Knowledge And Probability on Superphysics

Essay On Human Understanding

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

CHAPTER I. KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL

Our Knowledge conversant about our Ideas only.

Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them.

The Degrees Of Our Knowledge

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Of the degrees, or differences in clearness, of our Knowledge: I. Intuitive

All our knowledge consists of the ideas of the mind that it is capable of having.

The different clearness of our knowledge seems to me to lie in the different way of perception the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas.

The Extent Of Human Knowledge

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Extent of our Knowledge.

Knowledge, as has been said, lying in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, it follows from hence, That,

First, it extends no further than we have Ideas.

The Reality Of Knowledge

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Objection. ‘Knowledge placed in our Ideas may be all unreal or chimerical’

I DOUBT not but my reader, by this time, may be apt to think that I have been all this while only building a castle in the air; and be ready to say to me:—

Truth In General

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Truth is a right joining or separating of signs, i.e. either Ideas or Words.

Truth is THE JOINING OR SEPERATING OF SIGNS, AS THE THINGS SIGNIFIED BY THEM DO AGREE OR DISAGREE ONE WITH ANOTHER.

UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS: THEIR TRUTH AND CERTAINTY

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Treating of Words necessary to Knowledge.

THOUGH the examining and judging of ideas by themselves, their names being quite laid aside, be the best and surest way to clear and distinct knowledge: yet, through the prevailing custom of using sounds for ideas, I think it is very seldom practised. Every one may observe how common it is for names to be made use of, instead of the ideas themselves, even when men think and reason within their own breasts; especially if the ideas be very complex, and made up of a great collection of simple ones. This makes the consideration of WORDS and PROPOSITIONS so necessary a part of the Treatise of Knowledge, that it is very hard to speak intelligibly of the one, without explaining the other.

Maxims

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Maxims or Axioms are Self-evident Propositions.

THERE are a sort of propositions, which, under the name of MAXIMS and AXIOMS, have passed for principles of science: and because they are SELF-EVIDENT, have been supposed innate, without that anybody (that I know) ever went about to show the reason and foundation of their clearness or cogency. It may, however, be worth while to inquire into the reason of their evidence, and see whether it be peculiar to them alone; and also to examine how far they influence and govern our other knowledge.

Trifling PROPOSITIONS

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Some Propositions bring no Increase to our Knowledge.

WHETHER the maxims treated of in the foregoing chapter be of that use to real knowledge as is generally supposed, I leave to be considered. This, I think, may confidently be affirmed, That there ARE universal propositions, which, though they be certainly true, yet they add no light to our understanding; bring no increase to our knowledge. Such are—

The Reality Of Knowledge

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OUR THREEFOLD KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE

General Propositions that are certain concern not Existence.

HITHERTO we have only considered the essences of things; which being only abstract ideas, and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular existence, (that being the proper operation of the mind, in abstraction, to consider an idea under no other existence but what it has in the understandings,) gives us no knowledge of real existence at all. Where, by the way, we may take notice, that universal propositions of whose truth or falsehood we can have certain knowledge concern not existence: and further, that all particular affirmations or negations that would not be certain if they were made general, are only concerning existence; they declaring only the accidental union or separation of ideas in things existing, which, in their abstract natures, have no known necessary union or repugnancy.

The Reality Of Knowledge

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OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER THINGS.

Knowledge of the existence of other Finite Beings is to be had only by actual Sensation.

The knowledge of our own being we have by intuition. The existence of a God, reason clearly makes known to us, as has been shown.

The Reality Of Knowledge

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THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge is not got from Maxims.

IT having been the common received opinion amongst men of letters, that MAXIMS were the foundation of all knowledge; and that the sciences were each of them built upon certain PRAECOGNITA, from whence the understanding was to take its rise, and by which it was to conduct itself in its inquiries into the matters belonging to that science, the beaten road of the Schools has been, to lay down in the beginning one or more GENERAL PROPOSITIONS, as foundations whereon to build the knowledge that was to be had of that subject. These doctrines, thus laid down for foundations of any science, were called PRINCIPLES, as the beginnings from which we must set out, and look no further backwards in our inquiries, as we have already observed.

The Reality Of Knowledge

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FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING OUR KNOWLEDGE.

Our Knowledge partly necessary partly voluntary.

Our knowledge, as in other things, so in this, has so great a conformity with our sight, that it is neither wholly necessary, nor wholly voluntary. If our knowledge were altogether necessary, all men’s knowledge would not only be alike, but every man would know all that is knowable; and if it were wholly voluntary, some men so little regard or value it, that they would have extreme little, or none at all. Men that have senses cannot choose but receive some ideas by them; and if they have memory, they cannot but retain some of them; and if they have any distinguishing faculty, cannot but perceive the agreement or disagreement of some of them one with another; as he that has eyes, if he will open them by day, cannot but see some objects, and perceive a difference in them. But though a man with his eyes open in the light, cannot but see, yet there be certain objects which he may choose whether he will turn his eyes to; there may be in his reach a book containing pictures and discourses, capable to delight or instruct him, which yet he may never have the will to open, never take the pains to look into.

Judgement

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Our Knowledge being short, we want something else.

The understanding faculties being given to man, not barely for speculation, but also for the conduct of his life, man would be at a great loss if he had nothing to direct him but what has the certainty of true knowledge. For that being very short and scanty, as we have seen, he would be often utterly in the dark, and in most of the actions of his life, perfectly at a stand, had he nothing to guide him in the absence of clear and certain knowledge. He that will not eat till he has demonstration that it will nourish him; he that will not stir till he infallibly knows the business he goes about will succeed, will have little else to do but to sit still and perish.

Probability

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Probability is the appearance of Agreement upon fallible Proofs.

DEMONSTRATION is the showing the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, by the intervention of one or more proofs, which have a constant, immutable, and visible connexion one with another; so PROBABILITY is nothing but the appearance of such an agreement or disagreement, by the intervention of proofs, whose connexion is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is, or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true or false, rather than the contrary.

Probability

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THE DEGREES OF ASSENT

Our Assent ought to be regulated by the Grounds of Probability.

The grounds of probability we have laid down in the foregoing chapter: as they are the foundations on which our ASSENT is built, so are they also the measure whereby its several degrees are, or ought to be regulated: only we are to take notice, that, whatever grounds of probability there may be, they yet operate no further on the mind which searches after truth, and endeavours to judge right, than they appear; at least, in the first judgment or search that the mind makes.

Faith and Reason

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Necessary to know their boundaries.

It has been above shown, 1. That we are of necessity ignorant, and want knowledge of all sorts, where we want ideas. 2. That we are ignorant, and want rational knowledge, where we want proofs. 3. That we want certain knowledge and certainty, as far as we want clear and determined specific ideas. 4. That we want probability to direct our assent in matters where we have neither knowledge of our own nor testimony of other men to bottom our reason upon. From these things thus premised, I think we may come to lay down THE MEASURES AND BOUNDARIES BETWEEN FAITH AND REASON: the want whereof may possibly have been the cause, if not of great disorders, yet at least of great disputes, and perhaps mistakes in the world. For till it be resolved how far we are to be guided by reason, and how far by faith, we shall in vain dispute, and endeavour to convince one another in matters of religion.

Reason

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Various Significations of the word Reason.

THE word REASON in the English language has different significations: sometimes it is taken for true and clear principles: sometimes for clear and fair deductions from those principles: and sometimes for the cause, and particularly the final cause. But the consideration I shall have of it here is in a signification different from all these; and that is, as it stands for a faculty in man, that faculty whereby man is supposed to be distinguished from beasts, and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them.

Wrong Assent or Error

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Causes of Error, or how men come to give assent contrary to probability.

KNOWLEDGE being to be had only of visible and certain truth, ERROR is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment giving assent to that which is not true.

THE DIVISION OF THE SCIENCES

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Science may be divided into three sorts.

All that can fall within the compass of human understanding, being either, FIRST, the nature of things, as they are in themselves, their relations, and their manner of operation: or, SECONDLY, that which man himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary agent, for the attainment of any end, especially happiness: or, THIRDLY, the ways and means whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of these is attained and communicated; I think science may be divided properly into these three sorts:—