The Bureaucratic Elite

Second Trend: The Bureaucratic Elite

The second visible trend is the changing composition, orientation and educational background of the bureaucracy.

The Pakistan civil service-the pivotal pillar of governance and until the 1980s the backbone of administration-is now plagued by institutional decline and a crisis of moral authority. Unlike the first three decades after Pakistan’s independence it no longer attracts the best and the brightest that instead prefer to go in to business and other private sector professions.

Since the mid 1990s recruitment has shifted from the upper middle class to the lower middle class who, for status enhancement and limited choices of personal advancement, still find the competitive examination for the civil service as the only vehicle for social mobility.

At the same time, in public perception and in reality, the integrity of the Federal Public Services Commission (FPSC) has been considerably eroded. Since 2001 the Police is the most preferred occupation group for new entrants. The yearly reports of the FPSC show that the choice of service suggests that the change in composition is not conducive to promoting representative government but appears more supportive of authoritarian and clientelist type of political system.

At the mid-career level the retention of civil servants remains a major policy challenge.

The past two decades have witnessed the emergence of a new breed of civil servants, ’the Laptop Wallas’, who are well-versed in information technology and governance issues, have acquired a foreign degree, and are professionally competent and increasingly attuned to the language of the international donor community.

Their number is small but growing. This is a genre that has put in ten to fifteen years of service and is under 40 years of age. These are the new ‘project managers’ who are either part of the federal or provincial government or working on a project run by the government but funded by a donor agency.

These ‘Laptop Wallas’ get an enhanced salary package and invariably demonstrate professional competence and effective managerial skills. While this is a phenomenon that exhibits individual competence it doesn’t necessarily translate in to better delivery of services and implementation of policies for a host of other reasons.

The transition to party-led government has not only accelerated the politicisation of bureaucracy but also widened the gap between the small number of professionally competent and the larger number of inadequately trained bureaucrats. Civil bureaucracy remains the life­ line of governance in the country. But its growing ineffectiveness raises concerns about capacity-building and the prospects for reform.

The Political Elite

The third trend is that the elites leading the political parties are becoming more dynastic and their leaders unabashed in giving key party positions to family members. The landowners, tribal leaders, business families, religious leaders, a few professionals and a sprinkling of the middle classes continue to comprise the dominant political elite.

But political parties are in decay, organisationally weak, lacking vision and programme and with no leadership succession plan. The current ruling coalition led by the PPP has banded together not on the basis of any principle but on the basis of expediency and desire for power.

Thus the outcome has been progress only in the procedural dimension of democracy because they have acquired power through election. But the normative dimension of democracy-respect for rule of law and core values of tolerance, accommodation and consensus remains weak. Analysts remain sceptical that the political parties, who have done little to promote a democratic culture internally, who pursue power with little regard to the public good, whose leaders are unable to communicate with each other without an ‘international broker’, can provide an alternative to the military.

Yet, despite political uncertainty, the restoration of party-based representative government is a positive development as it aids nation-building and helps in consensus building on issues of national significance.

After the 2008 elections, the leaders of the PPP, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Awami National Party (ANP) have conducted politics by consultation and consensus building which has created an expectation that they will be able to sustain a coalition government and stable government-opposition relations. This transition towards a multi-party system is still heavily dependent on the role and behaviour of the two larger parties, namely the PPP and PML-N.

But Asif Zardari, Nawaz Sharif and Asfandyar Wali are neither visionary nor transformational leaders but pragmatic and deft politicians. Yet this fragile consensus could rupture if the ‘international brokers’ (mainly the United States) withdraw support, change direction or lose interest in ‘managing’ Pakistan’s internal politics.

The Religious Elite

A significant change has been underway among religious institutions and the religious leadership, which represents the fourth trend. The past 30 years have seen the rise of Madrasahs as a source of social status and political power.

It is significant that these madrasahs have produced a new breed of religious leaders that claim legitimacy on the basis of scholarship as well as by assuming political roles. These religious leaders are relatively young, mostly in their late thirties or early forties. This religious elite is not necessarily well-versed in religious scholarship but is enthusiastic in instrumentalising Islam; they have increasingly become assertive and uncompromising in projecting their own form of Shari’a. In the late 1970s and 1980s state patronage, the Afghan jihad (supported by the US and Saudi Arabia) and trading communities were instrumental in supporting these new religious elites.

This has greatly influenced the Pakistani political discourse as religiosity rather than religious principles and ethics has acquired primacy leading to constraints on social, cultural, political and economic activities.

For example, if one were to tabulate the religious congregations that took place during the decade (between mid October and November each year) in Lahore and its surroundings-the Tablighi Jamaat, Ahle-Hadith Conference, Dawat-e-Islami (Maulana Ilyas Qadri) and Jamaat-e-Islami etc., the number would be a significant trend indicator.

These congregations perform symbolic, substantive and ideological messaging 113functions. The critical question is: to what extent has this religiosity fanned a jihadi culture? There is considerable evidence to support the view that without state connivance and support from the religious elites a jihadi culture could not have flourished in the country. Nor would militancy have become the monster it bas. In any case, the main casualty has been the liberal political space which has shrunk as a consequence. The emerging religious elites are self-confident and have emerged as a potent political force.

The US Factor

The fifth transformation, which has greatest significance, is the structural presence of the US in Pakistan’s policy and strategic decision-making. Because of the close collaboration of the Pakistani ruling elites—military, bureaucratic, political—it has become hard to differentiate between the interests of US policy-makers and these domestic elites.

In recent years the US presence has become more pervasive and reveals a strategic shift in US thinking on Pakistan. According to media reports, of the 240 plus members of the 2002 national assembly, thirty five members had US nationality.

During the 1950s the military elites set the ball rolling with the provision of air space. This later extended to logistical support and then intelligence gathering after 2001. Now almost all aspects of internal law and order, regional relations, counter-terrorism, anti-money laundering and nuclear non-proliferation policies are influenced one way or another by the relationship with Washington. Most ministries (including Interior, Defence, Commerce and Finance) have bilateral arrangements with the US.

The commander of CENTCOM (US Central Command) makes regular trips to Pakistan. Invariably, the new CENTCOM chief’s first destination is Pakistan. What all of this means is that the Pakistani state is hard put to make a case for sovereignty so deeply penetrated that its ally is in its affairs.

Pakistan’s governance issues are no longer internal, as outside help— especially economic support—has become essential to governing the country. Here is the paradox: while power elites collaborate, connive and compromise to consolidate this structural presence it leads to occasional official outbursts against outside interference which deepens the existing resentment against the US on the street. There is in fact a growing 114disconnect between the elites and civil society which opposes the US role and presence. If this disconnect deepens and spins out of control it could rupture the carefully crafted Western encouraged transition to democracy in Pakistan.

State Under Siege

As a consequence of these transformations the very structure or institutional landscape of the Pakistani state has undergone change. While one of the key functions of the state is to have a legitimate monopoly over the means of coercion there are various parts of Pakistan where the writ of the state is either weak or being challenged. The Pakistani state is under pressure and struggling with the question of how to accommodate competing interests while expanding its room to manoeuvre and restoring its writ. The critical challenge is whether it will be able to acquire a more legitimate basis of authority through institutions or a credible political leader. The answer to this question lies in understanding the dynamics of changing relationships among the elites and particularly the shifting dynamics of civil and military relations. This complex but contradictory change among Pakistani elite structures is transforming civil-military relations and a new pattern is emerging. The following section will focus on these transformations.

From Military Hegemony to Coalition Politics

For over 60 years, Pakistan has oscillated between military- hegemonic and dominant party political systems. Persistent and prolonged military rule has entrenched the military in politics, business and even the social sphere in the militarisation of Pakistani society. Despite this, military rule has never gained legitimacy among citizens. In a military­hegemonic system, the military has a monopoly over strategic policy issues and decision-making institutions. It can manipulate and direct the behaviour of political leaders and interest groups in a chosen direction.

The military-hegemonic system functions via three identifiable processes: first, political control through executive orders/ordinances; second, political exclusion through restrictions on parties and other political groups or urban professional groups; and third, the building of a strategic partnership with the United States. Pakistan’s history shows that 115military-hegemony evokes resistance. The longer the period of military rule the stronger resistance movements become in their push for free and fair elections. Upsurges of opposition and demands for the restoration of democracy by civil society groups and political parties have accompanied each period of military rule (General Ayub Khan, 1958-69; General Yahya Khan, 1969-71; General Zia-ul-Haq, 1977-88; and General Pervez Musharraf, 1999-2008). The recurring pattern has been that the collapse or more often a weakening of the military regime paves the way for elections which then facilitate a transition to civilian-led party governments.

It is distressing, however, that with each election opportunities for consolidating civilian-led party governments have mostly been squandered by Pakistan’s parties. Political leaders have not been successful in constructing a party system nor promoting democratic values. Construction of democratic values and ingraining a democratic culture in society is a time-consuming and long term project. A culture of respect for dissent, necessary for a representative form of government, has yet to be developed. The tendency has been for parties, when in power, to establish their dominance. In particular, the Pakistan Peoples Party led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from 1971 to 1977; the Pakistan Muslim League led by Muhammad Khan Junejo from 1985 to 1988; and both the Benazir Bhutto-led PPP and Nawaz Sharif-led Muslim League (PML-N) from 1988 to 1999, all attempted to establish political dominance by weakening the opposition.

In the post-2008 period there is a significant change. The issue is no longer projecting ‘dominance of a political party’ but maintaining a balance among multiple political parties. This is the consequence of coalition politics as no party got an overall majority in the 2008 polls. While this balance is evolving the dynamics of governance remain the same-who gets what and how much.

The lack of development of civilian-led party rule does not inspire confidence that the rule of law, good governance and the values of constitutional liberalism will be strengthened. Since the first general elections of 1970, the winning political party has adopted a post­election policy of establishing dominance rather than creating the political space necessary for opposition parties. Each time the military withdrew, political leaders neither paid any attention to reform nor democratising their 116political parties. Personalities drove the parties instead of organisation or programmes. Both the party in power and opposition parties pursued confrontational politics and failed to build consensus on how to restrict the role of the military in politics. The military, in turn, took advantage of the discord among parties and implicitly encouraged confrontation rather than cooperation. The party in power focused on establishing dominance and excluding political opponents instead of devising ways to restrain the military.

The party system and representative government could not be institutionalised. Thus both the military and the political parties have failed in creating pluralist norms and values necessary for a democratic society. Given this history, why should one expect political parties to behave differently now? Before addressing this question, Pakistan’s history in the past decade must be examined.

General Pervez Musharraf assumed power in October 1999, overthrowing the civilian government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. From 2002-2007, Musharraf enhanced presidential power via constitutional amendments and ordinances and ruled by decree, confining the role of the legislature to that of a decree-stamping institution. Until 2006 he maintained a political order that created a semblance of stability, but 2007 was perhaps the worst year in Pakistan’s legal and political history. In that year the president misused his powers through a series of unlawful acts: on 9 March 2007 he dismissed the Chief Justice of Pakistan, and on 9 November 2007 he issued a decree firing over sixty judges of the superior judiciary. Musharraf then managed to get re-elected as President in his capacity as both the Chief of the Army and serving general. Lawyers’ protests were ruthlessly suppressed.

Under domestic and international pressure, Musharraf announced that elections would be held on 7 January 2008. Political parties responded by demanding the return of exiled leaders Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. They also initiated a consultative process which led to the signing of the Charter of Democracy. Through this charter, they agreed to work together to restore democracy, seek independence of the judiciary and curb the political role of the military. On 5 October 2007, Musharraf issued the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), which exonerated political leaders from charges in cases of corruption. This paved the way for the return of these leaders especially Bhutto, which came to be known as the Musharraf-Bhutto deal.

As the election campaign progressed, key electoral issues included restoration of judges, the curtailment of presidential powers, disengagement of the military from politics, recognition of terrorism as a national issue, the use of political engagement rather than force to deal with religious extremists, the transfer of power to elected representatives and the supremacy of the legislature.

On 18 October 2007, Bhutto returned to Karachi to a rousing reception. Although she narrowly survived a suicide bomb at her welcome procession, the bomb killed over 100 participants.

Bhutto continued to campaign despite threats to her life. On 27 December 2007, Bhutto met a tragic death in a bombing of her election rally in Rawalpindi. This became a defining moment in Pakistan’s history. It sparked anger and a wave of sympathy not only for her party, the PPP, but also other political leaders.

Bhutto’s death intensified the revolt of urban professionals, which had been simmering since the removal of the Chief Justice in March 2007. The lawyers’ protests gave new meaning to the electoral process. Bhutto’s death jolted Pakistan and precipitated an expectation among the people that political party leaders would seize this opportunity to construct a civilian-led democratic order.

For almost two decades, Bhutto was centre stage, regardless of whether she was in or out of power, within or outside the country. She showed courage and imagination in confronting military rule and in the process facilitated a democratic transition. By winning two elections in 1988 and in 1993 she assumed the office of Prime Minister, a distinction in Pakistani politics. In the eyes of many, she was poised to win the 2008 elections. Despite her disappointing performance as Prime Minister, the promise and mystique of her leadership persisted.

Her ten weeks of electoral campaigning from 18 October 2007 to 27 December 2007 demonstrated how, despite threats to her life, she galvanised the PPP base across the country. In her speeches and interviews, she courageously attacked religious extremists and terrorists. She forcefully argued that democracy was the only alternative to an authoritarian military dictatorship. At the time of her death, she had re-emerged as the most popular political leader in recent history.

Her death was followed by massive protests and violence, creating 118much uncertainty. Elections were delayed by a full month, yet that did not diminish the PPP support base. The party secured victory even if it did not gain an overall parliamentary majority. Bhutto’s husband, Asif Ali Zardari emerged as the strongman of the party.

Despite a past tainted by corruption allegations he showed considerable political acumen in the period following Bhutto’s death. He has also been adept in consolidating control over the party and has sought reconciliation with the other major parties, particularly the Awami National Party (ANP), the PML-N, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and even the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). In June 2008, the MQM joined the provincial government in Sindh.

The outcome of the 2008 elections raised expectations that Pakistan would move away from a dominant-party system to a multi-party system where the PPP, PML-N, ANP, JUI and MQM would work as coalition partners. Each has a different agenda and support base yet they seem to agree on the idea of a minimal consensus. The politics of coalition building are not new to Pakistan and alliance-forming coalitions have emerged as effective oppositional groups. In the 1960s, 70s and 80s, politicians built alliances that became formidable opposition movements. This gave rise to both military-hegemonic and party-dominant regimes.

The 1990s saw Pakistan’s political parties and their leaders pursue the politics of regime confrontation, elite manipulation and even street agitation, but not reconciliation and consensus. Thus sustaining coalitions that would lead to politics of accommodation, consensus building and national reconciliation remained weak. Today, the multi-party coalition led by the PPP remains tenuous bur holds the promise of setting a new direction for coalition politics.

Leaders of the PPP, PML-N, MQM and ANP seem to be learning that politics is about compromise, bargain and consensus. But increasingly coalition parties have begun to reveal three disturbing trends.

1. Leadership is increasingly dynastic.

2. These parties are a coalition of landed elites, business groups, tribal elders and religious groups.

3. These leaders are driven by considerations of personal gain and power rather than public good and institution building.

The leaders are reluctant to change the status quo despite their apparent recognition that their supporters expect them to work together to improve security and governance, provide justice and reduce poverty.