Lord Shaftesbury

We then walk’d gently homewards (it being almost Noon) and he continu’d his Discourse.

One Man, said he, affects the Hero; esteems it the highest Advantage of Life, to have seen War, and been in Action in the Field. Another laughs at this Humour; counts it all Extravagance and Folly; prizes his own Wit and Prudence; and wou’d take it for a Disgrace to be thought adventurous. One Person is assiduous and indefatigable in advancing himself to the Character of a Man of Business. Another on the contrary thinks this impertinent; values not Fame, or a Character in the World: and by his goodwill wou’d always be in a Debauch, and never live out of the Stews or Taverns; where he enjoys, as he thinks, his highest Good. One values Wealth, as a means only to indulge his Palat, and to eat finely. Another loaths this, and affects Popularity, and a Name. One admires Musick and Paintings, Cabinet-Curiositys, and in-door Ornaments: Another admires Gardens, Architecture, and the Pomp of Buildings. Another, who has no Gusto of either sort, believes all those they call Virtuosi to be half-distracted. One looks upon all Expence to be Madness; and thinks only Wealth it-self to be Good. One games; another dresses, and studys an Equipage; another is full of Heraldry, Points of Honour, a Family, and a Blood. One recommends Gallantry and Intrigue; another ordinary Good-fellowship; another Buffoonery, Satir, and the common Wit; another Sports, and the Country; another a Court; another Travelling, and the sight of foreign Parts; another Poetry, and the fashionable Learning.——All these go different ways. All censure one another, and are despicable in one another’s eyes. By fits too they are as despicable in their own, and as often out of conceit with themselves, as their Humour changes, and their Passion turns from one thing to another.——What is it then I shou’d be concern’d for? Whose Censure do I fear? Or by whom, after all, shall I be guided?

If I ask, “Are Riches good, when only heap’d up, and unimploy’d?” One answers, “They are.” The rest deny. “How is it then they are to be imploy’d in order to be good?” All disagree. All tell me different things. “Since therefore Riches are not, of themselves, good (as most of you declare;) And since there is no Agreement among you which way they become good; why may not I hold it for my Opinion, that they are neither good in themselves, nor directly any Cause or Means of Good?”

{[sc|If}} there be those who wholly despise Fame; And if among those who covet it, he who desires it for one thing, despises it for another; he who seeks it with some Men, despises it with others: Why may not I say, “That neither do I know how any Fame can be call’d a Good?”

If of those who covet Pleasure, they who admire it in one kind, are superior to it in another; Why may not I say, “That neither do I know which of these Pleasures, or how Pleasure it-self, can be call’d Good?”

If among those who covet Life ever so earnestly, that Life which to One is eligible and amiable, is to Another despicable and vile; Why may I not say, “That neither do I know how Life it-self can, of it-self, be thought a Good?”

In the mean time, This I know certainly; “That the necessary Consequence of esteeming these things highly, is to be a Slave, and consequently miserable."——But perhaps (Philocles!) you are not yet enough acquainted with this odd kind of Reasoning.

More, said I, than I believe you can easily imagine. I perceiv’d the goodly Lady, your celebrated Beauty, was about to appear a-new: and I easily knew again that fair Face of Liberty, which I had seen but once in the [9]Picture you drew yesterday of that Moral Dame. I can assure you, I think of her as highly as possible: and find that without her Help, to raise one above these seemingly essential Goods, and make one more easy and indifferent towards Life, and towards a Fortune; ’twill be the hardest thing in the world to enjoy either. Solicitude, Cares, and Anxiety, will be multiply’d: and in this unhappy Dependency, ’tis necessary to make court, and be not a little servile. To flatter the Great, to bear Insults, to stoop, and fawn, and abjectly resign one’s Sense and Manhood; all this must courageously be endur’d, and carry’d off, with as free an Air, and good Countenance as possible, by one who studys Greatness of this sort, who knows the general way of Courts, and how to fix unsteddy Fortune. I need not mention the Envyings, the Mistrusts, and Jealousys—

No truly, said he, interrupting me, neither need you. But finding you so sensible, as I do, of this unhappy State, and of its inward Sores, (whatever may be its outward Looks) How is it possible but you must find the Happiness of that other contrary State? Can you not call to mind what we resolv’d concerning Nature? Can any thing be more desirable than to follow her? Or is it not by this Freedom from our Passions and low Interests, that we are reconcil’d to the goodly Order of the Universe; that we harmonize with Nature; and live in Friendship both with God and Man?

Let us compare, continu’d he, the Advantages of each State, and set their Goods one against another: On one side, those which we found were uncertainly so; and depended both on Fortune, Age, Circumstances, and Humour: On the other side, these which being certain themselves, are founded on the Contempt of those others so uncertain. Is manly Liberty, Generosity, Magnanimity, not a Good? May we not esteem as Happiness, that Self-Enjoyment which arises from a Consistency of Life and Manners, a Harmony of Affections, a Freedom from the Reproach of Shame or Guilt, and a Consciousness of Worth and Merit with all Mankind, our Society, Country, and Friends: all which is founded in Virtue only? A Mind subordinate to Reason, a Temper humaniz’d, and fitted to all natural Affection; an Exercise of Friendship uninterrupted; a thorow Candor, Benignity, and Good Nature; with constant Security, Tranquillity, Equanimity, (if I may use such philosophical Terms) are not these ever, and at all seasons Good? Is it of these one can at any time nauseate and grow weary? Are there any particular Ages, Seasons, Places, Circumstances, which must accompany these, to make ’em agreeable? Are these variable and inconstant? Do these, by being ardently belov’d, or sought, occasion any Disturbance or Misery? Can these be at any time overvalu’d? Or, to say more yet, can these be ever taken from us, or can we ever be hinder’d in the Enjoyment of ’em, unless by our-selves? How can we better praise the Goodness of Providence, than in this, “That it has plac’d our Happiness and Good in things We can bestow upon our-selves?”

If this be so, said I, I see no reason we have to accuse Providence on any account. But Men, I fear, will hardly be brought to this good Temper, while their Fancy is so strong, as it naturally is, towards those other movable Goods. And in short, if we may depend on what is said commonly, “All Good is merely as we fancy it. ‘Tis Conceit which makes it. All is Opinion and Fancy only.”

Wherefore then, said he, do we act at any time? Why chuse, or why prefer one thing to another? You will tell me, I suppose, ’tis because we fancy it, or fancy Good in it. Are we therefore to follow every present Fancy, Opinion, or Imagination of Good? If so, then we must follow that at one time, which we decline at another; approve at one time, what we disapprove at another; and be at perpetual variance with our-selves. But if we are not to follow all Fancy or Opinion alike; If it be allow’d, “That of Fancys, some are true, some false;” then we are to examine every Fancy; and there is some Rule or other, by which to judge, and determine. ‘Twas the Fancy of one Man to set fire to a beautiful Temple, in order to obtain immortal Memory or Fame. ‘Twas the Fancy of another Man to conquer the World, for the same Reason, or what was very like it. If this were really the Man’s Good; Why do we wonder at him? If the Fancy were wrong; say plainly in What it was so; or Why the Subject was not Good to him, as he fancy’d? Either therefore, “That is every Man’s Good which he fancies, and because he fancies it, and is not content without it:” Or otherwise, “There is That in which the Nature of Man is satisfy’d; and which alone must be his Good.” If That in which the Nature of Man is satisfy’d, and can rest contented, be alone his Good; then he is a Fool who follows that with Earnestness, as his Good, which a Man can be without, and yet be satisfy’d and contented. In the same manner is he a Fool who flies that earnestly as his Ill, which a Man may endure, and yet be easy and contented. Now a Man may possibly not have burnt a Temple (as Erostratus) and yet may be contented. Or tho he may not have conquer’d the World (as Alexander) yet he may be easy and contented: as he may still without any of those Advantages of Power, Riches, or Renown; if his Fancy hinders not. In short, we shall find, “That without any one of those which are commonly call’d Goods, a Man may be contented:” As, on the contrary, “He may possess them all, and still be discontented, and not a jot the happier.” If so; it follows, “That Happiness is from within, not from without.” A good Fancy is the Main. And thus, you see, I agree with you, “That [10]Opinion is all in all.——But what is this, Philocles, which has seiz’d you? You seem of a sudden grown deeply thoughtful.

To tell you truth, said I, I was considering What wou’d become of me, if, after all, I shou’d, by your means, turn Philosopher. The Change, truly, wou’d be somewhat extraordinary, reply’d Theocles. But be not concern’d. The Danger is not so great. And Experience shews us every day, That for talking or writing Philosophy, People are not at all the nearer being Philosophers.

But, said I, the very Name is a kind of Reproach. The word Idiot stood formerly as the Opposite to Philosopher: but now-a-days it means nothing more commonly than the Philosopher himself.

Yet, in effect, reply’d he, what else is it we all do in general, than philosophize? If Philosophy be, as we take it, the Study of Happiness; must not everyone, in some manner or other, either skilfully or unskilfully philosophize? Is not every Deliberation concerning our main Interest, every Correction of our Taste, every Choice and Preference in Life to be reckon’d of this kind? For “If Happiness be not allow’d to be from Self, and from within; then Either is it from outward Things alone, or from Self and outward Things together.” If from outward Things alone; shew it us, in fact, “That all Men are happy in proportion to these; and that no one who possesses them is ever miserable by his own fault.” But this, it seems, hardly any-one will pretend to evince: All own the contrary. Therefore “If Happiness be partly from Self, partly from outward Things; then Each must be consider’d, and a certain Value set on the Concerns of an inward kind, and which depend on Self alone.” If so: and that I consider “How, and in What these are to be prefer’d; When and on what occasion they are in season, or out of season; When properly to take place, when to yield:” What’s this, after all, but to philosophize? Yet even this, still, is enough to put one out of the ordinary way of thinking, and give one an unhappy turn for Business, and the World. Right! For this also is to be consider’d, and well weigh’d. And therefore This, still, is Philosophy; “To inquire Where, and in what respect one may be most a Loser; Which are the greatest Gains, the most profitable Exchanges;” since every thing in this World goes by Exchange. Nothing is had for nothing. Favour requires Courtship: Interest is made by Sollicitation: Honours are acquir’d with Hazard; Riches with Pains; Learning and Accomplishments by Study and Application. Security, Rest, Indolence are to be had at other Prices. They may be thought, perhaps, to come easy. For “What Hardship is there? Where is the Harm?” ‘Tis only to abate of Fame and Fortune. ‘Tis only to wave the Point of Honour, and share somewhat less of Interest. If this be easy; all is well. Some Patience, you see, is necessary in the case. Privacy must be endur’d; even Obscurity and Contempt.——Such are the Conditions. And thus every-thing has its Condition. Power and Preferments are to be had at one rate; Pleasures at another; Liberty and Honesty at another. A good Mind must be paid for, as other things. “But we had best beware lest, perhaps, we pay too dear for It. Let us be assur’d we have a good Bargain. Come on then.——Let us account.——“What is a Mind worth? What Allowance may one handsomly make for it? Or What may one well afford it for?"——If I part with It, or abate of It, ’tis not for Nothing. Some value I must needs set upon my Liberty, some upon my inward Character. Something there is in what we call Worth; something in Sincerity, and a sound Heart. Orderly Affections, generous Thoughts, and a commanding Reason, are fair Possessions, not slightly to be given up. I am to consider first, “What may be their Equivalent? Whether I shall find my Account in letting these inward Concerns run as they please; or Whether I shall not be better secur’d against Fortune by adjusting Matters at home, rather than by making Interest abroad, and acquiring first one great Friend, then another, to add still more and more to my Estate or Quality?” For Where am I to take up? Begin; and set the Bounds. Let me hear positively “How far I am to go, and Why no further?” What is a moderate Fortune, a Competency, and those other Degrees commonly talk’d of? Where is my Anger to stop? or how High may I suffer it to rise? How far may I engage in Love? How far give way to Ambition? How far to other Appetites? Or am I to let all loose? Are the Passions to take their swing; and no Application to be given to ’em, but all to the outward Things they aim at? Or if any Application be requisite; say plainly, “How much to one, and how much to the other?” How far are the Appetites to be minded, and how far outward Things? Give us the Measure and Rule. See Whether this be not to philosophize? and Whether willingly or unwillingly, knowingly or unknowingly, directly or indirectly, Everyone does not as much? “Where, then, is the Difference? Which Manner is the best?” Here lies the Question. This is what I wou’d have you weigh and examine. “But the Examination,” say you, “is troublesom; and I had better be without it.” Who tells you thus? “Your Reason, you say, whose Force, of necessity, you must yield to.” Tell me therefore, have you fitly cultivated that Reason of your’s, polish’d it, bestow’d the necessary Pains on it, and exercis’d it on this Subject? Or is it like to determine full as well when un-exercis’d, as when thorowly exercis’d, or ever so expert? Consider, pray, in Mathematicks; Whose is the better Reason of the two, and fitter to be rely’d on? The Practiser’s or his who is unpractis’d? Whose in the way of War, of Policy, or Civil Affairs? Whose in Merchandize, Law, Physick?——And in Morality and Life, I ask still, Whose? May he not, perhaps, be allow’d the best Judge of Living, who studies Life, and endeavours to form it by some Rule? Or is he indeed to be esteem’d most knowing in the matter, who slightly examines it, and who accidentally and unknowingly philosophizes?

Thus, Philocles (said he, concluding his Discourse) Thus is Philosophy establish’d. For Every-one, of necessity, must reason concerning his own Happiness; “What his Good is, and what his Ill.” The Question is only, “Who reason’s best?"” For even he who rejects this reasoning or deliberating Part, does it from a certain Reason, and from a Persuasion “That this is best.”

By this time we found our-selves insensibly got home. Our Philosophy ended, and we return’d to the common Affairs of Life.