailed (for example, Asif Ali Zardari) or compelled to go abroad (such as Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif) to ensure that no one will be forced into exile or put in prison.

This has helped improve the levels of trust among political leaders, with the bonds of prison and past exile giving new meaning to the politics of coalition building. Nawaz Sharif conveys the image of a 120confident but confrontational and somewhat defiant leader who remained focused on the restoration of judges and Musharraf’s removal.

Zardari appears calm, calculating and somewhat tentative but tenacious and leaning toward reconciliation. Both seem to understand that the politics of mass mobilisation could unleash social forces that can quickly become uncontrollable. For public posturing time and again Nawaz Sharif has engaged in a war of words but shown restraint in taking to the streets in protest.

5. Party leaders, despite the serious differences in their approaches, have evolved a consensus in recognising terrorism as Pakistan’s own problem, and the need to curb militants, particularly the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and others who provide sanctuary to al Qaeda.

This implies that the various leaders are, through consultation, repositioning themselves on how to handle extremism. While still evolving, the retention of a balance between engagement with the militants and the application of force is of critical importance. It is this balance between engagement and force that has improved levels of trust or necessitated teamwork between the civilian and military leadership.

6. Since the middle of 2006, the US and Pakistan have been reviewing and reassessing their anti-terrorism policies in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

In addition to pressing Pakistan to intensify military operations in these areas Washington also initiated dialogue with ANP leader Asfandyar Wali, who was invited to meet with the State Department and CENTCOM. During 2007, US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte visited Pakistan three times; these visits were supplemented by those of congressional leaders. Besides conducting regular meetings with Pakistani government officials, the Deputy Secretary and congressional leaders also met the heads of almost all the major political parties.

In 2008, the United States embarked on a three pronged approach to reset its policy toward Pakistan. The Pentagon, Department of State and House and Senate leadership acted in concert to engage the Pakistani civil and military leadership on wide-ranging domestic and bilateral concerns. This has deepened and expanded the scale and interactions of Pakistani and US officials.

In July 2008, President Bush invited Prime Minister Gilani to Washington, and in November President Zardari attended a UN forum on the ‘Culture of Peace’.

Gilani and Zardari both made efforts to assure US 121policy-makers and the global community that the civilian leadership of Pakistan was determined to combat terrorism and needed sympathy along with financial support. Relations have continued to grow in 2009 with an official visit to the US by President Zardari to negotiate issues ranging from supporting democracy to socio-economic reform to combating terrorism, a promising sign for the transition to democracy and evolution of a multi-party system.

The PPP-led coalition government is now in the third year of its rule. But corruption, violence and sectarian strife continue to deepen the crisis of governance. Despite significant political achievements including the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment, the seventh National Finance Commission Award (which governs the distribution of resources between the 4 provinces) and a Balochistan package (economic and other measures to address provincial sentiment after Musharraf’s use of force there) the regime’s public stock has been low on account of its weak governance and its inability to solve the deepening energy crisis, rising inflation and unemployment levels. All of this has eroded public confidence in party government and democracy.

Furthermore its poor and insensitive handling of the worst floods in Pakistan’s history in the summer of 2010 could turn out to be a watershed for the resurgence of the military and even the demise of party rule.

Given these changing dynamics of civil-military relations, what are the prospects of democratic consolidation? There are many indications that despite serious crises civil-military relations are undergoing an important transformation. This is borne out by several developments. In July 2010 Prime Minister Gilani ended rising speculation about General Kayani by granting him a three-year extension. This suggests an improved level of trust between the civil and military leadership that is helping to define the parameters of their evolving relationship. In theory and constitutionally this establishes the norm of the supremacy of civilian leadership.

The past had seen a tussle between the president and the prime minister over who has the right to appoint the Chiefs of the Armed Forces and the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. Although the constitutional position on the issue has always been clear both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif as prime ministers found limits to their authority in this regard. The prime minister and the president should through mutual consultation develop a consensus on the selection of service chiefs. In 122reality, they have quarrelled over this matter. This reflects the weakness of the civilian leaders and the power of the military.

However, once the Chief of Army Staff is selected he assumes the role of an arbiter, sometimes broker, and of course a potential intervener in the country’s political process. What role the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) chooses to play depends on three factors: his personal orientation, political circumstances and the corporate interests of the military.

Seen from this perspective General Kayani has been careful and discreet so as to reveal little about his political or ideological beliefs except on national security issues. He went public in stating that the Pakistan military is ‘India- centric’ in its orientation and approach. Nationally and internationally he is recognised as a ‘professional soldier’. In 2009 Time magazine declared General Kayani as the ‘most influential General in the world’. Officials who have worked with General Kayani convey that he is calm, calculating, and prudent and keeps his cards close to his chest.

General Kayani earned Musharraf’s trust and confidence after he successfully investigated the assassination attempts on the former President in 2003 with professional competence and utmost discretion. Consequently, he was appointed as the head of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in 2004 and held that position till 2007.

Earlier in his career he had briefly served in the office of the military secretary to Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. This position provided him an opportunity to witness first hand political elite interactions and decision-making. Given his association with Musharraf and Bhutto he was ideally positioned to play a pivotal role in their ‘reconciliation’ in 2007. He also demonstrated the courage of his conviction on 9 March 2007 when Musharraf and his close aides read out a charge sheet to Chief Justice (CJ) Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, asking him to step down. Kayani was part of that team but remained silent throughout the meeting and refused to present an affidavit to the Supreme Court in the reference Musharraf had filed against the CJ and others.

Kayani has shown vigour and determination in conducting effective counter-terrorist operations in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In the post-Musharraf phase General Kayani had also carefully rebuilt the image of the military and strived to win the trust of his troops and the people. For example, as COAS, one of his first acts was to raise the salaries of Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs). Furthermore he announced that the Army 123will not interfere in politics and political decisions.

He has cultivated an image of staying aloof from politics but on issues of security and foreign policy-particularly the strategic dialogue with the US-he has taken charge. In this regard he took the unprecedented step of calling and presiding over a meeting of the federal secretaries at General Headquarters (GHQ). This earned him the distinction of being the first and the only COAS who summoned a meeting of the country’s top civil servants in the presence of a civilian democratic government.

Simultaneously, Kayani has played a key role in moving the US- Pakistan strategic dialogue forward, while gradually gaining American trust and confidence. He has become the person who most important officials in the Pentagon, the White House and NATO want to communicate with when deciding matters relating to Afghanistan and other regional security issues.

A different kind of example of his power is provided in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attack on Mumbai. President Zardari wanted to send the ISI head to India to calm down New Delhi but Kayani swiftly vetoed that. The person calling the shots on policy towards India is Kayani.

It is evident from this that on defence and foreign policy the military retains hegemony. But this is also a reflection of the lack of competence and ability on the part of the civilian leaders in this sphere. A different kind of interpretation would argue that by allowing this space on external policy to the COAS the civilian leadership is delineating policy arenas where it accepts a legitimate military voice.

Conclusion

Against this backdrop the future of civil-military relations holds both the promise of change and the peril of business-as-usual. Continuity is indicated on strategic policy issues on which military hegemony will likely persist. This means that the military can be expected to play the decisive role in navigating defence and foreign policy and determining strategic decisions, while the civilian government will handle the economy and issues of ’low’ politics at home.

An optimistic interpretation could be that civil-military relations are improving because an improvement in the trust level between the civilian and military elites reduces the possibility of a military coup. So while the military’s primacy in decision-making on strategic issues is conceded by the civilian regime, 124in return it would expect the military to support the political government and enable it to complete its parliamentary term.

In the short term a system of power sharing seems to be evolving rather than military s ubordination to civilian supremacy. At this stage the political leaders may concede that power sharing is a short term but unavoidable goal. The hope is that as the electoral process becomes a regular one and political parties pursue internal reform to democratise their internal structures, they may over time be able to provide a viable alternative to military hegemony.

This would happen, if the political elites and political parties demonstrate the will to strengthen the party system; improve governance and rule of law; prioritise citizen welfare policies and the media and judiciary band together in promoting accountability and dispensing social justice. However until then civil-military relations in terms of power and authority will remain skewed even if there is greater mutual trust between them.