Praetorians And The People

Two contradictory trends emerged after Pakistan’s post-February 2008 election:

1. Political continuity – the third and fourth generations of the traditional feudal, tribal, religious and business families are entering the political arena.

2. The social class origins of the dominant institutions, namely, the military and civil bureaucracy are undergoing change—the recruitment pattern is shifting from the upper middle class to the lower middle class.

This means that the social composition of Pakistani elites is undergoing change.

The emerging elite have humbler origins, hold conservative social and political views and reflect authoritarian tendencies in society rather than democratic values. Some elite circulation appears to be taking place but the implications for strengthening democracy and a party system remain uncertain.

For making a transition from a military-hegemonic system to a party-based representative system, elections are an important procedural element to measure democratic aspirations in a society. In Pakistan’s case this is severely conscribed by the military-hegemonic system.

While holding elections and transitioning to democracy are important, attention also needs to be paid to strengthening the substantive components of democracy: the rule of law, respect and tolerance of dissent and minority rights, religious freedom, Cultural pluralism, and freedom of association.

At 63 Pakistan is deeply troubled. Its people are despondent as they watch a ruling class concerned more with its own privileges than with serving the public, which has driven the debate in the media chat demands a reordering of the state and society. This discourse has also projected competing visions of transforming Pakistan and also urges the restoration of the dignity and self respect of ordinary citizens.

This should be putting pressure on the Pakistani elites to mend their behaviour but are they listening?

I present 3 arguments:

1. The transformations in elite structures are changing the dynamics of elite interactions.

These in turn are shaping the direction of civil-military relations.

2. Despite serious limitations, the political leadership is striving to sustain a multi-party system and redefining government-opposition relations.

3. The War on Terror is affecting the prospects of democratic development and contributing to reordering civil-military relations in Pakistan.

Elites and Democracy

Democracy theoretically flourishes in a society through 4 basic approaches.

1. Democracy is a function of the level of economic development

The higher the level of economic development, the better the prospects for democracy. Economic development leads to a vibrant middle class whose interest is in sustaining a free market economy, protecting rights and freedoms and building democracy.

2. Democracy is a function of the level of education

The higher the education levels of a society, the greater the chances of a successful democracy.

3. Democracy is a function of cultural pluralism and work ethics

A correlation exists between the culture of a society and its chances to create a representative government. This represents the Weberian hypothesis arguing that the rise of democracy in Western Europe was directly linked to the Protestant ethic.

4. Democracy is a function of the elites’ ability to bargain, compromise and build consensus on the normative aspects of democracy-rule of law, respect for dissent, protection of minority and women’s rights.

I assert that in Pakistan, a focus on elites explains the functioning or absence of democracy as compared to the other 3 approaches.

Do the elites have faith in democracy and representative government?

How are decisions made and policies adopted that subvert constitutional norms and resurrect the hegemonic position of the military?

The people and the general public might help in sustaining democracy. But constructing democracy is a function of the elites.

It is thus important to study the evolution and transformation of Pakistani elites to review the prospects of political stability and change in Pakistan.

In the last 39 years the structure of the Pakistani elites has undergone social and political transformation. At least five complex and contradictory trends are evident.

The Pakistani elites consist of the military and civil bureaucracy, leaders of political parties, the religious clergy and members of the emerging electronic media. Among these elite structures, the role of the military is distinctive because it has been involved in the ‘construction’ of other elites.

As Pakistan’s history attests, each military regime has patronised a new set of individuals to construct political elites who would adopt the political system that the military favoured. The following section provides an analytic framework and dynamics of emerging trends in each elite category.

First Trend: The Military Elite

During the 1970s and particularly since 1979, the social origins of the military elite have undergone change. Generals Jehangir Karamat and Pervez Musharraf and their cohorts were the last of the pre-independence generation.

The year 2007 marked the ascendancy of an indigenous post-independence generation at the helm of military decision-making. Until 1971 the base of military elites (Brigadiers to General) was relatively small, totalling approximately 120 officers.

Today there is a five-fold increase—the base of military elites has considerably expanded to over 600 officers. However, strategic decision-making is confined to the 10 Corps Commanders and another thirty to forty top staff officers. Their ethnic, social class and educational composition have also become noticeably diffuse.

There is considerable debate about the ideological orientation of military elites. During the 1960s and until the mid 1970s, the generals from rural background and the Potohar—the so-called ‘martial races’—were dominant.

But the new breed is more urban and comes from more modest social backgrounds. There is a noticeable shift from the ‘Huntingtonian model of military professionalism’ to the ‘Janowitzian model’—moving beyond a soldierly profession and assuming constabulary functions.

In the post-1979 period, with the exception of the Kargil conflict (1999), the military has increasingly been involved in combating internal disorder, fighting insurgency, designing counterinsurgency plans and, 109since 2002, increasingly fighting global terrorism; extensively performing UN peacekeeping and policing functions.

During this decade more military officers have interacted and been trained at American military institutions compared to the previous three decades. It would be worth watching how these interactions and trainings impact the ideological orientation and professional skills of the emerging elites.

The military has already entrenched itself in managing industrial, business, commercial and real estate ventures.

We should look at the transformation in officers’ professional skills, levels of competence and ideological orientation at the rank of Brigadier and not just at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

1. The military has become a corporate entity.

Its role and relationship in Pakistani society has undergone transformation—it has acquired a new sense of confidence and is tentative and cautious in showing ‘deference’ to the political leadership.

2. The military elites have been vigorous and aggressive in consolidating control on security, defence and the foreign policy arena.

Is there any noticeable shift in this trend in the post-February 2008 period?

The indications are that the military has made a tactical withdrawal because under General Musharraf (1999-2007), particularly after 2001, its policies had become too closely identified with the US led global War on Terror.

The operations that the military launched in 2005-06 in the tribal areas and the North West Frontier Province did not secure adequate political or public support, which had a demoralising effect on the troops.

As political and professional costs mounted the military leadership sought to regain the trust and confidence of the people.

In the post-Musharraf era the military elites re-assessed and re-strategised their role and relationship with the civilian leadership. They have shown ‘deference’ to the political leadership, galvanised public support for the military operations against the Taliban in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the tribal areas and refurbished its professional image.

Occasionally the military high command has also shown measured resistance to American policy. Examples include the opposition to the Kerry-Lugar Bill (which sets out conditions for US assistance) and pursuing nuclear cooperation with China.

Has the Army been able to restore its public image and rebuild trust? Indications are that the return to normalcy in Swat where the military operation in 2009 drove out the Pakistani Taliban has considerably restored public trust.

The July-August 2010 floods-which claimed 1600 lives, displaced millions of people in the country and caused extensive infrastructure and crop damage-saw the military take a lead role in relief and rescue operations and in reconstruction.

This contrasted with the weak response from political leaders and political parties in managing the catastrophe. All of this means that it is too soon to tell whether the ‘deference’ the military has shown for the political leadership is a tactical shift or more deeply-rooted.