The Problems of Philosophy on Superphysics

Appearance And Reality

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PREFACE

I have limited this work to those problems of philosophy which it possible to say something positive and constructive about, since merely negative criticism seemed out of place. For this reason, theory of knowledge occupies a larger space than metaphysics in the present volume, and some topics much discussed by philosophers are treated very briefly, if at all.

Sense-Data

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‘Sense-data’ are the things that are immediately known in sensation. Examples are colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on.

‘Sensation’ is the experience of being immediately aware of these things.

The Existence Of Matter

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Does matter exist?

Is there a table which has a certain intrinsic nature, and continues to exist when I am not looking?

Or is the table merely a product of my imagination, a dream-table in a very prolonged dream?

The Existence Of Other People

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The previous considerations depend on supposing that there are other people besides ourselves.

People exist to me as they are represented by certain sense-data such as when I:

The Nature Of Matter

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Chapter 2 explained that it is rational to believe that our sense-data are really signs of the existence of something independent of us and our perceptions.

Idealism

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The word ‘idealism’ is used by different philosophers in different senses.

It says that whatever exists is mental.

The doctrine is so widely held, and so interesting in itself, that even the briefest survey of philosophy must give some account of it.

The Nature Of Ideas

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What is the nature of ideas?

For this, we must disentangle 2 entirely separate questions which arise concerning sense-data and physical objects.

Berkeley was right in treating the sense-data which constitute our perception of the tree as more or less subjective, in the sense that they depend upon us as much as upon the tree, and would not exist if the tree were not being perceived.

Knowledge By Acquaintance, Knowledge By Description

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Chapter 4 explained that there are 2 sorts of knowledge:

Knowledge of things
Knowledge of truths

This chapter will explain exclusively with knowledge of things which I subdivide into 2:

Knowledge By Acquaintance

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We may therefore sum up as follows what has been said concerning acquaintance with things that exist.

We have acquaintance in sensation with the data of the outer senses, and in introspection with the data of what may be called the inner sense—thoughts, feelings, desires, etc.; we have acquaintance in memory with things which have been data either of the outer senses or of the inner sense. Further, it is probable, though not certain, that we have acquaintance with Self, as that which is aware of things or has desires towards things.

Induction

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In almost all our previous discussions we have been concerned in the attempt to get clear as to our data in the way of knowledge of existence. What things are there in the universe whose existence is known to us owing to our being acquainted with them?

Our Knowledge Of General Principles

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Chapter 6 showed that the principle of induction is necessary to the validity of all arguments based on experience. But it is itself not capable of being proved by experience. Yet it is unhesitatingly believed by everyone, at least in all its concrete applications.

Idealism

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A priori knowledge is not all of the logical kind we have been hitherto considering. Perhaps the most important example of non-logical a priori knowledge is knowledge as to ethical value. I am not speaking of judgements as to what is useful or as to what is virtuous, for such judgements do require empirical premisses; I am speaking of judgements as to the intrinsic desirability of things. If something is useful, it must be useful because it secures some end; the end must, if we have gone far enough, be valuable on its own account, and not merely because it is useful for some further end. Thus all judgements as to what is useful depend upon judgements as to what has value on its own account.

How A Priori Knowledge Is Possible

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Immanuel Kant is generally regarded as the greatest of the modern philosophers.

He lived through the Seven Years War and the French Revolution. But he never interrupted his teaching of philosophy at Königsberg in East Prussia.

Kant's System

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Kant maintained that in all our experience, there are 2 elements to be distinguished:

The one due to the object (i.e. to what we have called the ‘physical object’)
The one due to our own nature.

The physical object is different from the associated sense-data. The sense-data are the result from an interaction between the physical object and ourselves.

The World Of Universals

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Chapter 8 explained that such entities as relations appear to have a being which is in some way different from that of physical objects, and also different from that of minds and from that of sense-data.

Our Knowledge Of Universals

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In regard to one man’s knowledge at a given time, universals, like particulars, may be divided into those known by acquaintance, those known only by description, and those not known either by acquaintance or by description.

Intuitive Knowledge

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There is a common impression that everything that we believe ought to be capable of proof, or at least of being shown to be highly probable. It is felt by many that a belief for which no reason can be given is an unreasonable belief. In the main, this view is just. Almost all our common beliefs are either inferred, or capable of being inferred, from other beliefs which may be regarded as giving the reason for them. As a rule, the reason has been forgotten, or has even never been consciously present to our minds. Few of us ever ask ourselves, for example, what reason there is to suppose the food we are just going to eat will not turn out to be poison. Yet we feel, when challenged, that a perfectly good reason could be found, even if we are not ready with it at the moment. And in this belief we are usually justified.

Truth And Falsehood

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Our knowledge of truths, unlike our knowledge of things, has an opposite, namely error. So far as things are concerned, we may know them or not know them, but there is no positive state of mind which can be described as erroneous knowledge of things, so long, at any rate, as we confine ourselves to knowledge by acquaintance. Whatever we are acquainted with must be something; we may draw wrong inferences from our acquaintance, but the acquaintance itself cannot be deceptive. Thus there is no dualism as regards acquaintance. But as regards knowledge of truths, there is a dualism.

Knowledge, Error, And Probable Opinion

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Some of our beliefs are erroneous. Thus we are led to inquire what certainty we can ever have that such and such a belief is not erroneous. In other words, can we ever know anything at all, or do we merely sometimes by good luck believe what is true? Before we can attack this question, we must, however, first decide what we mean by ‘knowing’, and this question is not so easy as might be supposed.

The Limits Of Philosophical Knowledge

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In all that we have said hitherto concerning philosophy, we have scarcely touched on many matters that occupy a great space in the writings of most philosophers. Most philosophers—or, at any rate, very many—profess to be able to prove, by a priori metaphysical reasoning, such things as the fundamental dogmas of religion, the essential rationality of the universe, the illusoriness of matter, the unreality of all evil, and so on. There can be no doubt that the hope of finding reason to believe such theses as these has been the chief inspiration of many life-long students of philosophy.

The Value Of Philosophy

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What is the value of philosophy and why should it be studied?

It is the more necessary to consider this question, in view of the fact that many men, under the influence of science or of practical affairs, are inclined to doubt whether philosophy is anything better than innocent but useless trifling, hair-splitting distinctions, and controversies on matters concerning which knowledge is impossible.