Article 26

The Succession of Ideas

by Berkeley
7 min read 1436 words
Table of Contents
  1. We perceive a continual Succession of Ideas, some are anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear.

There is therefore some Cause of these Ideas whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them. That this Cause cannot be any Quality or Idea or Combination of Ideas, is clear from the preceding Section.

It must therefore be a Substance; but it has been shewn that there is no corporeal or material Substance: It remains therefore that the Cause of Ideas is an incorporeal active Substance or Spirit.

  1. A Spirit is one simple, undivided, active Being: as it perceives Ideas, it is called the Understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called the Will. Hence there can be no Idea formed of a Soul or Spirit: For all Ideas whatever, being Passive and Inert, vide Sect. 25. they cannot represent unto us, by way of Image or Likeness, that which acts.

A little Attention will make it plain to any one, that to have an Idea which shall be like that active Principle of Motion and Change of Ideas, is absolutely impossible.

Such is the Nature of Spirit or that which acts, that it cannot be of it self perceived, but only by the Effects which it produceth.

If any Man shall doubt of the Truth of what is here delivered, let him but reflect and try if he can frame the Idea of any Power or active Being; and whether he hath Ideas of two principal Powers, marked by the Names Will and Understanding, distinct from each other as well as from a third Idea of Substance or Being in general, with a relative Notion of its supporting or being the Subject of the aforesaid Powers, which is signified by the Name Soul or Spirit.

This is what some hold; but so far as I can see, the Words Will, Soul, Spirit, do not stand for different Ideas, or in truth, for any Idea at all, but for something which is very different from Ideas, and which being an Agent cannot be like unto, or represented by, any Idea whatsoever.

Though it must be owned at the same time, that we have some Notion of Soul, Spirit, and the Operations of the Mind, such as Willing, Loving, Hating, in as much as we know or understand the meaning of those Words.

  1. I find I can excite Ideas in my Mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the Scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than Willing, and straightway this or that Idea arises in my Fancy: And by the same Power it is obliterated, and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of Ideas doth very properly denominate the Mind active.

Thus much is certain, and grounded on Experience: But when we think of unthinking Agents, or of exciting Ideas exclusive of Volition, we only amuse our selves with Words.

  1. But whatever Power I may have over my own Thoughts, I find the Ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like Dependence on my Will. When in broad Day-light I open my Eyes, it is not in my Power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular Objects shall present themselves to my View; and so likewise as to the Hearing and other Senses, the Ideas imprinted on them are not Creatures of my Will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them.

  2. The Ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the Imagination; they have likewise a Steddiness, Order, and Coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of Humane Wills often are, but in a regular Train or Series, the admirable Connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the Wisdom and Benevolence of its Author.

The set Rules or established Methods, wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the Ideas of Sense, are called the Laws of Nature: And these we learn by Experience, which teaches us that such and such Ideas are attended with such and such other Ideas, in the ordinary course of Things.

  1. This gives us a sort of Foresight, which enables us to regulate our Actions for the benefit of Life. And without this we should be eternally at a loss: We could not know how to act any thing that might procure us the least Pleasure, or remove the least Pain of Sense.

That Food nourishes, Sleep refreshes, and Fire warms us; that to sow in the Seed-time is the way to reap in the Harvest, and, in general, that to obtain such or such Ends, such or such Means are conducive, all this we know, not by discovering any necessary Connexion between our Ideas, but only by the Observation of the settled Laws of Nature, without which we should be all in Uncertainty and Confusion, and a grown Man no more know how to manage himself in the Affairs of Life, than an Infant just born.

  1. Yet this consistent uniform working, which so evidently displays the Goodness and Wisdom of that governing Spirit whose Will constitutes the Laws of Nature, is so far from leading our Thoughts to him, that it rather sends them a wandering after second Causes.

For when we perceive certain Ideas of Sense constantly followed by other Ideas, and we know this is not of our own doing, we forthwith attribute Power and Agency to the Ideas themselves, and make one the Cause of another, than which nothing can be more absurd and unintelligible.

Thus, for Example, having observed that when we perceive by Sight a certain round luminous Figure, we at the same time perceive by Touch the Idea or Sensation called Heat, we do from thence conclude the Sun to be the cause of Heat. And in like manner perceiving the Motion and Collision of Bodies to be attended with Sound, we are inclined to think the latter an effect of the former.

  1. The Ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of Nature are called real Things: And those excited in the Imagination being less regular, vivid and constant, are more properly termed Ideas, or Images of Things, which they copy and represent.

But then our Sensations, be they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless Ideas, that is, they exist in the Mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the Ideas of its own framing.

The Ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent than the Creatures of the Mind; but this is no Argument that they exist without the Mind. They are also less dependent on the Spirit, or thinking Substance which perceives them, in that they are excited by the Will of another and more powerful Spirit: yet still they are Ideas, and certainly no Idea, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a Mind perceiving it.

  1. Before we proceed any farther, it is necessary to spend some Time in answering Objections which may probably be made against the Principles hitherto laid down.

In doing of which, if I seem too prolix to those of quick Apprehensions, I hope it may be pardoned, since all Men do not equally apprehend things of this Nature; and I am willing to be understood by every one.

First then, it will be objected that by the foregoing Principles, all that is real and substantial in Nature is banished out of the World: And instead thereof a chimerical Scheme of Ideas takes place. All things that exist, exist only in the Mind, that is, they are purely notional. What therefore becomes of the Sun, Moon, and Stars?

What must we think of Houses, Rivers, Mountains, Trees, Stones; nay, even of our own Bodies? Are all these but so many Chimeras and Illusions on the Fancy?

To all which, and whatever else of the same sort may be objected, I answer, that by the Principles premised, we are not deprived of any one thing in Nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or any wise conceive or understand, remains as secure as ever, and is as real as ever.

There is a rerum natura, and the Distinction between Realities and Chimeras retains its full force. This is evident from Sect. 29, 30, and 33, where we have shewn what is meant by real Things in opposition to Chimeras, or Ideas of our own framing; but then they both equally exist in the Mind, and in that Sense they are alike Ideas.

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