Commonplace

S. Thing & idea are much what words of the same extent and meaning. Why, therefore, do I not use the word thing? Ans. Because thing is of greater latitude than idea. Thing comprehends also volitions or actions. Now these are no ideas117.

S. There can be perception wthout volition. Qu. whether there can be volition without perception?

E. Existence not conceivable without perception or volition—not distinguish’d therefrom.

T. N. B. Several distinct ideas can be perceived by sight and touch at once. Not so by the other senses. ‘Tis this diversity of sensations in other senses chiefly, but sometimes in touch and sight (as also diversity of volitions, whereof there cannot be more than one at once, or rather, it seems there cannot, for of that I doubt), gives us the idea of time—or is time itself.

Wt would the solitary man think of number?

S. There are innate ideas, i.e. ideas created with us118.

S. Locke seems to be mistaken wn he says thought is not essential to the mind119.

S. Certainly the mind always and constantly thinks: and we know this too. In sleep and trances the mind exists not—there is no time, no succession of ideas120.

S. To say the mind exists without thinking is a contradiction, nonsense, nothing.

S. Folly to inquire wt determines the Will. Uneasiness, &c. are ideas, therefore unactive, therefore can do nothing, therefore cannot determine the Will121.

[pg 035] S. Again, wt mean you by determine?

N. T. For want of rightly understanding time, motion, existence, &c., men are forc’d into such absurd contradictions as this, viz. light moves 16 diameters of earth in a second of time.

S. ‘Twas the opinion that ideas could exist unperceiv’d, or before perception, that made men think perception122 was somewhat different from the idea perceived, i.e. yt it was an idea of reflection; whereas the thing perceiv’d was an idea of sensation. I say, ’twas this made ’em think the understanding took it in, receiv’d it from without; wch could never be did not they think it existed without123.

M. Properly speaking, idea is the picture of the imagination’s making. This is ye likeness of, and refer’d to the real idea, or (if you will) thing124.

S. To ask, have we an idea of Will or volition, is nonsense. An idea can resemble nothing but an idea.

S. If you ask wt thing it is that wills, I answer, if you mean idea by the word thing, or anything like any idea, then I say, ’tis no thing at all that wills125. This how extravagant soever it may seem, yet is a certain truth. We are cheated by these general terms, thing, is, &c.

S. Again, if by is you mean is perceived, or does perceive, I say nothing wch is perceived or does perceive wills.

S. The referring ideas to things wch are not ideas, the using the term “idea of126,” is one great cause of mistake, as in other matters, so also in this.

S. Some words there are wch do not stand for ideas, viz. particles, will, &c. Particles stand for volitions and their concomitant ideas.

S. There seem to be but two colours wch are simple ideas, viz. those exhibited by the most and least refrangible rays; [the others], being the intermediate ones, may be formed by composition.

[pg 036] S. I have no idea of a volition or act of the mind, neither has any other intelligence; for that were a contradiction.

N. B. Simple ideas, viz. colours, are not devoid of all sort of composition, tho’ it must be granted they are not made up of distinguishable ideas. Yet there is another sort of composition. Men are wont to call those things compounded in which we do not actually discover the component ingredients. Bodies are said to be compounded of chymical principles, which, nevertheless, come not into view till after the dissolution of the bodies—wch were not, could not, be discerned in the bodies whilst remaining entire.

I. All our knowledge is about particular ideas, according to Locke. All our sensations are particular ideas, as is evident. Wt use then do we make of abstract general ideas, since we neither know nor perceive them?

S. ‘Tis allow’d that particles stand not for ideas, and yet they are not said to be empty useless sounds. The truth really is, they stand for operations of the mind, i.e. volitions.

Mo. Locke says all our knowledge is about particulars. If so, pray wt is the following ratiocination but a jumble of words? “Omnis homo est animal; omne animal vivit: ergo omnis homo vivit.” It amounts (if you annex particular ideas to the words “animal” and “vivit”) to no more than this: “Omnis homo est homo; omnis homo est homo: ergo, omnis homo est homo.” A mere sport and trifling with sounds.

Mo. We have no ideas of vertues & vices, no ideas of moral actions127. Wherefore it may be question’d whether we are capable of arriving at demonstration about them128, the morality consisting in the volition chiefly.

E. Strange it is that men should be at a loss to find their idea of Existence; since that (if such there be distinct from perception) it is brought into the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection129, methinks it should be most familiar to us, and we best acquainted with it.

[pg 037] E. This I am sure, I have no idea of Existence130, or annext to the word Existence. And if others have that’s nothing to me; they can never make me sensible of it; simple ideas being incommunicable by language.

S. Say you, the unknown substratum of volitions & ideas is something whereof I have no idea. I ask, Is there any other being which has or can have an idea of it? If there be, then it must be itself an idea; which you will think absurd.

S. There is somewhat active in most perceptions, i.e. such as ensue upon our volitions, such as we can prevent and stop: e.g. I turn my eyes toward the sun: I open them. All this is active.

S. Things are twofold—active or inactive. The existence of active things is to act; of inactive to be perceiv’d.

S. E. Distinct from or without perception there is no volition; therefore neither is there existence without perception.

G. God may comprehend all ideas, even the ideas wch are painfull & unpleasant, without being in any degree pained thereby131. Thus we ourselves can imagine the pain of a burn, &c. without any misery or uneasiness at all.

N. Mo. Truth has 3 kinds:

1. natural
2. mathematical
3. moral

Mo. Agreement of relation onely where numbers do obtain: of co-existence, in nature: of signification, by including, in morality.

I. Gyant who shakes the mountain that’s on him must be acknowledged. Or rather thus: I am no more to be reckon’d stronger than Locke than a pigmy should be reckon’d stronger than a gyant, because he could throw off the molehill wch lay upon him, and the gyant could onely shake or shove the mountain that oppressed him. This in the Preface.

I. Promise to extend our knowledge & clear it of those shamefull contradictions which embarrass it. Something like this to begin the Introduction in a modest way132.

[pg 038] I. Whoever shall pretend to censure any part, I desire he would read out the whole, else he may perhaps not understand me. In the Preface or Introduction133.

S. Doctrine of identity best explain’d by taking the Will for volitions, the Understanding for ideas. The difficulty of consciousness of wt are never acted surely solv’d thereby.

I. I must acknowledge myself beholding to the philosophers who have gone before me. They have given good rules, though certainly they do not always observe them. Similitude of adventurers, who, tho’ they attained not the desired port, they by their wrecks have made known the rocks and sands, whereby the passage of aftercomers is made more secure & easy. Preface or Introduction.

Mo. The opinion that men had ideas of moral actions134 has render’d the demonstrating ethiques very difficult to them.