The Motives of Plants and Animals

61. What is the purpose for:

• the Organization of Plants
• the admirable Mechanism in the Parts of Animals?

might not Vegetables grow, and shoot forth Leaves and Blossoms, and Animals perform all their Motions, as well without as with all that variety of internal Parts so elegantly contrived and put together, which being Ideas have nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any necessary Connexion with the Effects ascribed to them?

If a Spirit immediately produces every Effect by a Fiat, or Act of his Will, then all that is fine and artificial in the Works, whether of Man or Nature, are made in vain.

By this Doctrine, though an Artist hath made the Spring and Wheels, and every Movement of a Watch, and adjusted them in such a manner as he knew would produce the Motions he designed; yet he must think all this done to no purpose, and that it is an Intelligence which directs the Index, and points to the Hour of the Day.

If so, why may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at the pains of making the Movements, and putting them together? Why does not an empty Case serve as well as another? And how comes it to pass, that whenever there is any Fault in the going of a Watch, there is some corresponding Disorder to be found in the Movements, which being mended by a skilful Hand, all is right again? The like may be said of all the Clockwork of Nature, great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtile, as scarce to be discerned by the best Microscope. In short, it will be asked, how upon our Principles any tolerable Account can be given, or any final Cause assigned of an innumerable multitude of Bodies and Machines framed with the most exquisite Art, which in the common Philosophy have very apposite uses assigned them, and serve to explain abundance of Phænomena.

LXI. To all which I answer, First, That though there were some Difficulties relating to the Administration of Providence, and the uses by it assigned to the several parts of Nature, which I could not solve by the foregoing Principles, yet this Objection could be of small weight against the Truth and Certainty of those things which may be proved `a priori, with the utmost Evidence. Secondly, But neither are the received Principles free from the like Difficulties; for it may still be demanded, to what end God should take those round-about Methods of effecting things by Instruments and Machines, which no one can deny might have been effected by the mere Command of his Will, without all that apparatus: Nay, if we narrowly consider it, we shall find the Objection may be retorted with greater force on those who hold the Existence of those Machines without the Mind; for it has been made evident, that Solidity, Bulk, Figure, Motion and the like, have no Activity or Efficacy in them, so as to be capable of producing any one Effect in Nature. See Sect. 25. Whoever therefore supposes them to exist (allowing the Supposition possible) when they are not perceived, does it manifestly to no purpose; since the only use that is assigned to them, as they exist unperceived, is that they produce those perceivable Effects, which in truth cannot be ascribed to any thing but Spirit.

LXII. But to come nearer the Difficulty, it must be observed, that though the Fabrication of all those Parts and Organs be not absolutely necessary to the producing any Effect, yet it is necessary to the producing of things in a constant, regular way, according to the Laws of Nature. There are certain general Laws that run through the whole Chain of natural Effects: These are learned by the Observation and Study of Nature, and are by Men applied as well to the framing artificial things for the Use and Ornament of Life, as to the explaining the various Phænomena: Which Explication consists only in shewing the Conformity any particular Phænomenon hath to the general Laws of Nature, or, which is the same thing, in discovering the Uniformity there is in the Production of natural Effects; as will be evident to whoever shall attend to the several Instances, wherein Philosophers pretend to account for Appearances.

That there is a great and conspicuous Use in these regular constant Methods of working observed by the Supreme Agent, hath been shewn in Sect. 31. And it is no less visible, that a particular Size, Figure, Motion and Disposition of Parts are necessary, though not absolutely to the producing any Effect, yet to the producing it according to the standing mechanical Laws of Nature. Thus, for Instance, it cannot be denied that God, or the Intelligence which sustains and rules the ordinary Course of things might, if He were minded to produce a Miracle, cause all the Motions on the Dial-plate of a Watch, though no Body had ever made the Movements, and put them in it: But yet if he will act agreeably to the Rules of Mechanism, by him for wise ends established and maintained in the Creation, it is necessary that those Actions of the Watchmaker, whereby he makes the Movements and rightly adjusts them, precede the Production of the aforesaid Motions; as also that any Disorder in them be attended with the Perception of some corresponding Disorder in the Movements, which being once corrected all is right again.

63. It may indeed on some Occasions be necessary, that the Author of Nature display his overruling Power in producing some Appearance out of the ordinary Series of things. Such Exceptions from the general Rules of Nature are proper to surprise and awe Men into an Acknowledgment of the Divine Being: But then they are to be used but seldom, otherwise there is a plain Reason why they should fail of that Effect. Besides, God seems to choose the convincing our Reason of his Attributes by the Works of Nature, which discover so much Harmony and Contrivance in their Make, and are such plain Indications of Wisdom and Beneficence in their Author, rather than to astonish us into a belief of his Being by anomalous and surprising Events.

64. To set this Matter in a yet clearer Light, I shall observe that what has been objected in Sect. 60. amounts in reality to no more than this: Ideas are not any how and at random produced, there being a certain Order and Connexion between them, like to that of Cause and Effect: There are also several Combinations of them, made in a very regular and artificial manner, which seem like so many Instruments in the hand of Nature, that being hid as it were behind the Scenes, have a secret Operation in producing those Appearances which are seen on the Theatre of the World, being themselves discernible only to the curious Eye of the Philosopher. But since one Idea cannot be the Cause of another, to what purpose is that Connexion? And since those Instruments, being barely inefficacious Perceptions in the Mind, are not subservient to the Production of natural Effects; it is demanded why they are made, or, in other Words, what reason can be assigned why God should make us, upon a close Inspection into his Works, behold so great Variety of Ideas, so artfully laid together, and so much according to Rule; it not being credible, that he would be at the Expense (if one may so speak) of all that Art and Regularity to no purpose?

65. To all which my Answer is, First, That the Connexion of Ideas does not imply the Relation of Cause and Effect, but only of a Mark or Sign with the thing signified. The Fire which I see is not the Cause of the Pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the Mark that forewarns me of it. In like manner, the Noise that I hear is not the Effect of this or that Motion or Collision of the ambient Bodies, but the Sign thereof. Secondly, The Reason why Ideas are formed into Machines, that is, artificial and regular Combinations, is the same with that for combining Letters into Words. That a few Original Ideas may be made to signify a great number of Effects and Actions, it is necessary they be variously combined together: And to the end their use be permanent and universal, these Combinations must be made by Rule, and with wise Contrivance. By this means abundance of Information is conveyed unto us, concerning what we are to expect from such and such Actions, and what Methods are proper to be taken, for the exciting such and such Ideas: Which in effect is all that I conceive to be distinctly meant, when it is said that by discerning the Figure, Texture, and Mechanism of the inward Parts of Bodies, whether natural or artificial, we may attain to know the several Uses and Properties depending thereon, or the Nature of the thing.

66. Hence it is evident, that those things which under the Notion of a Cause cooperating or concurring to the Production of Effects, are altogether inexplicable, and run us into great Absurdities, may be very naturally explained, and have a proper and obvious use assigned them, when they are considered only as Marks or Signs for our Information. And it is the searching after, and endeavouring to understand those Signs instituted by the Author of Nature, that ought to be the Employment of the Natural Philosopher, and not the pretending to explain things by Corporeal Causes; which Doctrine seems to have too much estranged the Minds of Men from that active Principle, that supreme and wise Spirit, in whom we live, move, and have our being.