What is the highest end of action?

Chapter 9

The fortunes of their descendants, and friends generally, contribute nothing towards forming the condition of the dead, is plainly a very heartless notion, and contrary to the current opinions.

But since things which befall are many, and differ in all kinds of ways, and some touch more nearly, others less, to go into minute particular distinctions would evidently be a long and endless task: and so it may suffice to speak generally and in outline.

If we have misfortunes that are either heavy or light, so our friends have them too.

if further, whether they whom each suffering befalls be alive or dead makes much more difference than in a tragedy the presupposing or actual perpetration of the various crimes and horrors, we must take into our account this difference also, and still more perhaps the doubt concerning the dead whether they really partake of any good or evil;

This means that if anything does pierce the veil and reach them, be the same good or bad, it must be something trivial and small, either in itself or to them.

Or at least it is of such a magnitude or kind as neither to make happy them that are not so otherwise, nor to deprive of their blessedness them that are.

It is plain then that the good or ill fortunes of their friends do affect the dead somewhat: but in such kind and degree as neither to make the happy unhappy nor produce any other such effect.

Does Happiness belong to the class of things praiseworthy or things precious?

Everything which is a subject of praise is praised for:

• being of a certain kind and
• having a relation to something else.

For instance, we praise the just, the valiant, the good man, and virtue itself because of the actions and the results.

We praise the strong man, the quick runner, etc, for being of a certain nature and having a relation to something good and excellent.

This is illustrated by praises to gods who are presented in a ludicrous aspect[39] relative to our standard. This is caused by all praise having reference to a standard.

If it is to such objects that praise belongs, it is evident that what is applicable to the best objects is not praise, but something higher and better: which is plain matter of fact, for not only do we call the gods blessed and happy, but of men also we pronounce those blessed who most nearly resemble the gods.

Similarly, in respect of goods, no man thinks of praising Happiness as he does the principle of justice, but calls it blessed, as being somewhat more godlike and more excellent.

Eudoxus is thought to have advanced a sound argument in support of the claim of pleasure to the highest prize.

Happiness is one of the good things. But it is not praised. He took for an indication of its superiority to those which are subjects of praise: a superiority he attributed also to a god and the Chief Good, on the ground that they form the standard to which everything besides is referred.

For praise applies to virtue, because it makes men apt to do what is noble; but encomia to definite works of body or mind.[41]

However, it is perhaps more suitable to a regular treatise on encomia to pursue this topic with exactness: it is enough for our purpose that from what has been said it is evident that Happiness belongs to the class of things precious and final.

It seems to be so also because of its being a starting-point; which it is, in that with a view to it we all do everything else that is done; now the starting-point and cause of good things we assume to be something precious and divine.