Scepticism: The Limitation of Humans

101. The two great Provinces of speculative Science, conversant about Ideas received from Sense and their Relations, are natural Philosophy and Mathematics.

The Sceptics triumph in Natural Philosophy.

They produce Arguments to:

• depreciate our Faculties, and
• make Mankind appear ignorant and low

Their main argument is that we are under an invincible Blindness as to the true and real Nature of Things.

This they exaggerate, and love to enlarge on.

We are miserably bantered, say they, by our Senses, and amused only with the outside and shew of Things.

The real Essence, the internal Qualities, and Constitution of every the meanest Object, is hid from our view.

It is beyond the Power of humane Understanding to fathom or comprehend what is in every drop of Water, every grain of Sand.

But all this Complaint is groundless. These are false Principles that make us mistrust our Senses, and think we know nothing of those Things which we perfectly comprehend.

102. The Sceptics emphasize our ignorance by the idea that everything includes within it self the Cause of its Properties.

They think that there is in each Object an inward Essence, which is the Source whence its discernible Qualities flow, and whereon they depend.

Some have pretended to account for Appearances by occult Qualities. But of late they are mostly resolved into mechanical Causes: the Figure, Motion, Weight, and such like Qualities of insensible Particles.

In truth, there is no other Agent or efficient Cause than Spirit.

It follows that Motion, as well as all other Ideas, is perfectly inert. See Sect. 25.

Hence, to endeavour to explain the Production of Colours or Sounds, by Figure, Motion, Magnitude and the like, must needs be labour in vain.

And accordingly, we see the Attempts of that kind are not at all satisfactory.

Which may be said, in general, of those Instances, wherein one Idea or Quality is assigned for the Cause of another.

I need not say, how many Hypotheses and Speculations are left out, and how much the Study of Nature is abridged by this Doctrine.

103. The great mechanical Principle now in Vogue is Attraction.

That a Stone falls to the Earth, or the Sea swells towards the Moon, may to some appear sufficiently explained thereby. But how are we enlightened by being told this is done by Attraction?

Is it that that Word signifies the manner of the Tendency, and that it is by the mutual drawing of Bodies, instead of their being impelled or protruded towards each other?

But nothing is determined of the Manner or Action, and it may as truly (for ought we know) be termed Impulse or Protrusion as Attraction.

Again, the Parts of Steel we see cohere firmly together, and this also is accounted for by Attraction; but in this, as in the other Instances, I do not perceive that any thing is signified besides the Effect it self; for as to the manner of the Action whereby it is produced, or the Cause which produces it, these are not so much as aimed at.

104. If we take a view of the several Phænomena, and compare them together, we may observe some likeness and conformity between them.

For Example, in the falling of a Stone to the Ground, in the rising of the Sea towards the Moon, in Cohesion and Crystallization, there is something alike, namely an Union or mutual Approach of Bodies. So that any one of these or the like Phænomena, may not seem strange or surprising to a Man who hath nicely observed and compared the Effects of Nature. For that only is thought so which is uncommon, or a thing by it self, and out of the ordinary Course of our Observation.

That Bodies should tend towards the Center of the Earth, is not thought strange, because it is what we perceive every moment of our Lives. But that they should have a like Gravitation towards the Center of the Moon, may seem odd and unaccountable to most Men, because it is discerned only in the Tides.

But a Philosopher, whose Thoughts take in a larger compass of Nature, having observed a certain similitude of Appearances, as well in the Heavens as the Earth, that argue innumerable Bodies to have a mutual Tendency towards each other, which he denotes by the general Name Attraction, whatever can be reduced to that, he thinks justly accounted for. Thus he explains the Tides by the Attraction of the Terraqueous Globe towards the Moon, which to him doth not appear odd or anomalous, but only a particular Example of a general Rule or Law of Nature.

105. If therefore we consider the difference there is betwixt natural Philosophers and other Men, with regard to their Knowledge of the Phænomena, we shall find it consists, not in an exacter Knowledge of the efficient Cause that produces them, for that can be no other than the Will of a Spirit, but only in a greater Largeness of Comprehension, whereby Analogies, Harmonies, and Agreements are discovered in the Works of Nature, and the particular Effects explained, that is, reduced to general Rules, see Sect. 62. which Rules grounded on the Analogy, and Uniformness observed in the Production of natural Effects, are most agreeable, and sought after by the Mind; for that they extend our Prospect beyond what is present, and near to us, and enable us to make very probable Conjectures, touching Things that may have happened at very great distances of Time and Place, as well as to predict Things to come; which sort of endeavour towards Omniscience, is much affected by the Mind.

106. But we should proceed warily in such Things: for we are apt to lay too great a Stress on Analogies, and to the prejudice of Truth, humour that Eagerness of the Mind, whereby it is carried to extend its Knowledge into general Theoremes.

For Example, Gravitation, or mutual Attraction, because it appears in many Instances, some are straightway for pronouncing Universal; and that to attract, and be attracted by every other Body, is an essential Quality inherent in all Bodies whatsoever.

Whereas it appears the fixed Stars have no such Tendency towards each other: and so far is that Gravitation, from being essential to Bodies, that in some Instances a quite contrary Principle seems to shew it self: As in the perpendicular Growth of Plants, and the Elasticity of the Air.

There is nothing necessary or essential in the Case, but it depends intirely on the Will of the governing Spirit, who causes certain Bodies to cleave together, or tend towards each other, according to various Laws, whilst he keeps others at a fixed Distance; and to some he gives a quite contrary Tendency to fly asunder, just as he sees convenient.

107. After what has been premised, I think we may lay down the following Conclusions.

First, It is plain Philosophers amuse themselves in vain, when they inquire for any natural efficient Cause, distinct from a Mind or Spirit. Secondly, Considering the whole Creation is the Workmanship of a wise and good Agent, it should seem to become Philosophers, to employ their Thoughts (contrary to what some hold) about the final Causes of Things: And I must confess, I see no reason, why pointing out the various Ends, to which natural Things are adapted, and for which they were originally with unspeakable Wisdom contrived, should not be thought one good way of accounting for them, and altogether worthy a Philosopher.

Thirdly, From what hath been premised no reason can be drawn, why the History of Nature should not still be studied, and Observations and Experiments made, which, that they are of use to Mankind, and enable us to draw any general Conclusions, is not the Result of any immutable Habitudes, or Relations between Things themselves, but only of God’s Goodness and Kindness to Men in the Administration of the World. See Sect. 30 and 31.

Fourthly, By a diligent Observation of the Phænomena within our View, we may discover the general Laws of Nature, and from them deduce the other Phænomena, I do not say demonstrate; for all Deductions of that kind depend on a Supposition that the Author of Nature always operates uniformly, and in a constant observance of those Rules we take for Principles: Which we cannot evidently know.